•  
  •  
 

Abstract

The federal constitutional right of an indigent defendant to appointed counsel in state court proceedings derives from two constitutional provisions. First, the sixth amendment, as incorporated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, provides the basis for an absolute right to counsel in criminal prosecutions leading to actual imprisonment. Second, the due process clause, as an independent source of individual rights, provides the basis for the right to counsel in civil proceedings. Both the sixth amendment and the due process rights may be implicated in a hearing for non-payment of a criminal fine. Title 17-A, section 1304 of the Maine Revised Statutes Annotated establishes a procedure for enforcing payment of a criminal fine. Section 1304 authorizes the court to order a convicted person who has defaulted on a fine to appear before the court to show cause why he should not be imprisoned for nonpayment. On the one hand, if the court finds the default excusable, it may allow additional time to pay, reduce the amount, or revoke the unpaid balance altogether. On the other hand, if the court attributes nonpayment to the defendant's "willful refusal to obey the order" or to a "failure to make a good faith effort" to pay the fine, then the court may, in its discretion, order him imprisoned. A recent trilogy of decisions has generated confusion regarding the appropriate method of assessing the right to counsel in a section 1304 hearing. In Colson v. State, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, applied a due process balancing test and held that an indigent defendant sentenced to imprisonment pursuant to section 1304 generally has no right to appointed counsel. The indigent defendant in Colson subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The federal district court applied the same due process balancing test, but disagreed with the result reached by the Law Court. The district court found that "the assistance of counsel is mandated at all section 1304 proceedings.” The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit subsequently upheld the district court's result, but reasoned that the sixth amendment, not the due process clause, governed the right to counsel at section 1304 hearings. The First Circuit did not substantiate its reliance upon the sixth amendment as the basis for its determination. This Comment argues, nonetheless, that the federal appellate court's determination is supported by two independent bases. First, although the section 1304 hearing is not technically a criminal trial, the proceeding resembles a criminal trial in such a manner that the sixth amendment right-to-counsel standard, promulgated by the Supreme Court, guarantees a section 1304 defendant the right to legal representation. Second, since the section 1304 proceeding arises directly from a prior criminal trial and conviction, the hearing constitutes a critical stage of the criminal proceedings to which the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches. This Comment further argues that even if the section 1304 hearing is characterized as a civil proceeding, thus requiring a due process inquiry rather than a sixth amendment analysis, a sentence of imprisonment conclusively establishes a right to counsel without recourse to a due process balancing test. This Comment focuses on the right to counsel in all section 1304 hearings and, like the dissent in Colson v. State, argues that the courts should not distinguish between the sixth amendment and due process rights to counsel in proceedings that result in actual imprisonment.

First Page

117

Download

Share

COinS