One Nation, Under Fraud: A Remonstrance

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ONE NATION, UNDER FRAUD: A REMONSTRANCE

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ABSTRACT

This Remonstrance presents a counter-cultural narrative and analysis of Maine’s legal, political, economic, and social interactions with the Wabanaki people. Although contemporary indicia of abuses by the State are glaringly obvious, a cohesive modern narrative that incorporates Maine’s history of

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predation upon and mistreatment of the tribes has remained poorly defined from an historico-legal perspective. Presenting its analysis through an historic, legal, political, economic, and social nexus, this Remonstrance traces the ontogeny of control exerted by the State of Maine over the Wabanaki tribes and endeavors to excavate the hidden historical narrative of the calculated politico-legal regime that has for two-hundred years driven the State’s coercive policies. In so doing, this Remonstrance examines the economic imperatives of the early American and Maine governments and the outgrowth of policies aimed at generating wealth from the stolen resources of Wabanaki tribal lands through an in-depth analysis of the transcripts of the legislative hearings (referred to here as the “Indian Papers”) that led to the commissioning of the Proctor Report of 1942.

These Indian Papers are undeniable primary evidence memorializing the strategy the State undertook to affect a regime of isolation, control, and elimination of the tribes. The Authors believe that the Indian Papers and other documents analyzed herein have been heretofore neglected as competent evidence of Maine’s conscious orchestration of coercive policies carried out and retroactively legitimized through fraudulent jurisprudence. Through critical analysis, the Authors arrive at the conclusion that not only did the State of Maine have actual knowledge and intent to thrust an illegitimate politico-legal regime of suppression upon the tribes, but—despite acknowledging its past bad acts—it consciously chose to adopt many of these same tactics more than one hundred years later.

INTRODUCTION

“To the living we owe respect, but to the dead we owe only the truth.”

—Voltaire

“All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them.”

—Galileo Galilei

Maine became a state on March 15th, 1820. Five months after Maine became a state, it would sign a treaty with the Penobscot Nation on August 17th, 1820, in Bangor. The Treaty was nearly the same treaty that was signed between the Penobscot Nation and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1818, with the exception that the 1820 Treaty did not provide for the transfer of two acres on the Brewer waterfront to the Penobscot Tribe. The Penobscot Tribe viewed the signing of the Treaty in 1820 as a last effort to survive as a tribe and protect sovereignty in the face of overwhelming odds. Signing meant that the Tribe

3. Id. at 278.
4. Id.
would secure a small bit of land consisting of four townships, the islands in the Penobscot River, as well as their home island—known today as Indian Island.\(^5\) In effect, the Treaty would preserve future generations.

Maine likely saw the signing of the Treaty as the creation of a document not of sovereignty, but of surrender. The ink was not even dry on the Treaty before Maine asserted guardianship over the tribes and treated the Wabanaki people as wards of the State.\(^6\) The State considered the tribes as “pauper[s]” and “imbecil[es]” and proceeded to institutionalize the control it exercised over the tribes through the appointment of Indian agents—government officers purposed as the gatekeepers for all land transactions with the lumber barons, and the treasurers for all funds dispersed to the tribes for their everyday needs.\(^7\) It was in this manner that the agents and State were able to control the tribes and keep them in a state of perpetual poverty—a population of manufactured paupers. Today—two hundred years after the signing of the Treaty—no tribal community in Maine has infrastructure comparable to that of the closest towns, nor do all tribal communities even have access to clean water.\(^8\)

For many Wabanaki people, it has been their lived experience that the tribes have never been able to become economically self-sustaining. Many Wabanaki people grew up in poverty, and the only way out to a better life was to leave the community to find work or to join the military.\(^9\) For many, one question has long lingered: “Why is it that Wabanaki tribes in this State have never gained any sort of economic foothold?” Growing up in an environment of pauperism and excoriation takes a mental toll. Tribal leaders have made every effort to move ahead and improve the lives of their people but always run up against roadblocks. Tribal members have long known there is a reason their people struggled to move forward in a progressive way but have been less able to prove these suspicions. Thus far, the tribes have fought for their sovereign rights in the court systems and in the Maine Legislature, all to no avail.

It was in this atmosphere of two hundred years of utter frustration and despair that the plain truth was laid bare in special transcripts of the 1942 Legislative Research Committee.\(^10\) The words of the state legislators and officials paint a

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5. Id.
7. See Murch v. Tomer, 21 Me. 535, 536–38 (1842) (describing the role of Indian agents in Maine and using the word “imbecility” to describe Maine Indians); Proctor Report, supra note 6, at 8.
10. See An Act Relating to the Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage: Hearing on L.D. 694 Before the Legislative Research Committee, 90th Legis. (1942) [hereinafter MacDonald Testimony] (testimony of Norman W. MacDonald, Director of Social Welfare); An Act Relating to the Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage: Hearing on L.D. 694 Before the Legislative Research Committee, 90th Legis. (1942) [hereinafter Cowan Testimony] (testimony of Frank I. Cowan, Maine Attorney General); Hearing on Ralph W. Proctor’s “Report on Maine Indians,” 90th Legis. (Me. 1942) [hereinafter Proctor Testimony] (testimony of Ralph W. Proctor).
picture of deceit, greed, theft, neglect, isolation, and genocide, answering the question of why the Wabanaki tribes have been unable to gain an economic foothold in Maine. The Wabanaki people are proud, honorable, and brave survivors of attempted genocide. In the spirit of the ancestors who, in 1833, solemnly affixed their marks to a remonstrance protesting the theft of the four townships and the illegal dispossession of their people, this Remonstrance will show it to be a miracle that the Wabanaki are still here—and that there is restitution to be made.

“It does not require many words to speak the truth.”

—Hinmatóowyalahtqit (or “Chief Joseph”)

Maine’s is a history of fraud. Modern empowerment of the once-subaltern narratives of colonized peoples has given rise to common acceptance of an undeniable truth: the history of America is one of brutality, fraud, and conquest. That the United States of America has committed innumerable crimes against the indigenous peoples upon whose land Americans live will come as no surprise to anyone with access to a history book or the internet. But what of the sleepy, seemingly homogenous State of Maine? The depth of the depravity with which Maine—often heralded as a progressive and sometimes even milquetoast state where little happens and little offends—has persecuted the Wabanaki people is largely expunged from public consciousness. It is the aim of the Authors to contribute to a counter-cultural narrative in which critical analysis of the historico-legal and economic discourse of Maine’s abuse of the Wabanaki people can be accurately portrayed and in good faith discussed.

The purpose of this Remonstrance is not to point out the obvious. Nor have the Authors set out to retrace the broadly familiar history of American genocide of indigenous cultures. Todosowould contribute little new intellectual capital to the prevailing discourse. Although we would be remiss not to acknowledge that modern cultural narratives and understanding have been attained at great personal cost to the indigenous people of this continent, the reality is that the story of cultural genocide perpetuated by white European and early American colonists is, broadly speaking, well-defined.

Excepting the work of tribal scholars and historians, much of the taxonomy of the power relations between Maine and the Wabanaki tribes has been anecdotal. Maine’s history of predation upon and mistreatment of the tribes has remained poorly defined. Indeed, while some oral and written histories of Maine’s indigenous people have survived to challenge prevailing Euromeric narratives, modern discourse still lacks a cohesive history tracing the origins, development, and maintenance of the politico-economic power structures weaponized by the State of Maine against the Wabanaki people. Despite the oral and written traditions of a resilient and advanced culture, the preservation remains largely anecdotal.

It is the Authors’ purpose to move beyond the anecdotal and instead engage in a critical analysis that traces the ontogeny of control exerted by the State of Maine over the Wabanaki tribes. Grounding our historical analysis in a recently rediscovered and remarkable written protest by the Penobscot Tribe in its 1833
remonstrance, this piece—which the Authors have styled as a modern remonstrance—seeks to amplify those Wabanaki voices and give these ancestors a modern platform for their unresolved grievances.

By engaging in an historico-legal forensic analysis, this Remonstrance endeavors to excavate the hidden historical narrative of the calculated politico-legal regime that has for two-hundred years driven the State’s coercive policies. In so doing, this Remonstrance examines the economic imperatives of the early American and Maine governments and the outgrowth of policies aimed at generating wealth from the stolen resources of Wabanaki tribal lands through an in-depth analysis of the transcripts of the legislative hearings (referred to here as the “Indian Papers”) that led to the commissioning of the Proctor Report of 1942.11 These Indian Papers, which came to light during the writing of this Remonstrance, are undeniable primary evidence memorializing the strategy the State undertook to affect a regime of isolation, control, and elimination of the tribes. The Authors believe that the Indian Papers and other documents analyzed herein have been heretofore neglected as competent evidence of Maine’s conscious orchestration of coercive policies carried out and retroactively legitimized through fraudulent jurisprudence. Through critical analysis, the Authors arrive at the conclusion that not only did the State of Maine have actual knowledge and intent to thrust an illegitimate politico-legal regime of suppression upon the tribes, but—despite acknowledging its past bad acts—it consciously chose to adopt many of these same tactics more than one hundred years later. Indeed, readers will discover that the recommendations of the Proctor Report are hauntingly reminiscent of the State’s earlier implementation of John G. Deane’s “coercive system” of 1830—purposed to isolate, control, and eliminate the tribes living on coveted Maine timberlands.12

Through novel contextualization of Maine Supreme Judicial Court (Law Court) decisions like *Murch v. Tomer* and *State v. Newell,13* this Remonstrance evidences the depth of politico-legal capital expended as Maine developed an illegal system of predatory colonialist economics which it legitimized through the courts, but which has no valid precedential basis. Serving as a centerpiece of this historico-legal analysis, examination of *Murch* and *Newell*—the twin pillars of Maine Indian jurisprudence—reveals how immediately and for centuries this body of law has fortified themes of non-recognition of tribal sovereignty and a determination to treat the tribes as wards, imbeciles, and paupers. Ultimately arriving at the unavoidable realization that Maine’s political and economic mistreatment of the tribes was done to intentionally dispossess the Wabanaki of their land and resources, this Remonstrance will examine the lineage of governmental policies and legal precedent which, layered atop this historical context, offer a stunning reframing of contemporary assumptions of tribal-state relations.

11. See MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10; Cowan Testimony, supra note 10.
12. Letter from John G. Deane, Esq. to the Governor and Executive Council of the State of Maine (July 20, 1830) [hereinafter Letter from John G. Deane].
This examination arrives at the following two overarching conclusions. First, the State of Maine, acting as a renegade state sovereign in contravention of Congress and for the purpose of financing its fledgling statehood, illegally usurped control of intercourse with the Wabanaki tribes and instituted a system of predatory economics masquerading as law. Second, once tribal resources were depleted, the State of Maine sought to exterminate the Wabanaki in dereliction of its duties pursuant to the Articles of Separation of 1820 because it was economically advantageous to do so.

Set against Maine’s forgotten history as a world economic power during the height of the lumber boom of the mid-nineteenth century,14 this Remonstrance examines the economic imperatives that fueled Maine’s campaigns to divest the tribes of their land, their ancestral claim to the old-growth forests upon which North American expansion was built, and, ultimately, tribal sovereignty.

This Remonstrance concludes with a discussion of the ongoing ramifications of Maine’s predatory politico-legal regime, which continues to limit tribal sovereignty and socio-economic autonomy to this day. Offering ameliorative and restorative alternatives to the current system, this Remonstrance suggests ways in which the State of Maine, through executive and legislative action, can make reparations for the cultural and economic losses suffered by the tribes under its despotic control.

Ultimately, it is the Authors’ intent that the reader come away with a new perspective on tribal-state relations as framed by the historical discourse and politico-legal analysis presented herein. The Authors hope their audience will analyze previously held assumptions and beliefs about Maine’s history and its discourse with the tribes and challenge established narratives that have been assigned to all parties involved.

Nearly two centuries ago, it was said of Maine (once heralded as a political bellwether), “[a]s Maine goes, so goes the nation.”15 Indeed, through the history revealed in this Remonstrance, the reader will recognize that many of the same policies, tactics, and conflicts that plagued American Indian relations during the expansion of the United States were, in fact, first tested in Maine. It is no coincidence, then, that President Andrew Jackson, in his First Annual Message to Congress in 1829—in which he professed that there could be no tribal sovereigns within a sovereign American nation—expressly referenced Maine’s efforts to exercise control over the Penobscot:

There is no constitutional, conventional, or legal provision which allows them less power over the Indians within their borders than is possessed by Maine or New York. Would the people of Maine permit the Penobscot [T]ribe to erect an independent government within their state? And unless they did would it not be the duty of the general government to support them in resisting such a measure?16

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16. President Andrew Jackson, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1829). In his congressional address, President Jackson made an appeal to legislators in favor of what would later
In Maine, where the seeds of systematic control were first sewn, their poisonous legacy flourished for decades. More than one hundred years later, during the height of the Maine Indian land claims in 1980, Governor James Longley would invoke the ghost of President Jackson when he fired a shot across the tribes’ bow, declaring in fiery rhetoric that there could be “no nation within a nation” in Maine.\(^\text{17}\)

Now, some two hundred years after Maine entered the Union as a Free State, it maintains a stranglehold on tribal sovereignty. While the Jacksons and Longleys of the world may have won their goal of an ultimate sovereign, they were only able to achieve their one nation by inhumane and brutal policies aimed at effecting the mass removal of indigenous peoples and theft of native lands.


*So we will tell our own story with our voice*
*So you can hear us*
*So we can shine a light on those dark deeds that were done to us.*\(^\text{18}\)

—Donna M. Loring

**A. The Theft of the Four Townships: Fraudulent Dispossession of the Penobscot People**

It is a familiar yet disturbing history. By 1833, the once boundless, verdant acres of pine forests and riverine valleys in which the Wabanaki people made their home had been relentlessly hewn, transacted, and concentrated down into a handful of diminutive land holdings among the several tribes. The four townships then belonging to the Penobscot Tribe were reserved to them in accordance with an 1818 Treaty with Massachusetts.\(^\text{19}\) It is believed that the first two lower townships—located around the area of Mattawamkeag Point—may have been home to a cultural center seated in a village at the confluence of the Penobscot and...
Mattawamkeag Rivers. The remaining two northern townships, located near present-day Millinocket, afforded the Penobscot easy lake access to their ancestral hunting grounds located in the interior of the River Valley. Considering the immense difficulty that the Wabanaki were experiencing with hunting and trapping in British North America at the hands of the Hudson Bay Company by 1833, access to these ancestral hunting grounds had by this time become vital to their survival. The Penobscot Tribe had little, if any, interest in selling or otherwise dispossessing itself of the four townships. But that did not deter Maine, which was hellbent on acquiring quiet title to as many acres of old growth forests as could be had in an effort to fund a “land lottery” designed to lift the impoverished fledgling state out of near bankruptcy.

To fully understand Maine’s history as an economic dependent of the tribes, it is first necessary to acknowledge that it is a legacy inherited from its progenitor, Massachusetts. In the wake of the American Revolution, the colonies struggled mightily in their infancy as independent territories. Massachusetts, for example, was financially destitute. One 1829 history reflected upon Massachusetts’s financial straits following the Revolution:

[H]er people borne down with the weight of taxes—her treasury empty—her credit that of a bankrupt—her paper currency worth, in the market, scarcely 10 per cent of its normal value—her commerce next to nothing—her utmost exertions barely able to discharge the ordinary expenses of government, in time of peace.

Facing a premature demise, Massachusetts weighed its options. Further taxation—a sore subject among the Americans—was out of the question. In a stunning mimicry of the very imperial regime it had just fought so mightily to overthrow, Massachusetts turned to exploitation of the District of Maine’s “exhaustless merchandi[s]e” of timber for salvation. In the eyes of Massachusetts’s first governor, John Hancock, the millions of acres of unsettled real estate in the District were “just waiting to be turned into desperately needed funds for the new Commonwealth.” Like the cuckoo bird come to roost and deposit its imposter offspring, so too would Massachusetts leech from the lifeblood of its host to survive.

When Maine became a state in 1820, it picked up exactly where Massachusetts had left off—commissioning land surveys and engaging in countless transactions and grants for the purpose of converting its timber resources into economic gain. By 1859, Maine retained a paltry two million of the eight million acres of wilderness lands it had once possessed at its zenith. These holdings were further depleted when, in 1868, the State granted nearly 700,000 acres to the European &

23. MOSES GREENLEAF, A SURVEY OF THE STATE OF MAINE 399 (1829).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 2 JAMES ELLIOTT DEFEOBAUGH, HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY OF AMERICA 29 (1907).
North American Railroad Company—leaving it with a mere 213,880 acres of wild lands left in its control.  

Concurrent with the dizzying expansion of Maine’s lumber industry, the tribes not only had to contend with an increased lumberman presence in their territory, but also suffered lumber pirates, trappers, and hunters as they began encroaching on reservation lands.  

When, in 1829, Penobscot Lieutenant Governor John Neptune appealed to the Maine Legislature to intervene in the encroachment upon tribal lands, lawmakers brazenly responded by authorizing Maine’s Governor to negotiate for the sale of two of the Penobscot Nation’s four townships. It was a stunning and open display of hostility—shocking even by the State’s standards at the time. Rather than addressing the Penobscots’ concerns, the State greedily hijacked Neptune’s appeal as an opportunity to secure territories the State had long coveted given their claimed military significance as artillery access roads leading to the British frontier.

On the heels of its gambit, Maine commissioned one of the most infamous figures in state-tribal history, John G. Deane, to negotiate the purchase of the two lower townships in question. Deane’s mandate was to acquire those two townships with access to an eastern road that had been built from present-day Milford to Greenbush and across the county towards Houlton, which belonged to those territories long claimed to have military significance in securing the international border. More specifically, Maine believed that the Houlton area was of critical importance in Maine’s ongoing efforts to stave off the advancement of British forces in present-day Canada who, despite the Treaty of Ghent, continued to dispute the international boundary—which was readily supplied by the eastern road. These tensions would eventually precipitate the political conflict referred to as the Aroostook War, a misleading moniker given the fact that no active military confrontation took place. It was a war of words in the truest sense, and the perceived military importance of the two lower townships was never legitimized.

Having been authorized by the Legislature to pay any amount necessary to secure the purchase of the two townships, Deane departed to treat with Penobscot
Governor John Attean at Indian Island. Upon arrival, Deane was frustrated to discover that Governor Attean would not negotiate or assent to terms until the Tribe had formed a general assembly. That Deane was surprised and/or dismayed by this was, of course, the product of his own ignorance. It had been common knowledge since the Wabanaki’s first dealings with the Europeans that tribal leaders were not traditionally imbued with absolute decision-making authority on behalf of their people. Rather, “[t]hey exerted authority only so far as their followers were willing to comply with their advice.”

In any event, once the Tribe had gathered, Deane set about negotiating for the purchase of the two townships. In 1830, he wrote: “A long conversation ensued between us in which I endeavored to discover their price, and when I was satisfied they had fixed no price among themselves, I named ten thousand dollars and requested their answer.” Under the leadership of Governor Attean, the Tribe wisely did not assent to these paltry terms, and instead issued a counteroffer amounting to $69,120, based on acreage.

Despite his unlimited purchasing authority, Deane declined on behalf of the State. He departed Indian Island having failed—perhaps purposely, given his carte blanche mandate—in his directive to acquire the two townships. With the benefit of historical hindsight, one must now wonder whether Deane’s refusal to exercise his unlimited purchasing authority was, in fact, purposeful. His letter of July 1830 confirms, at a minimum, that he had actual knowledge that a simple majority of the Tribe was “disposed to sell, and some of them at fifty cents the acre and less.” At the very least, the consequences of his decision (intentional or not) set into motion a cascade of events that would eventually precipitate the fracturing and division of the Penobscot people.

While Deane’s precise motivations for choosing not to exercise his purchase power are likely forever lost to history, the certainty of the words he penned in July 1830 are indisputable. Venturing well beyond the mandate of his commission for a land purchase, Deane took it upon himself to recommend a “coercive system” targeted at subjugating the tribes to state control. Deane’s system advocated for programs designed to keep the tribes stationary throughout the year (i.e., no more migratory hunting), the establishment of State control over tribal affairs, the sale of tribal landholdings to fund state support for the tribes, a conversion from

38. Id. Earlier that year, the Legislature had voted to authorize the Penobscot to sell two of their four townships with funds to be “invested for the benefit” of the tribes, but “no part” paid to them directly. See Urquhart, supra note 22, at 45.
41. Id.
42. Letter from John G. Deane, supra note 12.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
subsistence hunting and gathering to euroagrarian practices, and the division of communally held tribal lands into lots held by individual tribal families.\(^\text{47}\)

It seems clear from these proposed measures—and Occam’s Razor supports the conclusion—that Deane’s and the State’s ultimate purpose was to divest the tribes of their communally-held sovereign lands. By alienating tribal landholdings from the sovereign and putting title into individual hands, the State must have seen a means of eventually facilitating transfer into the hands of white society through transactional assimilation. From a legal perspective, once the lands were under individual ownership, they were held in fee simple and therefore subject to transfer. This is, of course, in diametric opposition to tribal practices in which individual ownership of land was either rare or unpracticed.\(^\text{48}\) It is worth noting that Maine pioneered a system eerily similar to that later adopted and expanded by the federal government under the Dawes Act during its dispossession of the tribes living in Oklahoma.\(^\text{49}\)

Critical contextual analysis of Deane’s “coercive system” lays bare his intent to impose a regime of political, social, and economic control aimed at dispossessing the tribes and, eventually, assimilating them to the point of extinction. Deane was a well-educated man and a graduate of Brown University.\(^\text{50}\) Ostensibly equipped with the intellectual acumen to conceive of the disparity between his knowledge and his recommendations, there can be little dispute as to Deane’s purpose. For, on the eve of dispossessing the tribes of the two townships, Deane had a conversation with a priest who lived among the Penobscot.\(^\text{51}\) In that conversation, Deane acknowledged that the Penobscot were distinct from the mighty Cherokee because, unlike the Cherokee, the Penobscot were still living on their own land.\(^\text{52}\) Deane described the situation of the Penobscot Indians as “peculiar not merely as it relate[d] to the mode in which they ha[d] been treated by the government since the settlement of New England, but as it relate[d] to themselves.”\(^\text{53}\) The peculiarity to which Deane was referring was that, dissimilar to the lion’s share of the eastern tribes that failed in their resistance to dispossession, the Penobscot retained genuine, ancestral title to their lands.\(^\text{54}\)

In the years that followed Deane’s failed attempt to acquire the townships, illegal cutting gangs began to fell timber located on Penobscot islands in the river.\(^\text{55}\) The Penobscot faced an equal threat to their lands from the increasing encroachments of sawmills installed along the length of the Penobscot River as territories were acquired for lumbering activity via sales commissioned by the

\(^{47}\) Id.


\(^{50}\) Wabanaki Windows, supra note 19, at 09:28.

\(^{51}\) Id. at 06:36.

\(^{52}\) See id.

\(^{53}\) Letter from John G. Deane, supra note 12.

\(^{54}\) See Wabanaki Windows, supra note 19, at 06:57.

\(^{55}\) See id. at 30:13.
State’s Indian agents—often without the knowledge or consent of the tribes.\textsuperscript{56} The hunt for “Indian gold”—or, land—was on and in full force. While the State persisted in coveting the four townships under the likely guise of their militaristic importance but surely for their proximity to valuable timberlands, private individuals with criminal designs tried to swindle the tribes out of their timber rights—sometimes even going so far as to impersonate Native American dress and to draft clearly fraudulent documentation of their timber rights.\textsuperscript{57}

By 1833, the State of Maine was tired of waiting. It wanted the issue of the four townships settled once and for all.\textsuperscript{58} The State commissioned yet another envoy to attempt to negotiate a purchase from the Penobscot Tribe and sent lumber baron Amos Roberts—one of eighteen original members of the first commercial lumbering enterprise on the Penobscot River, the Penobscot Boom Corporation\textsuperscript{59}—and his associate, Judge Thomas Bartlett, to acquire “such of the lands belonging to the Penobscot Tribe as they might be disposed to sell.”\textsuperscript{60} Of course, Roberts and Bartlett likely carried with them instructions to see to it that the reluctant Penobscot were disposed to sell all four townships.

What happened next is the subject of much historical conjecture, debate, and disagreement. According to the State, Roberts and Bartlett negotiated the purchase of the four townships for $50,000—a sum paid to the Tribe by bond of the Legislature on June 10, 1833.\textsuperscript{61} No one, including the State or the commissioners, would later claim that this price was fair market value for the land in question—the shared perception on both sides appears to be that it was not.

The Penobscot bemoaned the sale as fraudulent.\textsuperscript{62} Historians today have pieced together the general narrative of what transpired between Roberts, Bartlett, and the Tribe. Rather than taking Deane’s more “diplomatic” approach and negotiating terms, Roberts and Bartlett may have interfered with tribal leadership to fraudulently obtain the signatures of fifteen Penobscot members, including Governor John Attean and Lieutenant Governor John Neptune.\textsuperscript{63} Having acquired


\textsuperscript{57} See Wabanaki Windows, \textit{supra} note 19, at 30:49.

\textsuperscript{58} See URQUHART, \textit{supra} note 22, at 45.

\textsuperscript{59} Alfred Geer Hempstead, The Penobscot Boom and the West Branch of the Penobscot River 3–4 (1930) (M.A. thesis, University of Maine). As a matter of necessity, lumbering required lumberjacks to float logs down the river so that they could be processed, surveyed, purchased, and shipped at a central point of processing. \textit{See generally} 2 D\textsuperscript{E}FEBAUGH, \textit{supra} note 27. Because each log bore a blaze (or owner’s mark) to identify the company who had felled it, lumbermen needed a system for sorting the timber at various checkpoints. Hempstead, \textit{supra}, at 3. The checkpoints—referred to in the industry as booms—were strategically placed along waterways at points where large quantities of timber would accumulate before being passed through—like a riverine highway of sorts. \textit{See generally} 2 D\textsuperscript{E}FEBAUGH, \textit{supra} note 27. In the Penobscot River, the most logical sorting location was a point just above the logs’ final destination at the Old Town sawmill. Hempstead, \textit{supra}, at 3. It was here that the Penobscot Boom was erected. \textit{id}.

\textsuperscript{60} ROLDE, \textit{supra} note 17, at 191.

\textsuperscript{61} Proctor Report, \textit{supra} note 6, at 18.

\textsuperscript{62} See Remonstrance of the Penobscot Tribe (June 18, 1833) (on file at https://digitalmaine.com/native_tribal_docs/50/); URQUHART, \textit{supra} note 22, at 45. A transcript of the original remonstrance of June 1833 is included here as Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{63} See Remonstrance of the Penobscot Tribe, \textit{supra} note 62.
the marks, Roberts and Bartlett returned to Augusta believing and/or professing that they had obtained a legal release of the land, but as this Remonstrance has discussed, Wabanaki cultural practices did not imbue tribal leaders with absolute authority to agree to any such transaction without the consent of a majority of tribal members in a General Meeting.\footnote{64. To date, no tribal law can be enacted unless a general assembly of all tribal members of the tribe have given their assent. This cultural mandate has existed for millennia and certainly predated Euromerican intercourse with the tribes.}

The theft of the four townships, as some of the Penobscots have later referred to it,\footnote{65. The Theft of the Four Penobscot Townships House Hearing and Final Chapter, \textsc{Kennebec J.}, Feb. 7, 1834.} ignited a firestorm of protest from the Tribe. John Neptune traveled to Augusta in the winter of 1833–1834 to lead a delegation for the purposes of delivering unto the Legislature a remonstrance of the allegedly fraudulent transaction. Neptune and the Penobscot Delegation appealed to the Legislature, arguing that the deed to the townships had been procured without the knowledge of consent of the tribe.\footnote{66. Remonstrance of the Penobscot Tribe, \textit{supra} note 62.}

When the Maine Senate convened in January to hear the matter, it considered several documents as evidence of the parties’ claims, including a brief report by Roberts and Bartlett addressed to the State; a motion from the Governor’s Council approving the commissioners’ work; a deed to the land in question bearing the alleged signatures of fifteen Penobscot members; and the Tribe’s Remonstrance which, importantly, was signed by some of the very same names appearing on the deed in question.\footnote{67. \textit{Id.}}

The Penobscot remonstrance that bore the signatures of forty-two tribal members alleged that the commissioners (specifically naming Bartlett and one “Lovejoy,” a party of interest who, like Deane, had previously attempted to purchase the townships) had never explained the true nature of the transaction; that the commissioners had forced the Penobscot signatories to sign the deed under duress; and that the land had been acquired for far less than fair market value.\footnote{68. See \textit{id}. It is worth noting, as further supporting evidence of this widely accepted fact, that the land in question continued to have immense value throughout Maine’s history due to the natural resources located thereon. One of the townships—Township Three—would later act as a keystone to the success of establishing the Great Northern Paper Company in the late 19th century as it sat atop a major hydroelectric power source sufficient to power the paper manufacturer. \textit{See Rolde, supra note 14}, at 279.}

Despite openly acknowledging how ably written the Tribe’s remonstrance was, lawmakers refused to question the integrity of Roberts and Bartlett—even when held against these commissioners’ meager statement of facts. Incensed at a perceived attempt to defame the good name of the commissioners, the Legislature rejected the Penobscots’ plea to withdraw from the sale agreement brokered by Roberts and Bartlett.

\textbf{B. The Lumber Boom and Maine’s Rise to Economic Dominance}

Indian land was the gold of the 19th century. Reflecting thereon, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch once remarked that “the wildest
speculation that has ever prevailed in any part of the United States was in the Timberlands of Maine." Indeed, there is considerable truth to Secretary McCulloch’s observations, given that lumber was at times regarded as legal tender and “would buy any goods and pay any debts.” In the earlier days of its history, Maine—known even to this day as the most heavily forested state in the United States—was overflowing with timber.

The earliest indicator of significant efforts to export timber en masse was in 1816—“the year without a summer”—during which lumber yields reached approximately one million feet of timber processed through Bangor. Yields slowly continued to increase per annum through 1822, at which time Massachusetts lumbermen began to enter the Penobscot River Basin to partake in the “wood rush.” By 1831, lumber mills in present-day Penobscot County yielded approximately thirty million feet of timber. As a stunning indicator of just how abundant Maine’s pine forests were, despite these increases in lumbering, by 1832, there was still merchantable pine standing on the Penobscot River within the present limits of the city of Bangor.

Describing the rapidly changing landscape surrounding Bangor and Old Town at this time, historian Micah Pawling paints a vivid picture of the Penobscot River Valley and the deleterious effects that increased lumbering was having on the environment:

By the 1830s this waterscape, altered by various wing dams, had emerged as the hub of lumbering activities on the largest watershed within the borders of Maine. At the falls, several sawmills hummed with activity as flowing water powered the saws that cut logs into boards, shingles, laths, clapboards, and other wood products for market. Dams and sawmills also impeded canoe travel and deterred anadromous fish from spawning upriver. Moreover, the tons of sawdust discharged into the Penobscot River caused a decline of oxygen levels in the water, further degrading the rich fishery upon which the Penobscots depended for their livelihood. From April to September numerous log booms just north of Old Town Island changed the riverscape into a sea of floating logs as far as the eye could see, forever changing the Penobscot River. Boom piers or cribwork in the river that directed or sorted logs changed the flow of the river, emphasizing one channel over another. The river current, carrying an extra weight that increased its

69. ROLDE, supra note 62, at 232.
70. Id.
72. 2 DEFENBAUGH, supra note 27, at 52.
73. Id.
74. Id. The reader may be interested to note that by the mid-nineteenth century there were already approximately 250 lumber mills along the shores of the Penobscot River alone. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 48, at A-10.
75. 2 DEFENBAUGH, supra note 27, at 52.
force, beached floating timber on the reservation islands, transforming the
shorelines and threatening to separate the Indigenous inhabitants from the river.76

To the tribes, who for thousands of years had been faithful stewards of the land
and its renewable resources, the explosion of industrial activity and the insatiable
appetite of the lumber companies for the consumption of land was apocalyptic.
Such fears are powerfully captured by the accounts of tribal officials during the
early 1830s, published in newspapers of the time. As one example, a
Passamaquoddy Indian attempted to alert the public of the State’s attempts to
satisfy its increasing lust for land through the vigilante actions of its Indian agents:

Why should an agent of the government totally disregard his instructions and
assume the responsibility of managing the property of the Natives as he may
choose? When the present agent came into power . . . [h]e found an account from
the former agent and the trespassers for the value of fifteen hundred dollars . . .
[and evidence that] each year the agent wrote more permits than the law allowed.77

A similar account from the Tribe from around the same period bemoans the
State’s breach of its fiduciary duty to the tribes through its failure to protect and
subsequent regulation of the sale of Native lumber through the Indian agents:

If the Maine Governor intended that the agent shall permit timber to be cut off the
township at will, why is he not instructed to obtain the fair rate for timber on
Indian land? Had the timber cut off the present winter been fairly put into the
market, there would have been $2 to $3 might have been obtained for pine. As
few townships possess greater advantages for logging than this, it being ease of
access at all times, with abundance of hay in the area and having only a short
distance to drive. Had the right course been followed $6000 might have been
raised. The agent may say that the [nine] oxen teams and cutters are nearly all
trespassers without permits. If the agent had visited the area early in the year he
could have stopped the trespass. If all the transactions of the agent be laid before
the State Governor and his council, it is believed that a different exhibition would
be presented than now it appears. It is hoped that the property may be secured for
the native Passamaquoddy Tribe.78

It is worth pointing out that, once again, the failure of the State to honor its
fiduciary duty to the Passamaquoddy Tribe was a precursor to the federal
government’s failure to honor its fiduciary duties to the tribes.79

76. Micah A. Pawling, A “Labyrinth of Uncertainties” - Penobscot River Islands, Land
Assignments, and Indigenous Women Proprietors in Nineteenth-Century Maine, 42 AM.
77. SOCTOMAH, supra note 56, at 98.
78. Id. at 98–99.
79. Maine’s willful breach of its fiduciary duty to the tribes was later emulated by the federal
government when the Bureau of Indian Affairs mismanaged and failed to properly provide an
accounting of land allotments and interests held in trust for the benefit of the tribes and members thereof
(leasing tracts with valuable timber and mineral mining rights for far less than market value). See
Cobell v. Salazar, No. 1:96CV01285 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 7, 2009). The tribes were successful in levying a
class action lawsuit in which the federal government ended up having to remit approximately $1.5
billion for breach of fiduciary duty. Class Action Settlement Agreement at 6, Cobell v. Salazar, No.
There seemed to be no corner of Indian land that the State either had not claimed, stolen, purchased, or leased away against the tribes’ protests. Indeed, not even the grass atop the increasingly barren islands was safe, as Indian agents began leasing rights to lumbermen for conversion to hay to feed their draft animals during winter operations.

Maine’s liquidation of its public land holdings—many of which had originally been reserved under the state constitution for the benefit of education and religious organizations—was proof positive that if the lumber industry were to continue to grow (and Maine to continue to be an economic force), access to more land was necessary. At a time when Bangor was being touted as a “star on the edge of night,” the State had no plans to allow the barons—and therefore Maine’s economy—to fail.

So, in 1842, Maine began its campaign to push and facilitate the privatization and commodification of its public lands. By act of the Legislature, control was taken from the land agents and handed over to county commissioners who were, three years later, authorized to grant permits to cut timber on the reserved lots and in unincorporated townships.

Maine was precariously balancing many spinning plates in the air. It was likely desperate to sustain the lumber boom which had been a boon to settlement of the northern counties; the barons apparently thirsted for legal channels to consume as much land as possible; and the Penobscot Tribe—divided since the theft of the four townships—continued to see their lands alienated under predatory economic policies and gambits. Maine must have felt an increasing panic and need, not only to open channels for further dispossession of what little tribal lands remained, but more importantly to lend legitimacy to its past bad acts. As Maine struggled to keep the boom alive, the powers at hand embarked upon a quest to sow the seeds of an illegitimate lineage of legal precedent to support their empire. It marked the beginning of a system of predatory economics masquerading as law.

II. A CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF MAINE INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE

A. Predatory Economics Masquerading as Law: The Toxic Precedent
Set by Murch v. Tomer (1842)

“You whites make all the ammunition.”

—Mahpiya-lúta (or “Chief Red Cloud”)

Incident to its push to privatize, Maine had a serious problem when it came to the tribes: they did not want to sell their land. Despite the seemingly indomitable will of the tribes to retain possession of what little lands they retained, private

81. See Urquhart, supra note 22, at 72–74.
82. Id. at 72; Rolde, supra note 14, at 235.
83. See Urquhart, supra note 22, at 74.
landowners in Maine—particularly those living in riverine townships in the vicinity of the islands—expressed a desire for purchasing tribal riverine lands. Despite efforts by the 4th Legislature to fund the purchase of said islands by passing a resolve to fund the tribes’ dispossession, the tribes held strong and the resolve remained unexecuted. It is against this historical background that a Penobscot man named Peol Tomer set into motion events that would ripple throughout time as the foundation for Maine’s toxic Indian jurisprudence.

The Law Court’s 1842 decision in *Murch v. Tomer* is perhaps facially innocuous. Indeed, even as recently as 2015, some legal scholars have heralded *Murch* as a protectorate of Maine’s supposed guarantee of Lockeian natural rights. In truth, however, *Murch* is a case that, when critically examined, quickly reveals itself to be one in which the Law Court grossly abused its discretion by traveling well beyond the justiciable controversy before it and, in so doing, relied upon a judicial fiction to create precedent deleterious to tribal sovereignty. At the same time that *Murch* supposedly conveyed Lockeian rights upon tribal members, it minimized Native Americans’ ability to exercise those rights, claiming that they suffer from “[i]mbecility.”

*Murch* is problematic not simply because it is of the ilk of *Korematsu* or *Plessy*, but because it serves as a toxic progenitor to the later-described and highly injurious *Newell* case. Serving as the foundation of all future Maine Indian jurisprudence, *Murch* is the bad seed from which would forever grow fruit of the poisonous tree.

1. Facts and Background

*Murch* is strange in that there is very little surviving contextual detail to describe exactly why and how the parties ended up before Chief Justice Ezekiel Whitman and the Law Court. What is apparent is that the case is based upon a dispute over a promissory note executed by Peol Tomer and tendered to Charles Murch. No description of Murch is given, nor does the opinion specify the terms of the note. Only by reviewing the handwritten case file were the Authors able to determine that Tomer’s note was executed on April 13, 1837, to one Charles Murch of Passadumkeag, in the amount of $32.50. It is strange that a legal action would be taken against Tomer both in light of his status as a Tribal Representative (all of whose costs were expensed to the State) and since all debts incurred by tribal members for necessary expenses were paid by the State through a voucher system.

84. Id. at 18.
87. *Murch*, 21 Me. at 538.
88. Id. at 535.
Although this history lends some confidence to the correct identity of Tomer, little is known about Murch. That Murch sought enforcement of Tomer’s note is never explicitly stated or confirmed and must be inferred by the legal status of the parties. Further, the Authors were able to discern little to nothing about Murch personally.

Despite the gaps inherent in Murch, the unknown information is largely irrelevant. Given the Law Court’s grave departure from the subject matter of the case, it makes little difference whether Murch was about a promissory note against land or a contract for the purchase of a mere peppercorn.

2. Procedural Posture

From the opinion, the Authors similarly derive precious little information about the procedural posture of Murch. The Authors have learned that Tomer (defined as “an Indian of the Penobscot Tribe”) was represented by “Cony & Sewall”—ostensibly a law firm or two co-counselors.91 Murch was represented by “J. Appleton and Randall.”92 Apparently, upon Murch’s complaint to Tomer, Tomer’s attorneys furnished no defense.93 Pre-suit, the parties agreed to stipulated facts stating that the action was upon a note signed by Tomer and “that [Tomer] was at the time of signing it, and still is, an Indian of the Penobscot Tribe.”94 Lastly, the parties stipulated as to an application of law, agreeing that “if action could be maintained against the defendant, he being an Indian as aforesaid, he was to be defaulted; and if not, the plaintiff was to become nonsuit.”95 By consent of counsel, Murch was originally continued nisi under an agreement that it should be decided upon the submission of briefs to the Law Court.96 Neither counsel, however, submitted briefs, and the matter was brought before the Law Court with written arguments never having been made.97

3. Holding and Analysis

At issue in Murch—by stipulation of the parties—was whether Tomer “by his reason of being [an] Indian” could enter into legal contracts and therefore be held liable for breach upon the same.98

At the outset, Chief Justice Whitman dove headlong into a discourse on natural rights and whether Native Americans are endowed with the absolute title to their ancestral lands.99 In so doing, he concluded that although the Native Americans were legally dispossessed by European colonization, the U.S. Constitution contemplates that they might be voters if taxed and, therefore, should not differ from American citizens:

91. Murch, 21 Me. at 535.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 535–37.
The aborigines of this country were its ancient proprietors. But, emigrants from Europe having obtained a foothold here, and having increased in numbers, till their power had greatly transcended that of the natives, they at length assumed entire control over them: till it has become settled law, that even the territory and soil of the small districts, to which they are now reduced, in their occupation, is not absolutely theirs in fee. They are prohibited from alienating: and even the use and improvement is not left to their entire control . . . . Our constitution seems to contemplate that, under certain circumstances, they may become voters at our elections. It only excludes such from voting, as are not taxed: thereby implying, if taxed, that they may be voters. Our constitution moreover says that “all men shall be born equally free and independent” . . . why then, should an Indian differ from that of other individuals born and reared upon our own soils?  

Relying on the State’s establishment of Indian agents for the management of Indian property, Chief Justice Whitman inferred that control thereof was only intended to be exerted over real estate and not personal property of tribal members.  

Without citing precedent to support his conclusions, Chief Justice Whitman declared that although Indians might be considered citizens with rights incident to ownership and contracting of personal property, they are “imbecili[c]” and incapable of possessing natural rights to own and govern their land as a collective sovereign:

Although endowed with the attributes belonging to our species, and in fact, a portion of the human race, and born within our borders, and by the terms of our constitution having seemingly an inalienable right to the acquisition and control of property; yet, as a people, and as it were nationally and collectively, they are treated, and perhaps necessarily so to a certain extent at least, as having none of those attributes. Imbecility on their part, and the dictates of humanity on ours, have necessarily prescribed to them their subjection to our paternal control; in disregard of some, at least, of abstract principles of the rights of man. To the extent to which our laws go in abridging them of their supposed natural right, ordinarily incident to the ownership of property, we must consider them individually and collectively as under our tutelage. As the regulations before stated are in derogation of personal rights, however, we must not ex-tend them beyond what is obviously prescribed.

Essentially, Chief Justice Whitman concluded that tribal lands are “individually and collectively . . . under the tutelage” of the State of Maine. A clear abruption of then-contemporary federal precedent, Murch runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s opinions expressed in what has become known as the Marshall trilogy.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 537.
102. Id. at 538.
103. Id.
104. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (holding that aboriginal title was extinguished by the doctrine of discovery); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (holding that tribal nations are not foreign states within the meaning of Article III of the U.S. Constitution); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding that states do not have jurisdiction on tribal lands).
Chief Justice Whitman’s opinion is problematic for several reasons. First, he several times referred to the state constitution but made no mention of Maine’s obligations incident to the 1820 Treaty just twenty-one years earlier.\textsuperscript{105} Acknowledgement of such would show, as would the Maine Indian Land Claims Settlement nearly 140 years later, that entertaining the Articles of Separation and the 1820 Treaty in the first place was, at a bare minimum, a tacit recognition of tribal sovereignty.\textsuperscript{106} But the analysis goes deeper. Prior to his career as Chief Justice, Whitman was a representative to Congress for the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{107} A federalist, legal scholar, and member of the very framers who drafted the Maine Constitution,\textsuperscript{108} Chief Justice Whitman was doubtless aware of Maine’s obligations incident to the Articles of Separation as they pertained to the tribes. Indeed, even if it could be contended that Chief Justice Whitman was actually somehow ignorant of this fact based on personal experience alone, he would have had no excuse for overlooking the treaty obligations included in the text of the Maine Constitution as published just one year prior in 1841.\textsuperscript{109}

In basing his largely contradictory analysis on pseudo-citizenship rights (inclusive of the right to own private property and enter into contracts) held against a distinct class of rights incident to tribal sovereignty, Chief Justice Whitman leaves exposed the house of cards atop which the Law Court’s logic rests. Put plainly, the issue in \textit{Murch}—whether Tomer could be held liable on the promissory note—did not require an analysis of his status as a tribal member any more than it would have if Tomer was a foreign national. Chief Justice Whitman created a legal fiction by making this the central issue of the case and failing to correct the bizarre stipulation of the parties.

Similarly irregular were the actions of Tomer’s counsel. Why, if it was common knowledge that the Tribe had been a party to a treaty just twenty-one years earlier and, therefore, was cloaked with the recognition of sovereignty, would Tomer’s attorneys argue that his status as an Indian somehow bore on his ability to make a valid contract? Would not they have agreed that a Frenchman or Canadian had the ability to enter into transactions of foreign commerce? Furthermore, what of the fact that the State of Maine—incident to its treaty obligations assumed from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts—paid for tribal members’ food and living expenses? Given this, it makes little sense why Tomer—both a Penobscot Indian and a Tribal Representative—would enter litigation over a promissory note when, in fact, the State voucher system providing for necessary expenses of tribal members would have paid the amount in controversy.

It begs the question of whether \textit{Murch} was set up with a question that did not need to be answered for the purpose of engaging in a predetermined discourse serving the instrumental ends of the State and its political elite. This, of course, is further supported by the fact that the \textit{Murch} Court fails even to provide an

\textsuperscript{105} See \textit{Murch}, 21 Me. at 537–38.

\textsuperscript{106} See generally Maine Indian Claims Settlement of 1980, 30 M.R.S. §§ 6201–6214.


\textsuperscript{108} Id.

\textsuperscript{109} See ME. CONST., art. X, § 5 (1841).

enumerated remedy to Murch after finding in his favor.\textsuperscript{110} It is as if once the precedent was set, nothing else mattered.

That \textit{Murch} appears to have been predicated upon a legal fiction for the purposes of manipulating the judicial system for the establishment of a concocted precedent to serve State interests supports the theory that this was nothing more than predatory economics masquerading as law. In hindsight, \textit{Murch} almost serves the State’s dual imperatives, to degrade tribal sovereignty and liquidate land, too perfectly to be pure coincidence.

By 1842, Maine lusted to acquire as much land as possible to feed the lumber boom.\textsuperscript{111} Despite significant interest by the State and local municipalities in acquiring the Penobscot’s islands in the river, the Tribe had been uninterested in selling. It would be a shocking coincidence if \textit{Murch} and its mandate for legitimizing the alienation and subsequent liquidation of tribal lands held by tribal members just so happened to coincide with the State’s push for privatization of lands. The far more likely reality is that \textit{Murch} almost serves the State’s dual imperatives, to degrade tribal sovereignty and liquidate land, too perfectly to be pure coincidence. By 1842, Maine lusted to acquire as much land as possible to feed the lumber boom.\textsuperscript{111} Despite significant interest by the State and local municipalities in acquiring the Penobscot’s islands in the river, the Tribe had been uninterested in selling. It would be a shocking coincidence if \textit{Murch} and its mandate for legitimizing the alienation and subsequent liquidation of tribal lands held by tribal members just so happened to coincide with the State’s push for privatization of lands. The far more likely reality is that \textit{Murch} almost serves the State’s dual imperatives, to degrade tribal sovereignty and liquidate land, too perfectly to be pure coincidence.

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Not only is \textit{Murch} based upon a legal fiction, but it is an irrational decision that confuses the legal capacity thrust upon the tribes by the State. At the signing of the 1820 Treaty, Maine endeavored to establish a guardianship relationship with the tribes, with the State serving as guardian and the tribes as wards.\textsuperscript{112} Seeming to acknowledge this, Chief Justice Whitman’s “although endowed” soliloquy recognizes tribal members as individuals with natural rights incident to owning property while, in the same breath, designating tribal nations—those sovereign bodies comprised of these same tribal members to which he just prescribed property rights—as incompetent.\textsuperscript{113} The illogical conclusion of \textit{Murch} can be so stated: when tribal members own land and property as individuals, they inherently have capacity, but tribal nations—being collective children and wards—lack the same. \textit{Murch} thus impermissibly created a floating standard for capacity that is at odds with the State’s then-perceived relationship with the tribes. According to \textit{Murch}, tribal members had sufficient capacity to contract, but their body politic, being wards of the State, collectively lacked the same.\textsuperscript{114} These determinations of capacity are logically at odds.


\textsuperscript{110} See \textit{Murch}, 21 Me. at 538.

\textsuperscript{111} See, e.g., \textit{Urquhart}, supra note 22, at 72.

\textsuperscript{112} See \textit{Treat}, supra note 2.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Murch}, 21 Me. at 538.

\textsuperscript{114} See id.

\textsuperscript{115} Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in \textit{19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: RETIREMENT SERIES 660} (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2023); see also \textit{SUZAN SHOWN HARJO, NATION TO NATION: TREATIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS} 73 (2014). In a letter bemoaning the opinion, Thomas Jefferson complained bitterly that the
breaking point when he made a simple contract claim an investigation of the nature of Indians’ Lockean natural rights, Chief Justice Whitman and the Murch Court were legislating from the bench. The decision both promoted the State’s interest in divesting individual tribal members of their land and eroded sovereignty by putting the rights of the individual above the community, all the while outright disregarding federal Indian law, ignoring the sovereign status accorded to tribal governments, laying the foundation for the further erosion of federal Indian law, and creating their own Indian jurisprudence culminating in the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act (MICSA) in 1980—a devastating piece of legislation designed to further isolate, control, and eliminate the tribes by, inter alia, making them the legal equivalent of a municipality.  

As damaging as Murch was for the tribes, its true destructive force would not be felt until fifty years later, when it would serve as foundational precedent for Newell—the most hostile case in Maine Indian jurisprudence.

B. Stranger Than (Legal) Fiction: The Curious Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh—Analogue of Fraud or Stunning Coincidence?

As a matter of both fact and finding, comparisons between Murch and the infamous Supreme Court decision in M’Intosh are warranted given the similarities shared by these two cases. From a factual standpoint, both Murch and M’Intosh are Indian law cases that adjudicate the rights of Native Americans having transacted with non-tribal citizens. In reaching this issue, however, both M’Intosh and Murch had to widely “travel[] out[side] of [the] case,” as Jefferson put it. Neither the M’Intosh nor Murch court was presented with the legal question of whether Native Americans have a right to transact, but both courts nevertheless hacked out a rough path to reach this analysis. In the case of M’Intosh, modern legal scholars have


116. See generally Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (1980) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.). MICSA is a pariah in the world of American Indian law, as it imposes a quasi-municipal status upon the tribes, rather than adopting/implementing the standard nation-to-nation acknowledgements between the sovereign federal government, states, and tribes located elsewhere in the United States. For example, the Supreme Court, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, characterized indigenous tribes as “domestic dependent nations.” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 1, 2 (1831); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559–60 (1832) (“The words ‘treaty’ and ‘nation’ are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense.”).

117. It is, perhaps, interesting to note that the United States would also follow the Murch Court’s lead. By Act of March 3, 1875, the Homestead Act was amended so that “Indians abandoning tribal relations were given right of homestead, though not permitted to dispose of the land until after five years from issuance of the patent, retaining, however, a tribal interest in annuities and other funds.” 1 JAMES ELLIOTT Defebaugh, HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY OF AMERICA 385 (2d ed. 1906).

118. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, supra note 115.

119. See supra Section II.A.3.
identified several facts tending to prove that the case was a sham, consciously and
purposely staged to facilitate a contrived holding.¹²⁰

Far less discussed than the Supreme Court precedent set in M’Intosh, forensic
legal analysis of Murch is nevertheless indicative of similar fraudulent roots. Modern critical analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in M’Intosh offers a potentially eye-opening cause for comparison to Murch and, startlingly, anecdotal

evidence suggesting that, like M’Intosh, Murch was decided on fraudulent grounds.

A cornerstone of American property law, M’Intosh was founded upon a
dispute between two American landowners who had been deeded what the parties
alleged was the same plot of land.¹²¹ The controversy at hand arose when one party
obtained title as conveyed to him by the British Crown prior to the American
Revolution.¹²² The other obtained title as sold to him in a direct transaction with
the Piankeshaw Tribe living in Virginia.¹²³ Despite what appears, facially, to be a
competent controversy between two landowners, contemporary analysis of history
of the legal proceedings in M’Intosh supports the conclusion that the supposed
dispute between the two parties was “collusive and manufactured.”¹²⁴

There is a growing body of legal scholarship that supports the M’Intosh fraud
theory. One such scholar, Professor Eric Kades, claims that even without diving
into a complex analysis of the case, it is clear that it has fraudulent roots.¹²⁵
According to Kades, it was quite literally impossible that the two landowners in
M’Intosh could have had a dispute over a single contested parcel of land when, in
fact, the two deeds at issue were for two distinct tracts of land more than fifty miles
apart from one another.¹²⁶ Fellow legal scholar Lindsay G. Robertson also
contends that “Johnson v. M’Intosh was the result of the two sides committing a
fraud upon the Court.”¹²⁷

Ultimately, Robertson’s thesis that M’Intosh was a fabrication is borne out by
historical procedural fact. Attorney Robert Goodloe Harper—hired to represent
the interests of the land companies—did contrive an agreed upon statement of facts
to direct and constrain the justiciable controversies before the Court; Harper did
employ fellow attorney Daniel Webster as co-counsel in this matter and, together,
they hired the defense attorneys; and arguing before the Court, Harper and Webster
did employ a beneficent façade recognizing indigenous land rights as a means of
shuffling the Court along to their desired controversy.¹²⁸ But for Chief Justice
Marshall’s other plans, Harper’s fraudulent case clearly would have succeeded,
given his success in setting up the issue before the Court. His downfall was in
failing to anticipate the ways in which a rogue Chief Justice might use the
contrived case to meet his own instrumental ends. This was a valuable lesson for

¹²⁰ See, e.g., STEVEN T. NEWCOMB, PAGANS IN THE PROMISED LAND: DECODING THE DOCTRINE OF
¹²² Id. at 547.
¹²³ Id. at 548–58.
¹²⁴ NEWCOMB, supra note 120, at 73–74.
¹²⁵ See id. at 74.
¹²⁶ See id.
¹²⁷ Id.
¹²⁸ Id.
Harper, as well as for Webster, who would later pop up at a most curious time in Maine jurisprudence.

Having drawn upon the forensic analysis of Robertson, the comparative analysis with *Murch* yields stark similarities between the two cases that are eerily reflective of one another. First and foremost, like in *M'Intosh*, the parties in *Murch* agreed to a stipulated statement of fact that had direct bearing on the justiciable controversy before the Court. Dated “Jan. of the year 1841,” the Stipulated Statement of Fact reads:

Charles Murch vs. Peol Tomer  
Dist Court- Eastern Dis  
Jan. of the year 1841

In the above action the parties agree to the following statement of facts—the action is on a note of hand by the defendant and payable to the plaintiff. The defendant is an Indian of the Penobscot Tribe—if the defendant is not liable to the action in consequence of him being an Indian, and if he can take the objection at this time in any form of pleading, then the plaintiff agrees to become nonsuit, the endorser of the writ out of the holding, otherwise the defendant agrees to be defaulted.

Here, counsel for both parties—including those for Tomer, who were under a fiduciary duty to protect his legal interests—established the factual and legal parameters around which the case would be decided: the defendant was an Indian, and whether or not he had defaulted on his promissory note was dependent thereon. In a shocking concession of their client’s legal rights reminiscent of the contrived stipulations in *M'Intosh*, counsel for Tomer constrained itself to arguing and defending on one issue, forgoing the entire universe of potential alternative defenses that might have prevailed.

It is worth noting that, at the same time, the attorneys for the parties in *Murch* were coming to their agreement, Webster was prominent and active in the Maine Bar. Around this same time period, Webster was not only licensed to practice law in Maine, but he partook in high-profile land rights cases bearing on tracts coveted by the lumber barons and once under the protection of the tribes. As an example, around this time, Webster represented General Samuel Veazie in a claim brought by the law firm Wadleigh and Purinton and even conducted direct examination of John Neptune. Perhaps more notably, however, was Webster’s presence in Maine during 1842—the same year *Murch* was decided.

During the period of time that the Aroostook War was being waged on paper against the English in British-occupied Canada (it being a war of words), Webster was called upon to represent the United States in settling the international boundary in northern Maine. Together with Alexander Baring of England, Webster negotiated what later became known as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. Of course, Webster’s involvement in this, as in *M'Intosh*, is not immune from

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130. Id.
131. See Rolde, supra note 17, at 219.
132. See Urquhart, supra note 22, at 32, 69.
133. See id. at 69; Webster-Ashburton Treaty, U.K.-U.S., Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572.
speculation that his dealings were less than transparent. During negotiations and at a time when Webster was having immense difficulty getting Americans to support a compromise with Britain, there was a "fortuitous discovery... of a map that purported to show a boundary line drawn by Benjamin Franklin during the Paris peace talks in 1783 that helped assuage American feelings." Following this miraculous discovery, the Webster-Ashburton Treaty was signed in August 1842. Just two months prior, counsel for the parties in *Murch* agreed to continue proceedings *nisi* so that the case could "be argued in writing."

It is here that the confluence of Maine lumbering history, counsel’s reliance upon stipulated facts, and Webster’s prominence in the Maine Bar during 1842 forms a compelling nexus of incentive and resulting policy: in the face of an expanding industry and demand for timber, Maine needed to open up any lands it could, including those held by the tribes or individuals thereof. Indeed, “[i]n 1842, pine was still the lumberman’s prize, and Maine was the last place in the Northeast where it grew in commercially viable stands.”

"They were long gone from the state’s southern forests, but up north woodsmen could find the immense trunks of old and in wonderful quantity. Only the border dispute had prevented them from being exploited with confidence [by Maine].”

*Murch*, having been decided during this fateful year, fell directly in tandem with the signing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty—the certainty gained therefrom “uncorked a flood of optimism” in speculation and began to reverse a declining trend in land sales, “which had reached a nadir the prior year.” Indeed, the same summer the treaty was signed, Maine saw a flurry of “advertisements for saws, axes, and other woods-related stuff fill[] the pages of Bangor’s broadsheets.”

The Authors do not take the position that that the similarities between *M’Intosh* and *Murch* offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt that *Murch* was a fraudulent case. However, the Authors believe that *Murch*, like *M’Intosh*, bears several of the hallmarks of a manufactured case designed to set the stage for contrived precedent. Especially in light of the intimate connections with Webster, Maine’s land situation, and the timing of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, the Authors certainly suggest that, like *M’Intosh*, *Murch* is deserving of an analysis as thorough as Robertson’s.

C. Intervening Years: Shifting Economics, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and the Pauper Myth (1843–1892)

"Poverty is the worst form of violence."

—Mahatma Gandhi

138. Id.
139. Id. at 73.
140. Id.
The Murch decision punctuates a period of tribal history in which the Native American population in Maine was facing two converging threats to their continued existence: environmental destruction and dispossession. Together, these interrelated forces had a crippling effect on the tribes’ ability to continue practicing sustenance hunting and gathering and sustainable living. The tribes were forced to conform to a Euroagrarian construct of farming and industrialization or else face starvation. It was a false choice: assimilate or die.

1. Dispossession and Economic Assimilation by Force

When Maine became a state in 1820, it was agreed that the millions of acres of untamed wilderness lands that covered the region should become the “joint property of both” Maine and Massachusetts. Through this division, Maine came into possession of as many as seven million acres of wild woodlands. As the need for expansion onto public lands was fueled by unchecked lumbering, Maine desperately wanted to acquire additional lands within its borders. So, in 1853, the State purchased all remaining land within its borders from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for a sum of $362,500.

Though Maine had immediately liquidated some public lands to secure funding for its young government during the earliest stages of its statehood, it began to truly accelerate divestment efforts in the mid-19th century. Previously, lands had been used as an analogue to a bank loan, with the State financing political and infrastructural projects with land grants and sales:

Indeed, lacking money, the State was led in its early days to secure the things it desired by the grant and sale of its lands, the income from which, for many years, constituted its largest source of revenue. As an example of this policy, which later generations have not hesitated to characterize as wasteful, it is interesting to know that the construction of the State House was largely paid for with State lands, the Legislature providing for the sale of twelve townships, the proceeds of which were to be devoted to this purpose.

Such efforts were so lucrative that not only was the State able to fund governmental infrastructure projects, but funds were also channeled into promoting the settlement and industrialization of socio-economic centers like Bangor. Seemingly overnight, lumbering towns exploded in population size. For example, Bangor, regarded as a bastion of wealth and industry at this time, drew frequent comparisons to sister cities like New York and Boston in regard to its majesty.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 2 DEFEBAUGH, supra note 27, at 28.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. ROLDE, supra note 14, at 232.
150. Id.
The State—once heralded as home to “exhaustless” timber resources—had either sold into private hands or permitted the clearcutting of nearly all of its public lands.\textsuperscript{151} Having unwisely parted with nearly all of this land, Maine was largely held by private owners in immense tracts, often comprising one or more townships.\textsuperscript{152}

The effect of dispossession appears to have been two-fold. First, dispossession and industrialization of ancestral lands led to a drastic and accelerated shift in tribal cultural practices.\textsuperscript{153} People who were historically sustainable sustenance hunters and gatherers were no longer able to live a traditional life.\textsuperscript{154} This, in turn, forced the tribes to participate in the colonizers’ foreign economics, in which they were afforded little opportunity to succeed.\textsuperscript{155} Second, having taken nearly every acre of the tribes’ ancestral lands, and not able to further dispossess them, the State’s actions point to a regime of socio-legal policies aimed at keeping the tribes financially dependent while at the same time executing an attack on tribal sovereignty in an attempt to skirt treaty obligations and get the tribes off the State’s payroll.

\textbf{2. Environmental Crises and the Hypocrisy of Pauperism}

Dispossessed of nearly all of their ancestral land holdings, the tribes began expanding into white settlements across the state.\textsuperscript{156} In so doing, the tribes were less following white expansion than they were attempting to maintain ties to advantageous ecological sites discovered and stewarded by their ancestors for centuries.\textsuperscript{157} There was, however, some imperative to intersperse among the white settlements as a means of survival. In the face of unduly restrictive State hunting, fishing, and trapping laws, the Wabanaki people were unable to practice traditional means of sustenance.\textsuperscript{158} By force, the tribal populations became increasingly dependent on currency and commercial foodstuffs consumed by the Americans.\textsuperscript{159} In an effort to earn a living in this alien economy, tribal members worked as hunting and fishing guides, laborers, lumberjacks and log drivers, seasonal farmers, basket makers and craftsmen, canoe builders, and even traveling Indian doctors practiced in naturopathy and herbal remedies.\textsuperscript{160}

Further limiting the tribes’ ability to practice their traditional, sustainable lifestyle was the proliferation of lumber booms during the second quarter of the 19th century, which destroyed ancestral fisheries at Old Town and below the islands.\textsuperscript{161} Species that once swam in abundant numbers such as salmon, shad, and

\begin{footnotesize}
151. \textit{Urquhart}, \textit{supra} note 22, at 3, 96.
152. \textit{2 Defebaugh}, \textit{supra} note 27, at 25.
154. \textit{Id.}
155. \textit{Id.} at 12, 21.
156. \textit{Id.} at 21.
157. \textit{See id.}
158. \textit{See id.}
159. \textit{See id.} at 12, 21.
160. \textit{Id.}
\end{footnotesize}
alewives no longer engaged in migratory spawning in the Penobscot River.\textsuperscript{162} Concurrently, deforestation and the increasing presence of humans encroaching ancestral hunting grounds precipitated a decline in moose and deer populations.\textsuperscript{163}

The tribes made some efforts to incorporate agrarian methods into their traditional means of survival, but met challenges in this as well. Following John Attean’s example of planting a corn field at Mattawamkeag Point, many Penobscots tried their hand at farming on the islands, but spring flooding and invasive species—like the roaming cattle of the lumber teams—made the riverine environment hostile to their efforts.\textsuperscript{164}

In the face of the environmental crises befalling them, many indigenous families were likely “anxious to leave the crowds of laborers and the log jams, human filth, and thick sawdust polluting their river, not to mention the screaming saws that destroyed the serenity of their island home.”\textsuperscript{165} It was around this same time that many tribal communities began making increased voyages to ancestral coastal holdings in the Mount Desert Island region which, by this time, was beginning to take hold as a destination among the Americans.\textsuperscript{166} Here, the Indians would sell baskets or medicines.\textsuperscript{167} Perhaps most importantly, they would be free from the constant pressures of the “industrialization surrounding them at Indian Island and, to a lesser extent, Pleasant Point.”\textsuperscript{168}

Struggling to integrate into the white economy due to the paucity of opportunities and institutional and societal pressures of racism opposing them, the tribes fell into deep poverty—inflicted, as it was, by the State’s dispossession of their lands and interference with their sustenance.\textsuperscript{169}

By 1852, the cascade of events that had bankrupted the tribes began to take on a new narrative. No longer did white Americans blame cultural differences for the impoverished state of the Native Americans, but instead it was “native slothfulness” that was to blame.\textsuperscript{170} According to an 1852 Governor’s Report on Indian Affairs, the tribes were destined to remain “in a condition bordering on pauperism... until their habits have been changed.”\textsuperscript{171} Though the State (and its progenitor, Massachusetts)—and not the tribes—had been paupers from their inception, the proliferation of the pauper myth of the Native American had begun to spread like wildfire. No one seemed to notice that, in fact, it was the State leeching from tribal resources, and not the tribes leeching from the State.

By 1878, the lumber business—as a whole, regardless of species felled—began to die down, resulting in yields in 1906 of just sixteen million feet per

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{162}] See id. at 33:55.
\item[\textsuperscript{163}] See id.
\item[\textsuperscript{164}] See id.
\item[\textsuperscript{165}] McBride & Prins, supra note 29, at 13.
\item[\textsuperscript{166}] See id. at 13–14.
\item[\textsuperscript{167}] Id.
\item[\textsuperscript{168}] Id. at 14.
\item[\textsuperscript{169}] AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 48, at A-21.
\item[\textsuperscript{170}] Rolde, supra note 17, at 283.
\item[\textsuperscript{171}] Id.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
It was this—the death of Maine’s golden economic years—that precipitated attempts to extinguish the tribes altogether.

Through fabrication of the pauper narrative, the State attempted to legitimize its efforts to dump the tribes from its payrolls by dissolving tribal sovereignty and subsequent assimilation. Maine’s campaign was one of misinformation and unjust characterization of the tribes as paupers when, quite oppositely, it was Maine who had always been the pauper—dipping into tribal funds and stealing to further engorge itself and expand.

In an astoundingly hypocritical and shameless perversion of the public narrative, the duality of tribal versus state self-sufficiency was turned on its head. In retrospect, this miscarriage of truth is brazen in its unabashed falseness. Somehow, the State succeeded in portraying itself as a beneficent guardian of the “poor, slothful” Indians when, in fact, the tribes were and always had been the economic donor class that carried the endless waves of Euromerician paupers. Without having stolen tribal lands, Massachusetts and Maine would never have survived the economic hardships that retarded their growth in infancy.

D. Genocide in the Courtroom: State v. Newell and the Law Court’s Assault upon Tribal Sovereignty (1892)

“And I can see that something else died there in the bloody mud, and was buried in the blizzard. A people’s dream died there. It was a beautiful dream.”

—Heȟáka Sápa (or “Black Elk”)

In this time of economic decline of the lumber industry, the Law Court found before it a perfect opportunity to end its treaty obligations to the Wabanaki Tribes, thus eliminating thousands of dollars in annual payments.

Exactly fifty years after the Law Court’s decision in *Murch*, a seemingly innocuous hunting trip shared between two Passamaquoddy tribal members would precipitate the most caustic jurisprudence ever authored by the Maine judiciary. An attempted death blow to the recognition of tribal sovereignty in Maine, the Law Court’s 1892 ruling in *State v. Newell* set into motion a cascade of case law that, over the years, would erode indigenous rights.174 Belonging to the same class of infamous decisions as *Korematsu*, *Dred Scott*, and *Plessy*, *Newell* is an unapologetic assault upon the sovereignty of the tribes in Maine and an attempt to illegally cancel the treaty obligations of the State thereto.

Despite the *Newell* Court’s genocidal and racist intentions, perhaps the most incredulous legacy it leaves is that it is still lawful precedent. A shameful

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172. 2 Defebaugh, supra note 27, at 83.
174. See, e.g., *Stevens v. Thatcher*, 91 Me. 70, 70, 39 A. 282, 283 (1897).
176. See *Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that enslaved people were property).
177. See *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing the “separate but equal” doctrine).
miscarriage of justice, Newell is an embarrassment to Maine jurisprudence that not only mars the legacy of the Law Court so long as it remains good law, but continues to have deleterious effects on tribal sovereignty.

1. Facts and Background

In the winter of 1891, Peter Newell and Joseph Gabriel—both members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe at Peter Dana Point (Indian Township)—readied their gear and set out to go hunting.178

They shot two deer that fateful day—January 14, 1891.179 Unbeknownst to either of the hunters, the killing of these two deer would soon turn out to be perhaps the most consequential event in the history of Wabanaki Tribes in Maine.

Whether known to the two hunters or not, Newell’s and Gabriel’s deer were, in fact, taken during what is referred to as “closed season”—a period of time in which certain game may not be legally hunted, as regulated by State fisheries and wildlife laws.180

Following the hunt, Newell was issued a summons while on reservation land.181 He was indicted and arraigned for killing two deer in violation of state law.182 At his arraignment, Newell’s attorney entered a guilty plea and offered the affirmative defense that, by way of Newell’s status as a member of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, “he had a lawful right” to do so by reason of the treaties of 1713, 1717, 1725, 1727, 1749, 1752, 1780, and 1794 between the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the English Crown or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the hunting privileges reserved to the tribes thereunder.183 In other words, Newell acknowledged that he had taken the two animals, but argued that he had a lawful right to do so by reason of the treaties between his tribe and Massachusetts.184 At Newell’s arraignment, the parties agreed to petition the Law Court for review of the matter.185

A bit of historical context on the parties involved in the Newell case bears discussion. Just eight months after being indicted, Peter Newell was elected Chief of the Passamaquoddy Tribe at Indian Township on September 30, 1891.186 The presiding Chief Justice of the Law Court at this time was John A. Peters.187 The son of a lumber merchant from Ellsworth, Maine, Peters was a Yale educated attorney and member of the secretive Skull and Bones society.188 Upon his return

178. See Newell, 84 Me. at 466, 24 A. at 943; Rolde, supra note 17, at 252.
179. See Newell, 84 Me. at 466, 24 A. at 943; Rolde, supra note 17, at 252.
180. See Newell, 84 Me. at 466, 24 A. at 943; Rolde, supra note 17, at 252.
182. See Newell, 84 Me. at 466, 24 A. at 943.
183. Id.
184. Rolde, supra note 17, at 253.
185. Id.
186. Soctomah, supra note 181.
to Maine, Peters initially served as a State Senator from 1862–1863 before holding office as Attorney General from 1864–1866. In 1867, Peters was elected to serve in the U.S. Congress, where he was a member until 1873, thereafter returning to Maine to serve as a judge. A decade later, Peters’s jurisprudential career reached its peak when he was appointed as Chief Justice of the Court—a position he held from 1883 until his resignation in 1900.

Given the focus of this Remonstrance and the depth into which its Authors have examined the political and socio-economic repercussions of Maine’s lumber industry, it will be of great interest to note that Chief Justice Peters’s second wife, Fannie E. Roberts, was the daughter of infamous Maine lumber baron Amos Roberts—of the theft of the four townships. To state that Chief Justice Peters’s immediate family had a vested interest in the vitality of the Maine lumber industry is perhaps an overly modest characterization. That Newell quickly devolved from a criminal matter bearing upon the killing of two deer in a closed season into a full-on assault of tribal sovereignty by means of treaty rights recognition is concerning, if not entirely unexpected. As was the case in Murch, it very much felt as though the deck was stacked against the tribes from the very beginning.

2. Holding and Analysis

Writing on behalf of a unanimous Court (with one justice abstained), Justice Lucillius Emery (who would later serve as the Court’s Chief Justice) spared little time departing from the criminal matter at hand in favor of a more expansive discourse regarding tribal sovereignty. Although the justiciable controversy before the Court might readily have been resolved by a facial reading of the hunting statute or the treaties in question, the Court instead endeavored to cloak itself with the authority to determine, de novo, what constituted an Indian Tribe.

The Court dedicates two sentences to discussing the underlying criminal matter:

The defendant admittedly killed two deer in this State contrary to the form, letter and spirit of the statute for the preservation of deer and other game animals. The only matter of fact he interposes in defense is, that he is an Indian, one of the Passamaquoddy tribe, a tribe living on and near Lewey’s Island in the eastern part of the State.

Having so stated the most basic of facts and Newell’s affirmative defense, the Court immediately dove headlong into a dialectic analysis of the status of Native American tribes in general, comparing those in the east with those in the west:

189. Peters, John Andrew, supra note 187.
190. Id.
191. Id.
193. NORMAN L. BASSETT, REPORT OF THE MAINE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION FOR 1920 AND 1921 244 (1921).
194. Newell, 84 Me. at 466, 24 A. at 943–44.
195. Id. at 466, 24 A. at 943.
Whatever the status of the Indian tribes in the west may be, all the Indians of whatever tribe, remaining in Massachusetts and M[aine] have always been regarded by those States and by the United States as bound by the laws of the State in which they live.\footnote{Id. at 466, 24 A. at 943 (emphasis omitted). This statement, of course, is complete fallacy. There were, in fact, no “western tribes” under the jurisdiction of the United States of America at the time that the federal government established its relationships with indigenous populations pursuant to Article I, Section VIII of the Constitution—establishing sole authority to treat with the tribes—and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, vesting in Congress the sole authority to transact with the tribes.}

The fallacy of this statement is exposed by an examination of the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution was drafted in May of 1787 and ratified in July of 1789. At the time of ratification, Article I, Section VIII gave the U.S. Congress sole authority to regulate affairs among the tribes in the United States.\footnote{U.S. Const., art. I, § VIII.} Western tribes were not contemplated by this section because they were not even in the United States until the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and annexation of Mexican lands in 1848.\footnote{Louisiana Purchase Treaty, Fr.-U.S., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.} Contrary to Justice Emery’s assertion, the U.S. Constitution always considered the eastern tribes as falling under federal—not state—jurisdiction, because they were the only tribes living within the geographic boundaries of the United States at the time the Constitution was written.

Citing Murch as direct authority, the Court disingenuously expanded the holding thereof as an access point for reaching a question not before the Court: “how are the Indian tribes regarded in Maine?” Although the Court then embarked upon analyses of the treaties, the exercise was entirely illusory given its ultimate determination:

> Whatever may have been the original force and obligation of these treaties, they are now functus officio. One party to them, the Indians, have wholly lost their political organization and their political existence. There has been no continuity or succession of political life and power. There is no mention in the treaties of a tribe called “Passamaquoddy,” and we cannot say that these present Indians are the successors in territory, or power, of any tribe named in the treaties, or are their natural descendants.\footnote{Newell, 84 Me. at 467, 24 A. at 944.}

It would seem, after all, that the Court found little purpose in its own academic dissection, given its determination that the treaties did not, in fact, apply to any Maine tribes still in existence. Justifying this finding, the Court writes:

> Though these Indians are still spoken of as the “Passamaquoddy Tribe,” and perhaps consider themselves a tribe, they have for many years been without a tribal organization in any political sense. They cannot make war or peace, cannot make treaties; cannot make laws; cannot punish crime; cannot administer even civil justice among themselves. Their political and civil rights can be enforced only in the courts of the State; what tribal organization they may have is for tenure of property and the holding of privileges under the laws of the State. They are as completely subject to the State as any other inhabitants can be. They cannot now
invoke treaties made centuries ago with Indians whose political organization was in full and acknowledged vigor.200

The Court delivered its final blow to tribal identity (and thus sovereignty) in its interpretation of the applicability of the most recent treaty—the Treaty of 1794 and that which, importantly, was the last to reserve the then-present-day holdings to the Passamaquoddy Tribe:

What the report calls “the treaty of 1794,” was simply a grant by the commonwealth to the Passamaquoddy tribe of Indians of certain lands and the privilege of fishing in the Schoodic river, in consideration of their releasing all claims to other lands in the commonwealth. Clearly the defendant gains no right to hunt under that grant.201

In an unabashed miscarriage of judicial restraint and respect for the separation of powers of government, the 1892 Law Court attempted to deliver a death blow to the tribes, invalidating nearly two centuries’ worth of treaty agreements and laying waste to the agency of the tribes to articulate meaningful defenses to attacks on their sovereignty over the greater part of the next century. Newell is highly problematic for a multitude of reasons. First, it is a direct and grave violation of the terms of the Articles of Separation,202 in which Maine

200. Id. at 468, 24 A. at 944.
201. Id., 24 A. at 944.
202. An Act Relating to the Separation of the District of Maine from Massachusetts Proper, and Forming the Same into a Separate and Independent State, ch. 161, 1819 Mass. Acts 248–60. With Congress’s blessing, the Articles of Separation provided for the establishment of an independent Maine. Under the Articles, Massachusetts bequeathed unto Maine some eleven million acres of public lands to which it had previously held title in the District. See Urquhart, supra note 22, at 42; see also Rolde, supra note 14, at 227. The reader should understand that beginning at Maine’s inception in 1820 through 1871, the Articles of Separation and the treaty agreements thereto were published as a pretext to the Maine State Constitution. Although contemporary publications of Maine’s Constitution no longer contain the printed text of these treaty agreements, they remain in full effect per the original Articles. Me. Const. art. X, § 5. The original language of the Articles relating to the Commonwealth’s treaty obligations to the tribes read:

The new State shall, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made for that purpose, assume and perform all the duties and obligations of this Commonwealth, towards the Indians within said District of Maine, whether the same arise from treaties, or otherwise; and for this purpose shall obtain the assent of said Indians, and their release to this Commonwealth of claims and stipulations arising under the treaty at present existing between the said Commonwealth and said Indians; and as an indemnification to such new State, therefor, this Commonwealth, when such arrangements shall be completed, and the said duties and obligations assumed, shall pay to said new State, the value of thirty thousand dollars, in manner following, viz.: The said Commissioners shall set off by metes and bounds, so much of any part of the land, within the said District, falling to this Commonwealth, in the division of the public lands, hereinafter provided for, as in their estimation shall be of the value of thirty thousand dollars; and this Commonwealth shall, thereupon, assign the same to the said new State, or in lieu thereof, may pay the sum of thirty thousand dollars at its election; which election of the said Commonwealth, shall be made within one year from the time that notice of the doings of the Commissioners, on this subject, shall be made known to the Governor and Council; and if not made within that time, the election shall be with the new State.
expressly recognized and adopted several of the treaties discussed in Newell. As such, Newell is not only a toxic miscarriage of justice, but it is also an illegal decision properly characterized as a contravention of the highest law of the land.

Also of great concern is the Law Court’s lack of judicial integrity in following the spirit and letter of the law. Not only did the Newell Court violate the Maine Constitution with its decision, but it abandoned established principles regarding veracious application of *stare decisis* and faithful adherence to good-faith principles of logic and reason. Put plainly, it is as if the Newell Court was content with its thinly veiled attempts to make it up as it went along. For example, the interpolation that the tribes had enjoyed “no continuity or succession of political life and power” is both false and an absurdity.\(^{203}\) Not only had recognition of the tribes and tribal membership served as the literal basis for the Law Court’s logic in *Murch*, but even the most cursory review of contemporary legislative reports would have revealed otherwise. One such report—the 1860 Report from Indian agent James A. Purinton of Old Town—dated December 15, 1860, documents that Maine was still paying treaty obligations to the tribes.\(^{204}\)

Another article—this from the wife of Passamaquoddy Indian agent W. Wallace Brown, recounts that despite the discontinuation of some traditional cultural and political practices within the Tribe, not all long-practiced rites and procedures had been replaced:

> The government is a tribal assembly, composed of chief, subordinate chief, (potoo-us-win), captains, and councilors. The latter are appointed by the chief from among the old men of the tribe. They do not make the law for the law is usage transmitted by tradition. They settle all manner of dispute by the decision of the majority, receiving the chief’s sanction.\(^{205}\)

Although the learned Law Court might not have had the benefit of electronic databases or the internet at the time it decided Newell, it certainly had access to contemporary publications and, more importantly, legislative materials. Given that the sole objective of the Law Court is to apply the Maine Constitution and the laws of the State in resolving appellate cases, one would hazard to guess that said justices had a fast and loose relationship with legal research. A more discerning perspective, however—and that held by the Authors—is that this judicial activism was purposeful.

The finality of the Law Court’s decree being what it was at the time, Newell entered the world as a piece of shameful revisionist judicial activism aimed at eradicating the very existence of the ancient Wabanaki civilization. Importantly, it is a decision which amounts to a one-sided argument by a governmental body purposed to be an impartial arbiter of objective justice. It is, though, the toxic legacy of Newell that is perhaps its most poisonous attribute. Stacked atop the fraudulent *Murch* decision, Newell is the crown jewel of the house of cards that is Maine Indian law. Newell stands on nothing, yet stands for everything when it

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203. *Newell*, 84 Me. at 468, 24 A. at 944.


comes to the subsequent lineage of cases that have vitiated tribal sovereignty throughout the ensuing decades. In the words of Donald Soctomah, Passamaquoddy tribal historian and former Tribal Representative to the Maine Legislature, the precedent set by Newell would set off a cascade effect that propelled the tribes into what he called “the Invisible Years” between 1890–1920.206

The deplorable living conditions suffered by the residents of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy reservations in the mid-20th century provide a stark case study illustrative of Soctomah’s Invisible Years. In 1934, Dr. Gladys Tantaquidgeon—then a young Mohegan woman working at the Bureau of Indian Affairs—visited the reservations in Maine, recording her observations of the unsanitary and inhumane conditions.207 Sent by Commissioner John Collier to report on the general state of the Penobscots and Passamaquoddy, Tantaquidgeon visited Indian Island and found the residents to be in a state of utter despair.208 Tantaquidgeon was horrified to discover that the State had condemned the Tribe’s wells and was subsequently derelict in any attempt to restore or provide a source of potable drinking water.209 Tantaquidgeon learned that the Tribe had only managed to survive by retrieving ice during the winter months, storing it, and melting it down.210 Compounding the health threats posed by a lack of clean drinking water was the fact that the Tribe was without a working sewage system.211

Traveling east, Tantaquidgeon found conditions equally deplorable at the Passamaquoddy reservations. Living among ramshackle shelters and failing structures was a malnourished and diseased population plagued by childhood malnutrition, tuberculosis, and venereal disease.212 Tantaquidgeon learned that as much as 95% of the Passamaquoddy relied on “relief notes” to survive, and it was a near universal practice for families to sleep on floors covered with threadbare coats, for want of proper beds.213

The Invisible Years were long and difficult. It would be another eight years after Tantaquidgeon’s visit to Maine before the State’s greed and desire to stop paying meager aid to the tribes would set into motion publication of the Proctor Report, thus bringing the tribes back into the spotlight.

3. Considerations

That Newell remains valid precedent is an embarrassment to Maine jurisprudence. That it has not yet gone the route of similarly abhorrent decisions like Korematsu, Plessy, and Dred Scott is an embarrassment for the Court. But this does not have to be the case. In fact, there are plenty of considerations which, if

206. See SOCTOMAH, supra note 56, at 98–99.
207. ROLDE, supra note 17, at 269.
208. See id. at 270.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 271.
applied by an informed court seeking to restitute the grave harms effected by Newell, could provide fertile grounds for a reversal of course.

For example, the Law Court lacked jurisdictional authority to issue rulings interpreting treaties with Native American nations.\textsuperscript{214} It had no authority to determine what constituted and how to legally define a tribe (typically the province of the federal government). Neither did it have authority to determine tribal membership. Nor was it imbued with the power to assess whether a tribe may invoke treaty obligations. In truth, the Law Court had no more authority to interpret or enforce tribal treaties than it would the Paris Accord.

It would be an understatement to suggest that the Law Court, sitting in 1892, was merely ill-equipped to decide these questions even if it somehow could manufacture judicial authority. It outright lacked the authority to do so. For example, in interpreting the 1794 Treaty, the Newell Court concluded that the Passamaquoddy Tribe—setting aside for a moment its belief that the tribe did not exist—could not hunt on its own land because hunting was not expressly mentioned in the land grants thereunder.\textsuperscript{215} This begs the question: what is a land treaty if not the grant of land for something in return?

In addition to questions of jurisdiction, authority, and competence, there are also considerations borne out by contemporary historico-legal analysis. As anthropologist Darren Ranco, Ph.D., has opined, the Maine Constitution contemplates a dichotomy of tribal-state relations that is far afield of that put into practice.\textsuperscript{216} Referencing the “Indians not taxed” language included in the Constitution of the State of Maine, Dr. Ranco theorizes that it “recognizes . . . they are not a part of the public and the republic of the U.S. and State of Maine in that context.”\textsuperscript{217} The importance of harnessing the insight afforded by contemporary social, economic, and political study cannot be understated and, by example of Dr. Ranco’s analysis, may even be revelatory in presenting modern courts with the necessary perspective to revisit foundational legal documents and principles that have been misconstrued for centuries.

Of course, context always matters and only through thoughtful application of these analyses can our society function in a just and equitable manner. For, as Dr. Ranco acknowledges, even though the “Indians not taxed” language is properly

\textsuperscript{214} Premised upon the constitutional authority vested in Congress pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, U.S. \textsc{Const}. art. VI, and federal jurisdiction over treaties, U.S. \textsc{Const}. art. II, \S\ 2, the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Worcester v. Georgia} is illustrative of this point:

The [\textsc{C}onstitution, by declaring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among the powers who are capable of making treaties . . . . The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force . . . . The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation is, by our \textsc{Constitution} and laws, vested in the Government of the United States.


\textsuperscript{215} State v. Newell, 84 Me. 465, 465, 24 A 943, 944 (1892).

\textsuperscript{216} Wabanaki Windows, supra note 19, at 02:45.

\textsuperscript{217} Id.
interpreted as a recognition of tribal sovereignty, it is in many ways a “double-edged sword.” According to Dr. Ranco, while this language recognizes tribal sovereignty, it “allows for a category of ‘racialized otherness’ for the State to really treat Indians as second-class citizens, as a racialized group not deserving of a full set of rights and also therefore ignoring any kind of promises that are embedded, for example, in the Articles of Separation . . . and treaties.”

III. THE INDIAN PAPERS: MAINE’S OWN NIXON TAPES

A. A Legislative Discourse of “Squaws,” “Freaks of Nature,” and “Paupers”

“But when the President does it, that means that it is not illegal.”

—Richard M. Nixon

1. LD 694: An Act Relating to Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage

On the afternoon of July 28, 1942, members of the Joint Legislative Research Committee gathered at the State House in Augusta, Maine. On the docket for consideration that day was L.D. 694, “An Act Relating to Loss of Membership in Indian Tribes by Marriage.” Sponsored by Senator George W. Chamberlain and touted as “an attempt backed up by the Indians in general to try and limit membership in the tribes,” L.D. 694 stripped tribal membership from Penobscot and Passamaquoddy women who married non-tribal partners:

If any woman who is a member of the tribe marries a man who is neither a member of the tribe nor eligible for membership therein she shall forfeit her membership in the tribe and shall not be eligible for adoption into the tribe during the period of such marriage. All provisions of this section shall apply to the Passamaquoddy tribe of Indians as well as to the Penobscot tribe, and such persons shall be subject to removal from the tribal reservations as provided in sections 261 and 291 of this chapter.

It is incomprehensible that the Maine Legislature thought itself empowered to determine who is and who is not a tribal member. Even the federal government, which has a constitutional mandate to regulate relations with the tribes, has never claimed the authority to determine tribal membership. Indeed, as the Indian Child Welfare Act would subsequently acknowledge, the ability to determine tribal membership is the ability to eradicate the tribe.

218. Id. at 05:11.
219. Id.
220. See MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10.
221. Id. at 2.
222. L.D. 694 (90th Legis. 1942).
223. This maxim finds its genesis in the testimony of Chief Calvin Isaac of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw. In Chief Isaac’s testimony before the United States Senate’s Select Committee on Indian Affairs, considering the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977, he said the following:
Earlier that year, when L.D. 694 was initially presented to the 90th Legislature, lawmakers were flummoxed to discover that tribal laws already provided a system limiting title transfers of reservation land between tribal members.\textsuperscript{224} Although these tribal laws were distinct from L.D. 694’s express purpose of vitiating membership on the basis of marriage, the revelation apparently generated confusion among legislators about the nature of the State’s relationship with the tribes, the laws applicable thereto, and the history behind tribal-state relations.

The Legislature referred the matter to the Research Committee for clarification. In response, the Research Committee appointed Maine Attorney Donald W. Webber as Special Counsel.\textsuperscript{225} Special Counsel Webber—who eleven years later, in 1953, would take a seat as a justice on the Maine Supreme Judicial Court—had previously served the Legislature as a legal advisor to the Joint Special Session Investigative Committee.\textsuperscript{226} Upon assessing the bill in question and the uncertainty of legislators as to Maine’s entire “Indian situation,” Special Counsel Webber concluded that it would be a waste of legislative resources to “spend very much time just on [L.D. 694] unless we might be considering at the same time some of the broader aspects of the whole Indian situation in Maine.”\textsuperscript{227} Special Counsel Webber proposed that the Research Committee convene to discuss both the bill and Maine’s “Indian situation.”\textsuperscript{228}

2. MacDonald and Cowan Testimony Before the Legislative Research Committee (1942)

Special Counsel Webber convened the Legislative Research Committee panel on July 28, 1942, at two o’clock in the afternoon.\textsuperscript{229} After welcoming those in attendance—an audience which consisted of members of both the State House and Senate—Special Counsel Webber again explained the nature of business to be discussed.\textsuperscript{230} He disclosed that he had ordered a contemporaneous record of the proceedings “simply because in considering so many different problems none of us can retain this stuff in our minds.”\textsuperscript{231} Despite this, however, Special Counsel

\textsuperscript{[c]}ulturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their people. Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut the tribes’ ability to continue as self-governing communities. Probably in no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially and culturally determinative as family relationships.

\textit{The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S. 1214 before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 157 (1977)} (statement of Chief Calvin Isaac, Mississippi Band of Choctaw).

\textsuperscript{224} MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10, at 2–3.

\textsuperscript{225} Final Report of the Legislative Research Committee for 1941–42 to the 91st Legislature 3 (Dec. 1, 1942) [hereinafter Final Report of the Legislative Research Committee].

\textsuperscript{226} Id.

\textsuperscript{227} MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10, at 1.

\textsuperscript{228} Legis. Rec. 1400 (1941); MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10, at 38.

\textsuperscript{229} MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10, at 1.

\textsuperscript{230} Id.

\textsuperscript{231} Id. In hindsight, this administrative directive by Special Counsel Webber had the effect of essentially creating a time capsule, for which the Authors are supremely grateful. Without Special
Webber reminded lawmakers and officials that he had no intention “to confine [them] to the record at all” and offered free reign to discuss matters off the record as requested.  

First to testify was Norman W. MacDonald, Director of Social Welfare for the State of Maine. Special Counsel Webber invited MacDonald to educate the Committee as to the background of L.D. 694, and to offer the Department of Health and Welfare’s official position on its soundness. MacDonald began his testimony by explaining that L.D. 694 arose out of an attempt to limit tribal membership, which he claimed was “backed up by the Indians in general.” MacDonald recounted the Legislature’s inability to reconcile the proposed law with existing tribal and state regulations on title transfers of reservation lands. He added that there was resistance from “certain members” of the tribal communities who “did not want to be deprived of their property right through marriage.” Ultimately, MacDonald expressed his belief that the bill’s marriage mandate would “limit membership in the tribe to persons who are actual Indians” as opposed to “our present laws which could result in . . . no full-blooded Indians or half-blooded Indians even.”

State Representative and Republican Floor Leader, Walter Mayo Payson of Portland, interjected, focusing on what he referred to as the “fundamental proposition” of “what was the situation with relation to these tribes? [Were] they practically people on the State payroll, state-supported and state-sponsored?” MacDonald’s response was to point to the original treaty obligations of the State of Massachusetts, which were absorbed and assented to by the State of Maine in the Articles of Separation, concurrent with its admission to statehood in 1820. Representative Payson rebuffed MacDonald; he explained that he was not interested in what the treaties provided for but what the practical effect was. In Representative Payson’s words, he wanted to know what the “actual situation” with regard to State expenditures for supporting the tribes was.

MacDonald’s answer—that Maine was spending approximately $48,000 per annum to support the Penobscot Tribe—prompted a deluge of questions about whether and how tribal members worked to support themselves. The discussion then moved to whether the treaties had memorialized land transfer agreements between the tribes and Maine or Massachusetts. Committee Chair and State Counsel Webber’s record of the proceedings of the Legislative Research Committee on L.D. 694, much of the critically important context of the Proctor Report and its place in Maine history would be lost.

232. Id.
233. Id. at 2; Sen. & House Reg. 2 (89th Me. Legis. 1939). In 1933, the Maine Department of Health and Welfare was given general supervisory authority of the tribes. P.L. 1933, ch. 1, § 241.
234. MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10, at 1–2.
235. Id. at 2.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 4.
238. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 5.
Senator Robert B. Dow addressed the question directly, asking of the tribes’ assent to treaty terms: “Do they agree to give us the rest of Maine if we will give them some reservations?”

The Research Committee had now strayed from discussion of the bill, and MacDonald began explaining Maine’s history of land transactions with the tribes, including the “purchase[]” of the four townships from the Penobscot Tribe in 1833.

Special Counsel Webber refocused the Committee, asking MacDonald whether the Department favored L.D. 694. To this, MacDonald responded by noting his concerns that the bill might unfairly deprive tribal members of their lawful property without consideration. When asked, however, if the Department favored the bill “insofar as [it] prevent[ed] the addition of further white blood into the picture,” MacDonald replied “yes.”

Having come to a consensus on the propriety of the underlying aims of L.D. 694, the Committee began discussing how to amend the bill so as to ameliorate any unjust deprivation of tribal property rights. To this end, MacDonald suggested a provisional period—perhaps ten years—in which tribal members could liquidate their holdings or, alternatively, a system to allow the State to purchase and hold title to the land. After much debate about what a state acquisition program might look like, Representative Payson again interjected: how did any of this get the tribes off state support programs? It did not, confessed MacDonald, who agreed that the bill was “not a means of solving the problem of supporting the Indians.”

From there, the discussion devolved into a cacophony of uninformed conjecture and confusion. The real impetus for L.D. 694 was laid bare: there was considerable concern that “[s]ome degraded white men . . . would marry Indian women and live on the reservation” at the expense of and “[o]n the bounty of the State.” Chairman Dow inquired which was more prevalent, “white men marrying squaws, or vice versa.” Indian agent Flagg Cummings’s contribution was an anecdote of a “quite ugly” and “bossy” white man who had “married an Indian girl,” had eleven children, and “liv[ed] on the reservation [while] the State support[ed] his family.” With this, MacDonald concurred that “[o]f course, they are not very high class white men that marry in there.”

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244. Id. at 7. This was a tacit admission that the State occupied land still belonging to the tribes, which would come to bear in the Maine Indian Land Claims litigation.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 8.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 9.
250. Id. at 11.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 31 (statement of Roy S. Libby, State Representative).
253. Id. (statement of Robert B. Dow, State Senator and Legislative Research Committee Chair).
254. Id. at 14.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 14–15.
was the uncontrolled expansion of “pauper support,”\textsuperscript{257} that MacDonald stated “[was] a real problem.”\textsuperscript{258}

What followed in the Committee’s discourse was a disturbing dialogue in which the members laid bare their aspirations to dissolve the tribes in Maine. At one point, Representative Payson inquired about “segregating these people and keeping them intact as a separate people,”\textsuperscript{259} to which MacDonald replied that such a plan was not feasible because “those people are citizens of the United States.”\textsuperscript{260}

Instead, MacDonald opined that a law “to prohibit white men living on the reservation” might work, offering that “if they married a squaw they have got to leave there.”\textsuperscript{261} This was met with approval from State Senator Jean Charles Boucher, who declared “[i]f a white man has a squaw, get them off the reservation and keep them off the rest of their life, and their children can’t go back.”\textsuperscript{262} The discussion showed an astounding ignorance of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as Chief Justice Marshall had held in \textit{Worcester v. Georgia} that states have no right to dictate who may go onto tribal lands.\textsuperscript{263} That authority rests with the sovereign tribe.\textsuperscript{264}

After a brief yet disturbing tangent endorsing Native American children crossing frozen areas of the Penobscot River during spring and fall thaw to attend school,\textsuperscript{265} it was agreed that the State should endeavor to dissolve the tribes.\textsuperscript{266} MacDonald opined that the State might absorb the reservations into adjacent townships,\textsuperscript{267} to which one legislator replied that such a plan would serve the goals of assimilating the tribes.\textsuperscript{268}

The Committee wanted a way to move forward, both on L.D. 694 and on the larger “Indian situation.”\textsuperscript{269} It was Representative Payson who compared the situation to a “min[i]ature slave problem,” offering that any attempts to dissolve the tribes and integrate the members into society would be reminiscent of the Reconstruction era in the south:

You gave the slaves in the south emancipation, made them all free men, but you didn’t solve anything so far as the economic problem was concerned. We have got a miniture [sic] slave problem here, and it seems to me we need to be careful in working it out, not by the Legislature but by people who know how to work people out of a bad proposition as a social proposition.\textsuperscript{270}

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Id.} at 6, 31 (phrase used by Chairman Dow & Representative Payson).
\textsuperscript{258} \textit{Id.} at 31.
\textsuperscript{259} \textit{Id.} at 15.
\textsuperscript{260} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{261} \textit{Id.} at 16.
\textsuperscript{262} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{264} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{265} MacDonald Testimony, \textit{supra} note 10, at 20.
\textsuperscript{266} \textit{Id.} at 21–22.
\textsuperscript{267} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{268} \textit{Id.} at 22 (statement of Lorenzo J. Pelletier, State Representative).
\textsuperscript{269} \textit{Id.} at 30.
\textsuperscript{270} \textit{Id.} at 34.
Properly concluding that the Committee was woefully uninformed and therefore ill-equipped to make any substantive policy recommendations, MacDonald suggested that the Committee commission an investigation “to make a real study of the Indian situation from 1820 on.”

“Wouldn’t you like to know,” MacDonald asked the Committee, “why we made the treaty with the Indians in the first place, and . . . why we have utterly ignored and set up a new group of laws to govern Indian affairs, and, since we did, what has been the effect?”

The Committee did. As evidenced by Representative Payson’s statements, the Committee apparently not only sought an investigation into the “Indian situation” for the purposes of moving forward with its plans to disband State financial support for the tribes, but also to “get enough facts from any source to destroy the myth the Indians own the State and we are paying them interest on that ownership.”

The plan was clear: “if we can get rid of that whole phase by reporting this whole thing as a deal between the Indians and the State of Maine and they have been doing pretty well . . . we might be able to lay a little background for a long-range plan that wouldn’t have so much maudlin sympathy.”

With the die cast on the plan to commission an investigative report of tribal-state relations, the Committee broke for recess. Later that same day, Maine Attorney General Frank I. Cowan was called to testify before the Legislative Research Committee to “share any pearls of wisdom” about the legality of L.D. 694. Addressing the panel before him, Attorney General Cowan advised that he could “not remember the exact bill” but was intimately familiar with “quite a few individuals [who came] into the tribe who [had] been adopted under that quarter blood law that [had] been trouble makers.”

When asked about his opinion as to long-term solutions to Maine’s “Indian situation,” Attorney General Cowan expressed the opinion that the tribal members were “just children” and would “never . . . develop” unless Maine undertook coordinated efforts to “get[] any of them that show any ambition at all off the island and away from the reservation.”

Special Counsel Webber then immediately jumped to the Committee’s concerns about Maine’s historical intercourse with the tribes, asking: “Do you think we owe them any money?” Attorney General Cowan was unequivocal. “Oh yes,” he replied, “no doubt about that . . . . I think we owe them some millions probably.”

Having perhaps unwittingly opened Pandora’s box, Attorney General Cowan continued on, seemingly unaware of the tensions discussed by the Committee during the earlier session that day. Although Attorney General Cowan acknowledged that he felt Maine had “paid [the tribes] very well” in recent history,
Chairman Dow then asked the Attorney General if he supported a program that would “wipe them out.” When Attorney General Cowan said that he did not, Chairman Dow asked, “what is an Indian anyhow?” Attorney General Cowan’s response manifested a belief that interracial relationships between tribal members and non-members quickly dissolved “Indian characteristics.” He then proffered an example of two brothers with Native American descent, one of whom had “quite a lot of Indian blood in him” while his brother did “not seem to show any Indian characteristics.” To this, Special Counsel Webber proclaimed “[t]hat is a freak of nature.”

Having sufficiently demonstrated a shared perspective of the societal caste of these “freaks of nature,” the Committee pressed Attorney General Cowan on whether he had ever investigated “the whole Indian thing” in his official capacity and made a report. The Attorney General’s response was striking: “On the Indians, no, sir. I was scared of it when I got into it and closed the door.” He further explained his previous efforts to investigate the “Indian situation” in Maine—an exercise which led him into the archives of the State House and Land Office:

I was digging into things down there and I kept running into this stuff, and I was checking up on the Indian trust fund, trying to find the origin of it and find out why it was a certain amount of course, and as I went back through the Land Office records I began to get more and more dubious. I finally said “the Indian Trust Fund amounts to $138,000—period,” and stopped right there.

To this, Representative Payson offered perhaps the most developed thought shared between Committee members that June afternoon: “This is a skeleton in our closet.” “Well,” Cowan responded, “I had a feeling it would be more than we wanted to see in that closet, so I closed the door.”

280. Id. at 3.
281. Id. at 6.
282. Id. It is significant and worth mentioning that although Attorney General Cowan and the Legislative Research Committee displayed a very clear disdain for Native Americans—referring to them as slow, imbecilic, and wards rather than citizens—the Legislature, just one year earlier, had petitioned the Law Court for a determination of Native American voting rights. Proctor Report, supra note 6, at 75. Here, in the span of just two years, Maine’s vacillating stance on indigenous citizenship is laid bare for what it was, and always has been: fluid and subservient to whatever political whims are prevailing at the time. When it benefitted the State to argue that there could be “no nation within a nation,” it argued that the tribes were comprised of citizens. ROLDE, supra note 17, at 43. Elsewhere, when it fit the narrative of disparaging the tribal members as imbeciles and paupers, they were no longer considered citizens. Murch v. Tomer, 21 Me. 535, 538 (1842); MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10, at 6.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1, 6.
287. Id. at 7.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
3. A State of Utter Confusion: Commissioning the Proctor Report to Address Maine’s “Indian Situation”

Having arrived at a “state of utter confusion,” the Committee members agreed to commission an investigation of Maine state-tribal affairs and history. At the end of July that same year, Special Counsel Webber obtained funds from the Committee for the purposes of commissioning Ralph W. Proctor—a local school administrator—to investigate the matter and draft a report.

Proctor’s work—which took approximately five weeks to finish—was not foundational. When the Maine Legislature transferred “general supervision” of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Tribes to the Maine Department of Health and Welfare in March 1933, the Department commissioned a research study of tribal-state relations referred to simply as the “Indian Project.” Margaret Snow of Rockland, Maine, was hired to lead the research project. In a letter from Ms. Snow to the Department of Health and Welfare, she summarized what she understood to be the aim of the project:

During the 114 years of her jurisdiction over these two tribes, the State has built up in the performance of her obligations acquired in the separation of Maine from Massachusetts in 1820, certain policies, practices, and customs. Yet, the evidence of these policies, of these practices, and of these customs through the years, lie buried in a mass of legislative, executive, and judicial state documentary records, both published, and in manuscript form. To unearth, to compile, and finally, to reduce this knowledge to a concise, workable medium for both historical fact, present development, and future possibility with regard to Indian Affairs, is the aim, or hope of the present project.

Following her commission, Snow and her cousin, Dorothy Snow, conducted extensive research in the archives of the Governor’s Council “with great thoroughness and investigated various departments in the State House for original source material on the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Indians. Unfortunately, it appears as though the Department of Health and Welfare deemed the Snows research of little importance and destroyed some of it:

291. MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10, at 47.
293. Id. At the time he conducted his investigation and drafted the Proctor Report, Proctor was acting principal of Edward Little High School—a public school located and still operating today in Auburn, Maine. Id.
296. DEP’T OF HEALTH & WELFARE, UNTI TLED INTERNAL MEMORANDUM REGARDING MARGARET SNOW’S WORK ON THE “INDIAN PROJECT” (1934), https://digitalmaine.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=arc_finding_aids [https://perma.cc/QYL8-N8XF]
297. SNOW, supra note 295.
298. ELIZABETH RING, UNTI TLED COVER LETTER REGARDING “INDIAN MATERIAL” COMPILED BY MARGARET AND DOROTHY SNOW (1942), https://digitalmaine.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=arc_finding_aids [https://perma.cc/QYL8-N8XF].
It is evident on examination of this manuscript that a great deal of the material used and compiled by Miss Snow in the early stages of the work was discarded. The intent of the project was to discover exactly what the state’s policy in Indian affairs had been when by Act of the Legislature, March 28, 1933, the conduct of Indian affairs was turned over to the Bureau of Health and Welfare. Much of the information gathered by Miss Margaret Snow could not be of very great value to the Bureau who employed her. It was, however, of great value to the Indian historian and should have been preserved.\(^\text{299}\)

Several years later, on January 5, 1942—approximately eight months before the commissioning of the Proctor Report—Margaret and Dorothy Snow were killed when they were struck while changing a tire on a roadway in Rockland, Maine.\(^\text{300}\)

Reflecting on this sudden and unexpected tragedy, Maine historian Elizabeth Ring—who later came into possession of the surviving Snow research materials—lamented that “[t]he accidental death in 1942 of the two young women who worked on the project leaves doubt as to what actually became the typed material from which the followed report was made.”\(^\text{301}\)

After the Snows’ death, Ring shepherded the surviving research materials from the Department of Health and Welfare archives to the Maine State Library in June 1942.\(^\text{302}\) Given the speed with which Proctor subsequently conducted his five-week investigation, one wonders whether and just how much of the Snows’ original research was available to him.

Ultimately, Proctor finished his “Report on Maine Indians”—which came to be known as the Proctor Report—in September 1942.\(^\text{303}\) Broken into ten sections, the Proctor Report contained investigative analyses of subject matter ranging from “Treaty Rights and Obligations” to histories of tribal funds and appropriations, tribal censuses, and a report on the “Progress of Indians.”\(^\text{304}\)

Touted by Special Counsel Webber as the new “leading authority on Indian affairs in the State of Maine,” Proctor delivered testimony to the Legislative Research Committee on October 6, 1942.\(^\text{305}\) Proctor advised the Committee that his research had been guided by six questions: (i) “[w]hat is an Indian?”; (ii) “[d]o we owe the Indians any money?”; (iii) “[h]ow many Indians are there?”; (iv) “[w]hat is the condition of the Indians?”; (v) “[w]hat should we do for them?”; and (vi) “[w]hat are their citizenship rights?”\(^\text{306}\)

The discussion that followed on October 6, 1942, and the conclusions drawn by the Proctor Report are the subject of Section III.B of this Remonstrance. The principal conclusions, however, can be summarized here. Proctor offered

\(^{299}\) Id.

\(^{300}\) Shocking Double Tragedy: Dorothy Snow and Margaret Snow Fatally Injured When Hit by an Automobile, COURIER-GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 1942, at 1, 3.

\(^{301}\) RING, supra note 298.

\(^{302}\) Id.

\(^{303}\) See Proctor Report, supra note 6.

\(^{304}\) See id. at 18.

\(^{305}\) See Proctor Testimony, supra note 10.

\(^{306}\) Id. at 27.
unconditional support for “the policy of limiting the responsibility to the Indian tribes.”

When Chairman Dow responded with the suggestion that “[y]ou could have the State buy [reservation land under tribal title] and tear down the buildings and keep somebody else from living there,” Ralph Proctor, “the leading authority on Indian affairs in the State of Maine,” replied: “[y]ou might gradually buy back the reservation,” before the Committee stopped transcription and went off the record.

Two months later, in its Final Report to the 91st Legislature, the Legislative Research Committee would acknowledge more than a century of militant State programs, tactics, and behaviors that worked to injure the tribes. As reparations for these enumerated harms, the Committee would suggest *de minimus* legal relief—without interest.

**B. The 1942 Proctor Report**

“You will forgive me if I tell you that my people were Americans for thousands of years before your people were here. The question is not how you can Americanize us, but how we can Americanize you. We have been working at that for a long time.”

—Unknown Indigenous Voice

Exactly fifty years after the Law Court’s severe hobbling of tribal sovereignty in *Newell* (but still thirty-eight years before the Maine Indian Land Claims Settlement would finish the job of stamping out tribal independence almost entirely), the Research Committee for the 90th Maine Legislature found itself in a precarious situation. Having endeavored to legislate on matters affecting a culture and a people of which and whom they had precious little (if any shred of) intelligible understanding, lawmakers exposed themselves as ignorant of the history, relationship, and ongoing obligations and duties existing between the tribes and the State.

When Ralph Proctor delivered his Proctor Report in September 1942, after just five weeks of research, the Research Committee convened to hear his testimony in October. During his testimony, Proctor fielded questions about his findings and explained the structure of his inquiry. Proctor defined his mandate as “to record general trends and practices through a careful study of basic treaties, legislation, handling of funds, and present responsibilities, in order to furnish a basis for

307. *Id.* at 26.
308. *Id.* at 27.
309. *Id.* at 1.
310. *Id.* at 27.
312. *Id.*
consideration of future policy in regard to Indian affairs.” Having established his objectives, he set out to answer the six primary questions previously identified to supposedly help educate the Research Committee.

Then, in a shocking moment of candor characteristic of the hostile social mores of 1940’s America, Proctor put into words the objective of the 90th Legislature: his findings allowed him to support “the policy of limiting responsibility to the Indian tribes.”

The Proctor Report provides a window fixed upon a moment in time, an almost fleeting moment when the State—evoking the taped confessions of disgraced future president Richard Nixon—let down its guard and admitted to genocidal acts and intentions. Laying naked for all the world to witness its goals of “assimilat[ion],” “buy[ing] back the reservation,” limiting responsibility towards the tribes, and even undertaking measures such as controlling the intermarriage and interbreeding of mixed-race couples, the State apparently forgot that the tape was running. Now, unveiled and dragged into the light, the Proctor Report serves as a self-audit and accounting of the conscious purpose of Maine’s persecution of the tribes.

1. This Land Is Your Land, and Now It’s My Land: Treaty Abruptions and Fraudulent Transfers of Tribal Land Holdings

As revelatory as the conclusions of the Proctor Report and the subsequent recommendations of the Legislative Research Committee are, the research that forms the substance of the Proctor Report is rather paltry. In evaluating some three centuries of historical events and documents, Proctor revealed three instances of land transactions that constituted potential violations of Maine’s treaty obligations to the tribes. As has been made abundantly clear by this Remonstrance, there have been far more than three instances of uncompensated and/or fraudulent dispossession of the Maine tribes.

Later characterized by the Committee as “certain minor items in connection with the handling of Indian affairs,” Proctor described the following three transactions:

First, on October 11, 1835, the State sold, at auction, three islands in the Penobscot River belonging to the Penobscot Nation for $7,550. The Tribe never received this money. Second, the sale of fifteen islands in the St. Croix River—having been granted to the Passamaquoddy Tribe in the 1794 Treaty, despite having been sold to a William Bingham in 1793—were assessed by an Indian agent

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315. Proctor Report, supra note 6, at 1.
316. Proctor Testimony, supra note 10, at 27.
317. Id. at 26.
318. MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10, at 22.
319. Proctor Testimony, supra note 10, at 27.
320. See MacDonald Testimony, supra note 10; Proctor Report, supra note 6.
321. Proctor Report, supra note 6, at 3, 29.
322. Final Report of the Legislative Research Committee, supra note 225, at 44.
323. Proctor Report, supra note 6, at 3; Proctor Testimony, supra note 10, at 8–9. This payment is equal to $237,300.79 in 2021 U.S. dollars.
324. Proctor Report, supra note 6, at 3; Proctor Testimony, supra note 10, at 8–9.
in 1855 as having been worth $2,000. The Tribe never obtained the islands or the $2,000 value. Third, in October 1834, the State sold to Joseph Granger, at auction for $7,530, a collection of said islands in Old Town Falls belonging to the Passamaquoddy Tribe under the 1794 Treaty obligations. In 1855, Granger sued the Tribe for trespass thereupon and was awarded damages of $2,486.17. This was paid out of the Tribe’s Trust Fund. The Tribe lost both the islands they believed to be their rightful property and the costs associated with defending the trespass action.

Speaking to the Legislature through his report, Proctor posed the question of whether payment should be made to the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Tribes for the illegal dispossession of these lands. The Legislative Research Committee issued its response: the land would not be returned to the tribes and the sums outstanding and never obtained would be paid to the tribes’ respective Trust Funds—without interest.

The sums repaid to the tribes at the direction of the Legislative Research Committee in 1942 were not only grossly less than the present-day value when adjusting for inflation, but failed to take into account the interest to which the tribes were entitled and would have realized on these sums if paid at the time of divestiture. In essence, not only did the State steal from the tribes by failing to remit value duly adjusted for inflation, but it further divested the tribes of their expectant financial interests as well. At a minimum, the State failed to repay the tribes for the fair market value of the interests in question when it chose to tender only the original dollar amounts. It is an unsatisfactory argument that the State does not pay interest as part of its sovereign immunity because the tribes, having been left without consideration for decades, received an incomplete remedy in 1942. If these transactions could ever be deemed a valid accord and satisfaction, surely scrutiny would reveal that there was never an accord and the State failed to satisfy.

2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Misappropriation of Trust Funds

Next, the Proctor Report addressed instances of misappropriation of Trust Funds by the State in relation to both the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Tribes. Despite the voluminous accounting records presented as evidence with the report (giving examples of payments remitted for the acquisition of basic necessities and foodstuffs for the tribes), this section of the report fails in its mandate from Special Counsel Webber to examine the root causes and problems that precipitated the mishandling of funds initially. A review of Proctor’s reporting reveals that this
failing is the result of a lack of historical context—something this Remonstrance endeavors to remedy.

First focusing on misappropriations of Passamaquoddy Trust Fund monies, Proctor listed the following irregularities: (i) impounded bank accounts totaling $1,718.70; (ii) a loss realized on defaulted bonds purchased from the City of Eastport by the State, on behalf of the Tribe; and (iii) a total of $3,877.12 belonging to the Passamaquoddy Trust Fund, for balances accrued from the sale of timber rights, instead deposited into the State’s General Fund from 1938–1940. As to the Penobscot Fund, Proctor listed a loss of $22,911.04 from the impoundment of bank accounts in which the State had invested Fund monies.

Again, addressing the Legislature, Proctor’s report inquired whether the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Trust Funds should be credited these amounts. In the alternative, Proctor supposed, the Legislature also had the option to cancel these amounts owed to the tribes “on basis of the thousands spent . . . in excess of treaty obligations.”

The Legislative Research Committee recommended that only the $3,877.12 owed to the Passamaquoddy Trust Fund be restored—without interest—on the basis of mistake of law. As to the other outstanding losses, the Legislature stated its belief that

> [T]hese sums were deposited in banks of the State of Maine and in bonds of the City of Eastport in good faith, that the losses which may be incurred are the result of no more than the normal hazards accompanying any investment program, and that no negligence on the part of the State in so investing the Indian funds is apparent, and therefore recommends no restoration of these sums to the funds.

It is disingenuous for the State, having a fiduciary duty to the tribes, to invest the tribes’ money with a financially insecure municipality when the municipality cannot pay the bond, and to say it is not the State’s fault. Essentially, the State used tribal funds to reduce the amount that it might have to pay to support a moribund and bankrupt municipality.

3. Disinterested and Without Interest: Recommendations of the Legislative Research Committee on Maine’s “Indian Situation”

Expounding upon its rationale for denying the tribes any interest whatsoever— for any of the losses noted in the Proctor Report—the Committee explained:

In making these recommendations, the Committee is basing its conclusions not upon any recognized legal obligations but solely upon a sense of the State of its responsibility for the protection of Indian welfare. In recommending that no interest be included, the Committee is mindful of the fact that its contributions and appropriations to the Indians over the period of many years has exceeded by

334. Id. at 12.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
339. Id. at 45.
hundreds of thousands of dollars any of its financial obligations arising from the treaties with the Indians.\(^{340}\)

In denying interests to the tribes occasioned by “hundreds of thousands of dollars” paid to them over the course of “many years” in excess of treaty obligations,\(^{341}\) the Commission stripped the tribes of legal relief duly accorded them for deprivation of the enjoyment of their property over a period of years of malfeasance. No consideration was lent or thought given to the separation of legal remedy from ancillary benefits. In short, the State unilaterally decided that its unrelated overpayments to the tribes in excess of treaty obligations—which, fairly stated amounted to a paltry cache of stipend foodstuffs—were able to be substituted in place of sums deprived and otherwise bearing significant interest. It was another robbery.

Had Proctor and the Committee ended their escapades there, the tribes would have been left bereft of their rightful property and spared the indignity of a superfluous racist diatribe bearing on the delusions of a group of legislators self-admittedly ignorant of the entirety of the history of Maine tribal-state relations.

Unfortunately, the Committee had one last blow to deliver the tribes. Even though the Committee had settled (albeit unfairly) the foregoing unlawful and irregular transactions, it proceeded to launch into a defense of the indefensible—levying gratuitous and racist insults:

> It is elementary that people who have no need for self-dependence and self-reliance seldom develop it. That is the status of the Maine Indians today. Whether this attitude is wholly or in part Indian nature, or whether it has been created by the paternalistic attitude of the State in providing for them, is a matter for conjecture—possibly both factors have contributed. The Committee feels that at least the elements of the Indian problem have been cleared, and concurs in the following statement: . . . [t]here are those amongst the Indians themselves and in other places who have maintained that the Indians in Maine were robbed. Our conclusion is that it is not so, that they have been amply repaid for whatever they gave up and excessively well-treated on the financial side; that they never owned or occupied the whole of the State of Maine; that the numbers of Indians at the time of the treaties show the impossibility of their having reduced to possession any substantial part of the State; and that as a result of the above conclusions the State is in a position to deal with the Indians fairly but on a realistic basis with a policy looking to the eventual self-dependence and self-reliance of each Indian.\(^{342}\)

Having thus decreed, and in a haunting evocation of John Deane’s 1830 “coercive system,”\(^{343}\) the Committee recommended the State adopt the following policies: (i) definition of “an Indian” as a person with “at least one-quarter Indian blood,” (ii) implementation of vocational training for youth “wherever . . . available” and seemingly without discretion, (iii) State sponsorship of “Indian handicraft” business, (iv) facilitation of agricultural vocational pursuits; and (v)

\(^{340}\) Id. at 46.

\(^{341}\) Id.

\(^{342}\) Id. at 47.

\(^{343}\) See Letter from John G. Deane, supra note 12.
restriction of State assistance programs solely to tribal members physically unable
to find and perform a job. 344

This was an orchestrated effort to continue the failed policies of agricultural
oppression and condemnation to a future as handicraft-makers that for a century
had been subject to systematic poverty occasioned by the State’s very own
predatory policies. It was, of course, straight out of Maine’s tried and true
genocidal playbook.

That Maine has committed genocide against the tribes is not widely accepted
by the general public. In general, the prevailing consensus appears to the Authors
to be that Maine may have unjustly enriched itself during a period of time where so
doing was acceptable or common practice, but there is no widespread
contemporary discourse surrounding the idea that Mainers are descended from a
legacy of literal genocide.

The United Nations has defined genocide as

any of the following acts committed with an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
   its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and/or]
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 345

IV. PRESENT DAY: A PATH FORWARD

“Let understanding and communication through education be the building
blocks of a new tribal-state relationship, one that recognizes and honors the
struggles and contributions of Native people.” 346

—Donna M. Loring

So, what can be done? While it may be true that nothing can wash away the
sins of the past, perhaps that assumes the wrong conclusion. Maybe, if the
toothpaste is out of the proverbial tube, rather than trying (and failing) to do the
impossible and putting it all back in, we instead start looking for a new container in
which to transfer it.

It is a crude analogy, but it makes the point: contemporary efforts to rectify,
solve, or make up for blood already spent—while noble—are not always practical.

78 U.N.T.S. 277. It may well be noteworthy that the United States would not ratify this Treaty until
November 25, 1988—nearly 40 years after it was drafted. William Korey, The United States and the
Genocide Convention: Leading Advocate and Leading Obstacle, 11 ETHICS & INT’L AFFS. 271, 271
(1997).
346. LORING, supra note 9, at v.
If, in endeavoring to make amends, our heart is in the right place, let us refocus our efforts on initiatives that can create real, tangible progress for the living.

As a coda to the foregoing historico-legal remonstrance of Maine’s persecution of the tribes within its borders, the Authors would like to offer some limited, practical suggestions for ways in which the State of Maine and the tribes can work together right now to make progress towards more humane relations with, justice between, and earned respect for one another.

A. Pulling Back the Curtain: Restoring the Language of the Original Treaties to Maine’s Constitution

A measure easily undertaken that would have the immediate and lasting effect of enlightening Maine’s population, lawmakers, and courts would be repatriation of the original text of Article X, Section 5, adapted from the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.347

This language—prefixed to the official publication of the laws passed by the First Legislature of the State of Maine—was subsequently published in the prefix of the Revised Statutes of Maine of 1841, 1857, and 1871, after which time an amendment provisioned for the following:

Section 7. Original sections 1, 2, 5, of Article X not to be printed; section 5 in full force:
Sections 1, 2 and 5, of Article 10 of the Constitution, shall hereafter be omitted in any printed copies thereof prefixed to the laws of the State; but this shall not impair the validity of acts under those sections; and said section 5 shall remain in full force, as part of the Constitution, according to the stipulations of said section, with the same effect as if contained in said printed copies.348

347. ME. CONST. art. X, § 5 (1820). The text read:

The new State shall, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made for that purpose, assume and perform all the duties and obligations of this Commonwealth, towards the Indians within said District of Maine, whether the same arise from treaties, or otherwise; and for this purpose shall obtain the assent of said Indians, and their release to this Commonwealth of claims and stipulations arising under the treaty at present existing between the said Commonwealth and said Indians; and as an indemnification to such new State, therefor, this Commonwealth, when such arrangements shall be completed, and the said duties and obligations assumed, shall pay to said new State, the value of thirty thousand dollars, in manner following, viz.: The said Commissioners shall set off by metes and bounds, so much of any part of the land, within the said District, falling to this Commonwealth, in the division of the public lands, hereinafter provided for, as in their estimation shall be of the value of thirty thousand dollars; and this Commonwealth shall, thereupon, assign the same to the said new State, or in lieu thereof, may pay the sum of thirty thousand dollars at its election; which election of the said Commonwealth, shall be made within one year from the time that notice of the doings of the Commissioners, on this subject, shall be made known to the Governor and Council; and if not made within that time, the election shall be with the new State.

Id. 348. ME. CONST. art. X, § 7.
Given the already substantial length of the Maine Constitution, Section 7’s purpose is dubious, at best. Restoration of this language to the Maine Constitution is both a symbolic gesture of Maine’s recognition of its legal obligations to the tribes, as well as a corrective measure aimed at restoring this critical historic information to the public domain in a manner that is practically accessible.

B. Amending the Maine Constitution: Establishing a Constitutional Officer on Tribal Relations

The tribes have always had sovereignty. The question is not whether the tribes are sovereign, but what it would mean to Maine tribes if they were free from molestation to practice their sovereignty. Paternalistic views on the matter have bred fears of unintended consequences if the tribes’ sovereignty were recognized by the State. The unfortunate reality, however, is that the tribes have been suffering from the damaging intended consequences occasioned by restrictive State control for centuries.

Forced political subjugation of the sovereign tribes in Maine is predicated upon a system designed both to siphon resources away from the tribes and keep said tribes dependent. Paradoxically, Maine’s apparent desire to eliminate the tribes altogether, while not vitiated, is certainly prolonged by such measures. Inexcusable and entirely preventable hardship continues to befall Maine’s indigenous populations. The Passamaquoddy Reservation at Pleasant Point has not had potable drinking water in their community—ever. Attempts by neighboring townships and municipalities to block tribal efforts to access clean water were explained away as posing a threat to the water supply of these larger population centers. The current system allowing for towns and municipalities to have any influence over tribal issues is unproductive and produces inhumane results.

Recognition of the tribes’ inherent sovereignty will afford a certain freedom from Maine towns and municipalities that would act (and in the past have acted) to harm the tribes. Through the channels created incident to the recognition of their sovereignty, the tribes would be empowered to deal directly with the federal government for access to clean water, emergency services, and technical assistance needed in areas such as law enforcement, tribal courts, housing, healthcare, and business—all areas the State of Maine has historically neglected. Indeed, following the passage of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, not far removed from Maine’s dissolution of its Department of Indian Affairs, the tribes would have no direct discourse with either State or federal governments. This is, of course, highly problematic because it deprives the tribes of any conduit for addressing grievances and accessing governmental programs and assistance (similar to how the rest of the general population and states access said resources).

Instead, Maine seems to want a hybrid relationship with the tribes—seeking complete control of matters like jurisdiction over felonies committed on reservation lands, control of sovereign status, and a stranglehold over any political or economic

efforts that bear even remotely on extra-tribal interests, all the while denying the tribes any conduit for channeling their concerns to a governmental body equipped to address these systemic inequities. Emulating the models of intergovernmental discourse between the western tribes, states, and federal government would be an appropriate starting place for remedying Maine’s broken system of managing tribal affairs.

Recognition of tribal sovereignty would engender state-tribal cooperation on equal footing and, in so doing, require both powers to make mutually beneficial decisions. It would foster a new environment of respect and productivity the likes of which has yet to even be attempted in Maine history.

Maine can effect this change by taking permanent action to amend its State Constitution. Constitutional change is neither drastic, nor unprecedented. It is, however, entirely necessary. For decades, incoming Maine governors have vacillated between executive orders recognizing tribal sovereignty or treating the tribes in a paternalistic manner. This is not conducive to building trust between the State and the tribes.

Amending the Constitution to create a fifth Constitutional Officer, the Secretary of Tribal Relations, would be a show of good faith by the State in recognition of the extent of damage it has heretofore inflicted. As a constitutional office, this would be a permanent position appointed by the Legislature to serve as the official liaison between the State and the tribal governments. This singular action—this one appointment—would recognize tribal sovereignty and demonstrate Maine’s resolve to cultivate a new and honest relationship with the tribes.

This is something Maine can do now. It is entirely within the power of the Legislature to create this constitutional office and the people of the State of Maine have power to approve it.

C. A New Beginning: Implementing a Bicentennial Accord Between the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in Maine and the State of Maine

Yet another proposition—advanced by co-author of this Remonstrance and former Penobscot Tribal Representative to the Maine Legislature, Donna Loring—is the execution of an Executive Order to establish, and subsequent adoption of, an Accord with the Tribes. A successful and well-written example is the Centennial Accord between the federally recognized Indian tribes in Washington State and the State of Washington. A 1989 treaty between the State of Washington and twenty-six federally recognized tribes located therein, the Centennial Accord seeks to memorialize the tribes’ and state’s reciprocal recognition of one another’s sovereignty. It lays the framework for arms-length government-to-government exchanges, dispute resolutions, and cooperative efforts between the tribes and the

350. See, e.g., 30 M.R.S. § 6209-B.
351. A copy of proposed language to be implemented as the Bicentennial Accord is included in Appendix B.
353. Id.
Furthermore, it explicitly recognizes that it does not constitute a derogation or abandonment of any previously recognized rights or benefits afforded to the tribes by the state. \[355\]

Although state-tribal relations remain imperfect, Washington is perceived as the national leader when it comes to enlightened, intelligent, and humane intercourse with the tribes living within its borders. \[356\] In fact, where some states (like Maine) are entirely lacking in having signed any such Accord with the tribes living within their own borders, Washington has even adopted an “Out of State Accord” recognizing the sovereignty of federally recognized tribes residing outside its jurisdiction, so long as said tribal entities have treaty reserved rights in Washington. \[357\] These above and beyond efforts demonstrate a basic level of institutional integrity and human decency.

Maine’s signing of a Bicentennial Accord—aptly named given the recent two-hundred-year anniversary of its statehood—would be not only a showing of good faith, but a revelatory and historic step towards repairing its relationship with the tribes. An Accord and formal recognition of sovereignty would establish the proper governmental structure for arms-length interactions between two cultures sharing one state. Moreover, such a document would serve as competent evidence that the State of Maine recognizes the humanity of all its citizens and endeavors to treat them with dignity and respect. It would, in effect, be Maine’s political passport into legitimate, humane, and respected 21st century politics—an arena from which it will continue to be excluded until it makes an effort to address the grievous miscarriages of justice that persist within its borders.

**CONCLUSION**

“In the end, we will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.”

—Martin Luther King, Jr.

This Remonstrance has offered a critical historico-legal analysis of the State of Maine’s policies and intercourse with the Native American people living within its borders. By providing a detailed historical accounting of Euromerican discourse with tribal sovereigns, from first contact with the Europeans in 1604 through the period of 1892, the Authors sought to establish the context in which Maine’s political structures and systems were formed.

\[354\] See id.

\[355\] Id.


\[357\] Accord Between Federally Recognized Indian Tribes with Treaty Reserved Rights in Washington State and the State of Washington, I, Dec. 9, 2004. The practical effect of this “Out of State Accord” was to recognize the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation and the Nez Perce, both of whom have ancestral ties to the Pacific Northwest and present-day Washington.
From Massachusetts’s initial imperative to expand and lift itself from pauperism to the commercialization of the timber industry as a means of converting Maine’s natural resources into a source of immense wealth, the land and forests of present-day Maine have been commodified to serve the colonialist agenda. The ontogeny of Maine’s political intercourse with the tribes is particularly reflective of these parasitic practices. From the outset of statehood in 1820, Maine sought to usurp tribal ancestral resources to grow its fledgling government.

In so doing, Maine became a pariah. Rather than abiding the typical form and manner of state-tribal relations under the purview of the Congress, Maine consciously manufactured a system of complete control in which it isolated the Maine tribes and alienated them from their land for profit. When the land’s valuable timber began to wane in supply, the State set about a regime of genocidal practices designed to permanently disband the tribes in an effort to relieve itself of the burdens of treaty obligations previously secured in dealings with Massachusetts.

When compared against this historical context, the twin pillars of toxic Indian law precedent in Maine—Murch and Newell—take on new meaning revelatory of Maine’s clear intention to defraud and eliminate the tribes and in the severity of the harm these decisions carry as standing precedent. Contemporary evidence now strongly suggests that Maine’s political elite may have had a hand in manipulating the Murch case, weaponizing legal fictions to set off a cascade effect that paved the way for the Law Court’s attempted death blow to tribal sovereignty in Newell.

But for the Legislature’s commissioning of the Indian Papers and the Proctor Report in 1942, the now undeniable evidence and confirmation of Maine’s bad acts—and the elucidation of the insidious nature of the political construct against which Murch and Newell arose—might have been lost to the mists of time. Fortunately, Special Counsel Webber provided for what might be fairly referred to as Maine’s Nixon Tapes in having the proceedings of the Legislative Research Committee recorded.

From the Indian Papers and Proctor Report we get the State’s recognition of the historical economic disenfranchisement and the related genocidal initiatives designed to eliminate the tribes. Perhaps more shockingly, the Committee actually moves past historical recognition and, in real time and on record, admits to this as an ongoing objective of the State.

By engaging in this Remonstrance, this critical analysis arrives at the conclusion that Maine’s historic predation of the tribes for economic benefit and its subsequent persecution of the same continues to change form. Even today, Maine’s reluctance or failure to engage in arm’s-length government-to-government recognition of the tribes as sovereign entities (rather than the powerless and, frankly, inconsequential quasi-municipal entities forced upon the tribes under the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980)\textsuperscript{358} is a form of ongoing colonization.

And, uncomfortable though it may be for some to hear, Maine’s continued dereliction of its treaty obligations to the tribes—especially in light of the harm it has proactively caused them—fits entirely within the United Nations’ definition of genocide.

Despite all that has transpired—the bloodshed, the land stolen, the dignity stripped, and justice deprived—there is hope. There is hope that Maine will join with states like Washington in taking relatively simple, practical, and immediately viable steps to recognize the sovereignty of the tribes. Although Maine cannot go back in time and undo what has been done, it can adapt, and it can change for the better.

The remonstrance—first penned in 1833—continues to the present. We are still waiting for justice. Maine can still consider our voices, own its responsibilities, and do the right thing.
To the Governour and Council of the State of Maine

The undersigned Indians of the Penobscot Tribe beg leave to state, that on the 10th of June 1833 a sale was made of certain of the lands belonging to the Tribe, and that the deeds were signed by the Governour and a few other Indians, without the knowledge or consent of the undersigned. They beg leave to state, that they believe that the whole business relative to the sale, was transacted in a fraudulent manner and with the intention of injuring the Tribe in their property & rights. They further state, that as soon as they understood what had been done by the Governour and some of the Tribe at the instigation of Thomas Bartlet and one Lovejoy, they called a meeting of the Tribe, at which the Governour & chiefs were present and General Mark Trafton presided, and unanimously voted, that the deed or instrument presented to the Indians by Lovejoy and Bartlet, and which received the signature of the Governour & some of the Indians, is disapproved by the Tribe and by the Governor himself and that the above mentioned writing was obtained by fraud & deception—that the persons who attempted to purchase the land, promised to come & settle the business the next day but failed to do so—and voted, also, that the names of the Lt. Governour & some other Indians who were not present, were put to the above named deed without authority—voted, that the Agent notify the Commissioners that the Indians are ready to receive proposals for the purchase by the State, of one or all of their Townships. The undersigned conceive it to be their duty solemnly to protest against all the proceedings had relative to the sale of their lands as above expressed by their unanimous vote. They beg leave to state, as above expressed in their vote, that they are willing to negotiate relative to the sale of their lands, provided the same can be done with the full knowledge of the Tribe. They pray that all that has been done by a few of the Tribe at the instigation of the above Bartlet and Lovejoy relative to a sale of their lands, may be void. And your petitioners as in duty bound will pray.

PROPOSED FORM LANGUAGE OF BICENTENNIAL ACCORD

BICENTENNIAL ACCORD between the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in Maine and the State of Maine

I. Preamble and Guiding Principles

This Accord dated _______, is executed between the federally recognized Indian Tribes of Maine signatory to this Accord and the State of Maine through its governor, in order to better achieve mutual goals through an improved relationship between their sovereign governments. This Accord provides a framework for government-to-government relationship and implementation procedures to assure execution of that relationship.

Each party to this Accord respects the sovereignty of the other. The respective sovereignty of the state and each federally recognized tribe provide paramount authority for that party to exist and to govern. The parties share in their relationship particular respect for the values and culture represented by tribal governments. Further, the parties share a desire for complete Accord between the State of Maine and the federally recognized tribes in Maine reflecting a full government-to-government relationship and will work with all elements of state and tribal governments to achieve such an accord.

II. Parties

There are four federally recognized Indian tribes in the State of Maine. Each sovereign tribe has an independent relationship with each other and the state. This Accord provides the framework for that relationship with each other and the state. This Accord provides the framework for the state of Maine, through its governor, and signatory tribes.

The parties recognize that the state of Maine is governed in part by independent state officials. Therefore, although, this Accord has been initiated by the signatory tribes and the governor, it welcomes the participation of, inclusion in and execution by chief representatives of all elements of state government so that the government-to-government relationship described herein is completely and broadly implemented between the state and the tribes.

III. Purposes and Objectives

This Accord illustrates the commitment by the parties to implementation of the government-to-government relationship, a relationship reaffirmed as state policy by gubernatorial proclamation dated _____. This relationship respects the sovereign status of the parties, enhances and improves communications between them, and facilitates resolutions of issues.

This Accord is intended to build confidence among the parties in the government-to-government relationship by outlining the process for implementing the policy. Not only is this process intended to implement the relationship, but also it is intended to institutionalize it with the organizations represented by the parties.
The parties will continue to strive for complete institutionalization of the government-to-government relationship by seeking accord among all the tribes and the elements of state government.

This Accord also commits the parties to the initial tasks that will translate the government-to-government relationship into more efficient, improved and beneficial services to the Indian and non-Indian people of Maine. This Accord encourages and provides the foundation and framework for specific agreements among the parties outlining specific tasks to address or resolve specific issues.

The parties recognize that implementation of this Accord will require a comprehensive education effort to promote understanding of the government-to-government relationship within their own governmental organizations and with the public.

IV. Implementation Process and Responsibilities

While this Accord addresses the relationship between the parties, its ultimate purpose is to improve the services delivered to people and parties.

Immediately and periodically, the parties shall establish goals for improved services and identify the obstacles to the achievement of those goals. At an annual meeting, the parties will develop joint strategies and specific agreements to outline tasks, overcome obstacles and achieve specific goals.

The parties recognize that a key principle of their relationship is a requirement that individuals working to resolve issues of mutual concern are accountable to act in a manner consistent with this Accord.

The state of Maine is organized into a variety of large and separate departments under its governor, other independently elected officials and a variety of boards and commissions. Each tribe on the other hand, is a unique government organization with different management and decision-making structures.

The Chief of Staff of the governor of the state of Maine is accountable to the governor for the implementation of this Accord. State agency directors are accountable to the governor through the chief of staff for the related activities of their agencies. Each director will initiate a procedure within her/his agency by which the government-to-government policy will be implemented. Among other things these procedures will require persons responsible for dealing with issues of mutual concern to respect the government-to-government relationship within which the issue must be addressed. Each agency will establish a documented plan of accountability and may establish more detailed procedures in subsequent agreements between tribes and the particular agency.

The parties recognize that their relationship will successfully address issues of mutual concern when communication is clear, direct and between persons responsible for addressing the concern. The parties recognize that in state government, accountability is best achieved when this responsibility rests solely within each state agency. Therefore, it is the objective of the state that each particular agency be directly accountable for implementation of the government-to-government relationship in dealing with issues of concern to the parties. Each agency will facilitate this objective by identifying individuals directly responsible for issues of mutual concern.
Each tribe also recognizes that a system of accountability within its organization is critical to successful implementation of the relationship. Therefore, tribal officials will direct their staff to communicate within the spirit of this Accord with the particular agency, which under the organization of state government, the authority and responsibility to deal with the particular issue of concern to the tribe.

In order to accomplish these objectives, each tribe must ensure that its current tribal organization, decision-making process and relevant tribal personnel is known to each state agency with which the tribe is addressing an issue of mutual concern. Further, each tribe may establish a more detailed organizational structure, decision making process, system of accountability and other procedures for implementing the government-to-government relationship in subsequent agreements with various state agencies. Finally, each tribe will establish a document system of accountability.

As a component of the system of accountability within state and tribal governments, the parties will review and evaluate at the annual meeting the implementation of the government-to-government relationship. A management report will be issued summarizing this evaluation and will include joint strategies and specific agreements to outline tasks, overcome obstacles, and achieve specific goals.

The Chief of Staff will also use his/her organizational discretion to help implement the government-to-government relationship. The Senior Advisor on Tribal Affairs will assist the chief of staff in implementing the government-to-government relationship by providing state agency directors information with which to educate employees and constituent groups as defined in the accountability plan about the requirement of the government-to-government relationship.

V. Sovereignty and Disclaimers

Each of the parties respects the sovereignty of each other party. In executing this Accord, no party waives any rights, including treaty rights, immunities, including sovereign immunities, or jurisdiction. Neither does this Accord diminish any rights or protections afforded other Indian persons or entities under state or federal law. Through this Accord parties strengthen their collective ability to successfully resolve issues of mutual concern.

While the relationship described by this Accord provides increased ability to solve problems, it likely will not result in a resolution of all issues. Therefore, inherent in their relationship is the right of each of the parties to elevate an issue of importance to any decision-making authority of another party, including, where appropriate, that party’s executive office.

Signatory parties have executed this Accord on the date of ____ and agreed to be duly bound by its commitments.