2011

Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias

Dmitry Bam
University of Maine School of Law, dmitry.bam@maine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty-publications

Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Bluebook Citation
Available at: http://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty-publications/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu.
MakingAppearances Matter:
Recusal and the Appearance of Bias

Dmitry Bam*

In the United States, judges are required to recuse themselves—that is, remove themselves from participating in a case—not only when they are biased, but even when they may appear biased to a neutral observer. This nominally strict, appearance-based recusal standard is intended to ensure the judge’s impartiality in resolving disputes, to protect the judiciary’s reputation, and to instill public confidence in the fairness of the courts. It has long been assumed that so long as the judge makes the correct recusal decision, the appearance of impartiality is restored and the reputation of the judiciary is protected.

This Article challenges that long-standing assumption and argues that the focus on appearances only at the time of the recusal decision, when the public has already formed its impressions of judicial impartiality, may not fully restore public confidence and protect the reputation of the judiciary. In other words, a judge’s recusal decision may be too little and come too late. Moreover, when appearances are considered on a case-by-case basis, often by the very judge whose impartiality has been challenged, even the correct nonrecusal decision does not always foster an appearance of impartiality.

Most of the literature on recusal focuses on the recusal standard and the reasons why judges might, intentionally or unintentionally, reach the incorrect recusal decision, and seeks solutions to that problem. In this Article, I propose a new role that appearances should play in American recusal jurisprudence, and a new approach to judicial recusal. I argue that rather than allowing individual judges to consider appearances ex post (i.e., in the context of individual cases), legislators must consider appearances ex ante to prevent the damage to the judiciary from arising in the first instance. This means that legislators must regulate judicial selection (including judicial elections) and judicial conduct, as well as

* Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law; J.D. Stanford Law School. I want to thank Sarah Cravens, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Amanda Packel, and Deborah Rhode for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to a number of participants at the Fourth International Legal Ethics Conference for their feedback and critiques.
extrajudicial conduct, with an eye towards potential future recusal. To that end, legislatures should create ethical rules and regulations designed to eliminate any appearance of impartiality from arising. And, to the extent that recusal cannot be avoided by such ex ante regulation, legislatures must also consider appearances ex ante in creating and implementing new recusal procedures.

I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 103

II. JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PAST AND PRESENT ......................................... 108
    A. Roots ..................................................................................... 109
    B. Judicial Disqualification in the United States ............................ 110
       1. Federal recusal statutes .................................................... 110
       2. ABA Codes of Judicial Conduct ........................................ 115
    C. Recusal Under the Due Process Clause .................................. 116
       1. Financial interest .............................................................. 117
       2. Criminal contempt ......................................................... 118
       3. Caperton v. Massey .......................................................... 119
    D. Recent Incidents .................................................................... 121

III. IS GETTING IT RIGHT ENOUGH? ...................................................... 123
    A. “Getting to Recusal” ............................................................. 126
    B. Why Recusal May Not Be the Solution .................................. 129
       1. Too little, too late ............................................................. 130
       2. One case at a time .......................................................... 133

IV. EX ANTE REGULATION AND RECUSAL PROCEDURE....................... 138
    A. Ex Ante Regulation of Judicial Conduct and Judicial
       Elections ............................................................................... 138
       1. Judicial elections ............................................................. 140
       2. Judicial relationships ....................................................... 144
       3. Judicial financial interests ............................................... 146
       4. Extrajudicial involvement ............................................... 147
    B. Recusal Procedures ............................................................... 148
       1. (Non)history of recusal procedure .................................... 150
       2. The importance of procedure ........................................... 153

V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 158
“We may try to see things as objectively as we please. Nonetheless, we can never see them with any eyes except our own.”

—Judge Benjamin Cardozo

I. INTRODUCTION

Throughout this nation’s history, Americans have only sporadically paid close attention—or any attention—to judicial recusal. Recusal, which in certain circumstances requires a judge to step aside from hearing a case, is a doctrine that protects (some would say is crucial to protecting) both judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartiality. That a judge must be disinterested, and must appear disinterested, is universally accepted in American legal culture. But despite the centrality of that notion in Western legal thought, the attention that recusal receives is often short-lived. The public temporarily takes notice of the issue when controversy arises, and in response to public outcry, state and federal legislatures, state supreme courts, and various bar associations promulgate new rules and guidelines to govern judicial disqualification or, more often, revise the rules already in place. The issue then fades from the public’s mind and lays quiescent until the cycle is repeated with a new high-profile incident.

But the familiar on-again-off-again pattern has been broken in the last few years as recusal has steadily lingered in the national spotlight. From the controversy surrounding Justice Scalia’s infamous duck-hunting trip with then-litigant Dick Cheney, to the recent Supreme Court decision in Caperton v. A. T. Massey, to the more recent outcry over a federal district judge’s decision to overturn a federal moratorium on deep-sea drilling in the Deepwater Horizon controversy, to the

2. The terms “recusal” and “disqualification” are used interchangeably throughout this Article. These terms originally had slightly different meanings, with “recusal” referring to withdrawal at the judge’s discretion and “disqualification” meaning exclusion by force of law, but this distinction is no longer recognized. John P. Frank, DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES IN SUPPORT OF THE BAYH BILL, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 45 (1970); see also RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 20.8 passim (2d ed. 2007).
4. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). This case is discussed in greater detail throughout this Article. The underlying facts in Caperton were the basis for John Grisham’s best-selling novel The Appeal.
5. On June 22, 2010, federal district judge Martin Feldman overturned President Obama’s moratorium on deep-ocean oil well drilling. The president had imposed the moratorium in response to the disaster in the gulf that spewed millions of barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico each
even more recent debate about whether a reportedly homosexual federal district court judge should have recused himself from ruling on the constitutionality of California’s ban on gay marriage, judicial recusal has never been more in vogue. A federal appellate judge once commented that recusal is the “topic du jour,” and this was before the spate of recent incidents dramatically shook the foundation of the judicial disqualification jurisprudence. While the aphorism that there is “no such thing as bad publicity” may be true in many aspects of modern popular culture, this is not the case when it comes to the judiciary. As the number of high-profile disqualification controversies continues to grow, the reputation of our courts is tarnished, and the public’s faith in judicial impartiality and independence erodes.

There is potentially a silver lining to the cloud of negative publicity: as more people notice a problem, and it continues to capture their attention, more people tend to work on a solution. This has certainly been the case with judicial recusal. The Caperton decision has sparked, or at the very least rekindled, academic and political interest in judicial disqualification. Following on the heels of that decision, Congress held hearings examining judicial recusals in light of Caperton, states
grappled (and continue to grapple) with new recusal rules and procedures, and law schools around the country have held conferences and symposia dedicated to Caperton and judicial ethics writ large. But despite this concerted effort, no large-scale, national disqualification reform looms on the horizon. The problem seems to be that while many scholars and judges agree that something must be done, few agree on precisely what that something should be.

There is, however, an overwhelming consensus on one point: When it comes to recusal, the focus is generally on the actual recusal decision—“What did the judge decide?” and “Was that decision correct?” In other words, scholars, judges, and politicians have historically concentrated on what I call “getting to recusal,” that is, creating and amending substantive recusal rules that require partial judges (whether that partiality is real or perceived) to step aside. And even though appearances play an important role in the law of judicial recusal, only at the point of the recusal decision are appearances and public perception considered. This results-oriented, outcome-based approach to recusal is not surprising—the final recusal decision is generally the most salient part of the entire recusal process and one that figures most prominently shortly after the controversy over Justice Scalia’s non-recusal in a case involving Vice President Dick Cheney. Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee called for hearings into possible shortcomings of recusal laws that allowed Justice Scalia to hear a case after vacationing with one of the litigants. Senator Kerry asserted at the time that “[t]here is absolutely no question that when judges accept vacations and gifts from the parties before them it erodes public trust in the courts.”

Shortly after the controversy over Justice Scalia’s non-recusal in a case involving Vice President Dick Cheney, Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee called for hearings into possible shortcomings of recusal laws that allowed Justice Scalia to hear a case after vacationing with one of the litigants. Senator Kerry asserted at the time that “[t]here is absolutely no question that when judges accept vacations and gifts from the parties before them it erodes public trust in the courts.”


11. West Virginia, Michigan, and Wisconsin are just a few of the states where contentious debate regarding the appropriate reaction to Caperton took place. For an article summarizing reforms in the states following Caperton, see James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787 (2010). On June 27, 2011, New York issued new recusal rules for elected state judges, prohibiting those judges from hearing cases involving litigants—parties or lawyers—who contributed over $2,500 to their campaigns. See Rules Governing the Assignment of Cases Involving Contributors to Judicial Campaigns, RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS §151.1, available at http://nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/151.shtml#section151_1.


13. But see John A. Meiser, Note, The (Non)Problem of a Limited Due Process Right to Judicial Disqualification, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1799 (2009) (suggesting that national-level reforms to disqualification rules are unnecessary, and that the issue should be left to individual states).
in the public spotlight. After all, it was recusal decisions themselves that generally gave rise to the recusal-related controversies arising in the last decade. In turn, the focus on outcomes leads recusal reformers to proceed under a fundamentally flawed assumption that the problem can be solved by simply fashioning a new rule requiring a future judge to recuse under the same factual circumstances that may have led a present-day judge not to recuse. As a consequence of this assumption, substantive recusal standards have been continually revised and refined, while recusal procedures have remained stagnant. Additionally, the same assumption (i.e., that recusal can eliminate the appearance of partiality created by the judicial conduct requiring recusal in the first place) has led scholars and politicians to pay little attention to regulating the underlying judicial conduct.

In the pages that follow, I argue that this outcome-based approach is misguided when it comes to maximizing the appearance of judicial impartiality and judicial legitimacy. Focusing on the final recusal decision, and considering appearances only at the time of that decision, places too much emphasis on an aspect of recusal that may not be so important, at least when it comes to public confidence in the impartiality and fairness of American courts.

This Article recommends a two-part solution. The first part requires that attention shift away from the outcome-based recusal jurisprudence that focuses on the substantive recusal standard and the actual recusal decision. The second requires that attention shift toward the rules, regulations, and procedures that precede the recusal decision: namely, (1) ex ante regulation of judicial conduct and judicial selection that creates the appearance of bias in the first place,14 and (2) new recusal procedures to govern the processes by which judges make recusal decisions. The recommended shift of attention to ex ante regulation of judicial conduct and appearance-based recusal procedures will promote the appearance of judicial impartiality.

While at first glance recusal may seem like a narrow and obscure

---

14. Unlike ex post solutions like judicial recusal, which seek to minimize the damage to the judiciary by removing judges when they may be perceived as biased, an ex ante solution in this context consists of rules that minimize or eliminate the damage to the judiciary from occurring in the first place. It may seem odd at first glance that in this Article about recusal, the key jurisprudential change that I recommend is not actually a change to recusal rules at all, but rather a new approach to regulating judges and aspiring judges. Nonetheless, I hope to show that to maximize the appearance of impartiality, the time to think about recusal is before the appearance of bias arises in the first place.
topic within the larger field of judicial ethics and judicial impartiality, judicial recusal is a linchpin for the underlying proposition that a court should be fair and impartial. Partly as a result of a poorly functioning recusal scheme, public confidence in the legal system has waned, and people are rightly concerned about the impartiality of their courts.15 A “crisis of confidence” may be infecting our ideals of judicial impartiality.16 In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White17 and Citizens United v. FEC,18 recusal reform may be the best way—perhaps the only way—to deal with the appearance of partiality that can be created by large campaign contributions to a judge in the course of an election.19 As other safeguards of judicial impartiality have fallen by the wayside or been struck down by the Supreme Court, and as judicial elections have come to resemble legislative elections, finding a new approach to recusal becomes more and more crucial.

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II discusses the history of judicial recusal in the United States. This history shows the evolution of American thought about judicial recusal, from its common-law origins, when disqualification was required only if the judge had a pecuniary interest in the case, to the regime in place today, which requires recusal for a mere appearance of bias. I will also show how substantive recusal standards have evolved under the assumption that the substantive recusal rule is the key factor in creating the appearance of judicial impartiality.

Part III starts with the proposition that the public’s perception of judicial conduct—the appearance of fairness and partiality—must be considered in recusal and disqualification rules and standards. It nevertheless concludes that relying solely on the “appearance of bias” standard—an ex post standard that has largely been accepted by judges and scholars—fails to create an appearance of impartiality. I challenge

19. Of course, another solution would be to eliminate judicial elections altogether. However, the public strongly supports judicial elections, and eliminating judicial elections at this time is politically infeasible.
the long-accepted and virtually uncontroverted assumption that a judge’s recusal can eliminate the appearance of impartiality. To the contrary, I argue that the mere act of recusal is an ineffective way to restore the public’s confidence in the courts, in part because it comes much too late. Although the empirical data on this issue is very limited, some preliminary research suggests that once the public has perceived conditions that create impartiality or bias, the recusal decision alone cannot fully restore public confidence. Furthermore, I argue that making appearance-based recusal decisions in individual cases on an ad hoc basis may not create an appearance of impartiality, no matter the substantive standard. Both of these conclusions require substantially more empirical analysis, but this Article suggests that it is a field worth a closer look.

Part IV proposes a solution: to maximize the appearance of impartiality and protect the reputation of the judiciary, we must implement ex ante regulations of judicial conduct that prevent the need for recusal altogether whenever possible. When recusal cannot be avoided, I propose the implementation of systemic, appearance-based procedural recusal rules. The appearance-based recusal procedures are themselves the ends of my proposal, not the means by which we accomplish some other goal (namely, the “right” substantive result). And while I leave open the question of what specific ex ante rules and which particular recusal procedures do the most to maximize and restore the appearance of judicial impartiality, I conclude with some suggestions about how my proposals could be implemented.

II. JUDICIAL RECUSAL: PAST AND PRESENT

The American legal system is based on a simple and noncontroversial proposition: a fair and neutral judge is essential to the operation of a just legal system. This maxim was recognized throughout the history of legal institutions, and, in some respects, the academic scholarship on the judiciary, and the judicial role is about advancing fair, impartial, and independent judges. Disqualification of unfair and non-neutral judges is just one method commonly used to ensure impartiality within the judiciary.20 After all, judges are human and often develop

20. There are, of course, more draconian measures that can be used to remove biased or partial judges, including censure, reprimand, and impeachment. Often, these measures are reserved for judges who engage in blatant corruption or violate other ethical rules. See, e.g., Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/13judge.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1300986369-
personal and professional relationships that may hinder their ability to preside over a dispute in a fair and impartial manner. This Part provides an overview of the history and development of recusal rules in the United States. The recusal scheme that exists in the United States today has its roots in English common law. Exploring the history of recusal rules and standards helps explain recent controversies surrounding judicial disqualification in state and federal courts. The discussion will also highlight the important role that appearances—public perception of the judiciary and confidence in the courts—play in current recusal jurisprudence.

A. Roots

Early Jewish and Roman law recognized the importance of judicial impartiality.21 In fact, medieval Jewish law prohibited judges from participating in cases involving a friend or a kinsman,22 and the Roman Code of Justinian provided for removal of judges for mere suspicion of bias.23 Similarly, English common law provided for replacement of a suspect judge and recognized the maxim that “no man ought to be a judge in his own cause.”24 But by the 18th century, the common-law recusal practice was exceedingly simple and highly constrained: only if he had a direct pecuniary interest in the case was the judge to be disqualified.25

21. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 5. Bracton set out the common law rule for disqualification in the thirteenth century:

A justiciary may be refused for good cause, but the only cause for refusal is a suspicion, which arises from many causes, as if the judge be a blood relative of the plaintiff, his vassal or subject, his parent or friend, or an enemy of the tenant, his kinsman or a member of his household, or a table-companion, or he has been his counsellor or his pleader in that cause or in another, and in any such like capacity.

6 HENRICIDEBRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIE 249 (Travers Twisstrans., 1883).


23. Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 n.10 (1923).


Commentators, including Blackstone, and English courts of that time rejected the notion that a judge should be disqualified from hearing a case merely because he may be biased. This was largely due to the then-prevalent respect for judges. Blackstone wrote, “The law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge,” who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea. Recusal was not required even when family members appeared as parties in front of a judge.

B. Judicial Disqualification in the United States

Under the common law, and in the British Commonwealth even to this day, the law on judicial recusal is largely judge-made. In the United States, federal and state legislation also play a key role in regulating judicial disqualification. This is an important distinction, as this Article will later argue that judges are not in the best position to regulate their own conduct, whether it comes to recusal procedures or to the substantive recusal standard. For now, however, let us examine the history and development of the standard.

1. Federal recusal statutes

Although the American Founders shared some of the English reverence for the judiciary, and American disqualification law grew directly out of the common law tradition, American judges—at least American federal judges—have historically been held to a more stringent recusal standard than judges in England. Judges continue to take an oath swearing to administer justice “faithfully and impartially.” But in

26. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES*361; Brookes v. Rivers, [1668] 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (holding that a judge was not required to recuse himself in his brother-in-law’s case).
27. Of course, one could argue it was also partly due to a lack of understanding of human nature and subconscious bias. See PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERS 267–301 (2010) (discussing biases in processing and judging information, including hindsight bias, confirmation bias, and overconfidence).
28. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *361.
29. Brookes, 145 Eng. Rep. at 569 (explaining that a judge need not recuse himself from a brother-in-law’s case because “favour shall not be presumed in a judge”).
30. As I explain in greater detail below, while the substantive recusal standard has changed significantly since the common law, and we have a much greater understanding of both conscious and subconscious bias, the recusal procedures used in common law are still prevalent today.
virtually every jurisdiction, financial interest is now only one of many disqualifying factors, which also include familial and professional connections to the parties or their counsel, prejudice, partiality, bias, and knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts.32

Leading up to the American Revolution, colonists adopted the simple and narrow common law recusal rule described above. But shortly thereafter, in 1792, Congress passed the United States’ first recusal statute.33 It is unknown why Congress stepped into the fray so quickly, but the passage of the law was perhaps a sign of a concern that the recusal issue should not be left entirely to judges. This initial legislation was narrowly drawn and interpreted, and did not prohibit judges from hearing cases in which they might have a bias for or against a party.34 Rather, the statute largely codified the common law disqualification rules and called for disqualification of a district court judge who was “concerned in interest,” as well as judges who had “been of counsel for either party.”35

Over the next two centuries, the federal recusal statute was amended and shaped. The federal statute that governs recusals by federal judges today is 28 U.S.C. § 455.36 It is divided into two parts. Section 455(a) is a general catch-all provision that requires disqualification whenever a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”37 This standard was intended to promote not only the impartiality of the judiciary but also the public perception of the impartiality of the judicial process.38 No

following oath:

“I, ________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ________ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.”

32. See FLAMM, supra note 2, chs. 23–27 (surveying disqualification rules in state and federal courts).


34. Id. In other words, Congress did not entirely reject the simple recusal standard that was in place in England.

35. Id.

36. This statute is a descendant of the original 1792 statute, which was altered in 1821 by the Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643; in 1891 by the Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 23, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090; then again in 1911 by the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090; and recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1948.


longer do we tolerate all non-financial bias by our judges. Instead, the statute is interpreted to proscribe even the appearance of bias, as viewed from the perspective of an objective observer.

This appearance-based standard has been in place since the statute was amended in 1974 and was intended to overrule the duty-to-sit doctrine, which suggested that close questions on disqualification issues should be resolved in favor of hearing the case.39 Section 455(a) has been described by the Court as a “catchall” provision, covering all kinds of bias and prejudice, and requiring an objective evaluation rather than the earlier subjective standard.40

Section 455(b), on the other hand, lists specific circumstances requiring disqualification.41 Some consider the § 455(b) list as an a priori, per se determination of conditions that automatically satisfy the standard set forth in § 455(a), while others regard the list as a predetermined set of circumstances that involve actual bias rather than “the public perception of the judicial process.”42 Section 455(b) is (a) was designed to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process by replacing the subjective ‘in his opinion’ standard with an objective test.”).

41. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). Subsection 455(b)(1) requires a judge to recuse himself when he “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” Id. § 455(b)(1). Subsection (b)(2) requires recusal “[w]here in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning [the matter in controversy].” Id. § 455(b)(2).
42. Compare Leslie W. Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualification in Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1049–50 (1993) (arguing that § 455(b) particularizes the grounds for disqualification that satisfy the catch-all standard of § 455(a), with Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Section 455(b) covers situations in which an actual conflict of interest exists, even if there is no appearance of one.”) (emphasis omitted); see also Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1527 (11th Cir. 1988).
implicated in cases involving allegations of personal bias or prejudice, or when the judge’s relationships and interests—including prior employment, family relationships, and financial interests—create a conflict of interest. In other words, unlike § 455(a), which focuses on how a reasonable person would perceive the judicial conduct, § 455(b) addresses circumstances that are likely (in the eyes of the legislature) to create actual bias towards a party to the litigation.

Despite numerous amendments, each broadening and expanding the disqualification standards, judges have always interpreted the statute narrowly. This is partly because judges apply the law to themselves, and most judges hesitate to admit that they are so biased or so interested in a case as to be unable to render a fair, impartial decision. Research in cognitive psychology has recognized various biases that may affect judicial decisionmaking on recusal, including unconscious bias and self-serving bias. In addition, the judge-created “duty to sit” doctrine encouraged judges to err on the side of remaining on a case even when there was a strong argument in favor of recusal.

Judicial reluctance to acknowledge bias is only part of the reason why federal recusal statutes have had only limited success. Bias is a difficult concept to define. Generally, bias is defined as an “[i]nclination; prejudice, predilection; a preconceived opinion; a predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction.” Unfortunately, the attempts to draw bright lines for judges to follow have focused predominantly on judges’ financial interests at the expense of all other interests. In fact, the disclosures required of all federal judges address only financial holdings. The focus on financial interests is understandable since

46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 171 (9th ed. 2009).
47. A judge must recuse himself when “[h]e knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2000). Financial interest is defined as “ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small”Id. § 455(d)(4).
financial interests are generally easier to define and identify. Furthermore, the popularity of law and economics—which claims that wealth maximization motivates human behavior—shifts the emphasis even more to a judge’s financial ties.

A second recusal statute, codified as 28 U.S.C. § 144, allows litigants to seek disqualification of a district court judge for any alleged bias or prejudice and establishes a broader recusal standard. Under this statute, judges have limited discretion about whetherto recuse; litigants need only file an affidavit alleging sufficient facts to infer a judge’s prejudice. Once such an affidavit is filed, the facts contained in the affidavit are presumptively valid, and a judge is automatically disqualified from the case. In *Berger v. United States*, the Supreme Court explained that this statute prohibits a judge from ruling on the truth of the allegations in a party’s affidavit, requiring disqualification so long as the affidavit is facially sufficient.

However, judges have adopted a narrow definition of prejudice and continue to review the affidavit to determine whether the litigants have satisfied the statutory requirements. In other words, the very judge whose fairness is under review rules on the sufficiency of the affidavit. Professor Frank has explained:

Frequent escape from the statute has been effected through narrow construction of the phrase “bias and prejudice.” Affidavits are found not “legally sufficient” on the ground that the specific acts mentioned do not in fact indicate “bias and prejudice,” a reasoning which emasculates the *Berger* decision by transferring the point of conflict.


50. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 25.2.1, at 721 ("On its face § 144 appears to be a peremptory disqualification provision, and there is little doubt that it was originally intended to be one.").

51. 255 U.S. at 36.


53. Frank, *supra* note 25, at 629. Countervailing a judge’s duty to recuse was a judiciallycreated “duty to sit,” first articulated by the Fifth Circuit. *Edwards v. United States*, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964). That court explained that “[i]t is a judge’s duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason for recusation.” *Id.* The “duty to sit” provided the ammunition for judges to err on the side of nonrecusal, even when recusal was arguably justified. Although the duty to sit doctrine was eventually accepted by all circuits, see Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972), the duty to sit has now largely been rejected.
2. **ABA Code of Judicial Conduct**

While 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 and 144 control only in federal courts, nearly every state has adopted the American Bar Association’s *Code of Judicial Conduct*. The Code, therefore, governs judicial disqualification in almost all American state courts and applies to all full-time judges and all legal and quasi-legal proceedings.

Rule 2.11 of the 2007 Code states: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .” Impartiality is defined as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open mind in considering issues that may come before the judge.”

In many ways, disqualification under the Code resembles disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): both have been interpreted to impose an appearance-based disqualification standard. Both also leave judges with broad discretion in interpreting the Code’s requirements.

---

54. The Code of Judicial Conduct does not apply to the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, although the Supreme Court looks to the Code for guidance. See Caprice L. Roberts, *The Fox Guarding the Henhouse? Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort*, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 111 (2004). In light of recent controversies surrounding recusal of Supreme Court Justices, including Justices Scalia and Thomas, some commentators and law professors have called on the Court to adopt the Code for itself or for Congress to impose such adoption upon the Court.


57. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is another ethical code that applies to most federal judges and is largely similar to the ABA Model Code. The Code, adopted and revised by the Judicial Conference of the United States, does not govern the Justices of the United States Supreme Court because the Conference has no authority to create rules controlling the Supreme Court. See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., *Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?*, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 386 (2006).

58. *Model Code of Judicial Conduct* 2.11 (2007). The rule goes on to list specific situations where the likelihood of prejudice or its appearance is presumed, although the list is not exhaustive.

59. *Id.*

60. Abramson, *supra* note 56, at 55 n.2 (“Whether a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is also referred to as the appearance of partiality, appearance of impropriety, or negative appearances.”).
and applying this standard, and judges have exploited this discretion to downplay the potential for an appearance of bias. I discuss disqualification of state and federal judges interchangeably, as any distinctions between the two are generally inapposite for the purposes of this Article.

C. Recusal Under the Due Process Clause

In addition to the federal statutes and the state judicial codes, the Constitution’s Due Process Clause guarantees litigants a right to have their cases heard and decided by fair and impartial judges. The Supreme Court has held that a biased judge violates the litigant’s constitutional rights, requiring either a new trial or a new hearing on appeal without the tainted judge’s presence. These holdings, however, are exceptions rather than the rule, and it has long been thought that the Constitution mandates disqualification in only very limited circumstances. The Supreme Court has explained that “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion” rather than a constitutional recusal floor. For decades, it was thought that recusal was mandated under the Due Process Clause in only two circumstances: (1) when the judge has a financial interest in one of the parties; or (2) when the judge presides over a criminal contempt hearing after presiding over an earlier hearing in which the contemptuous behavior took place. But in Caperton, the Supreme Court held that recusal is also mandated when the judge’s relationship with one of the litigants creates a probability of bias. Although Caperton involved a judge who decided a case involving a supporter of the judge’s election bid, the holding of the case does not appear to be limited to the electoral context. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether Caperton will change recusal analysis under the Due Process Clause, or if it will be a one-off case limited to its facts. These three categories of recusal—the two classic standards, and the new Caperton standard—are discussed in greater detail below.

62. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
63. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”).
66. See id. at 2257, 2267.
1. Financial interest

The first situation where the Due Process Clause requires disqualification is when the judge may benefit financially depending on the outcome of the case. In the leading case, *Tumey v. State of Ohio*, an Ohio statute authorized a mayor to preside over cases as a judge. The mayor then received court costs assessed against a convicted defendant, but not an acquitted one. The Court held that this incentive scheme threatened judicial impartiality and invalidated the statute on due process grounds, explaining that due process is violated when a judge is “paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant.” In its holding, the Court relied on the common law rule that a judge may not have a “direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest” in the case. That rule has its origins in the maxim that no person is allowed to be “a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and . . . corrupt his integrity.” This result is neither controversial nor surprising; a judge should not receive “contingency fees” for convicting a defendant.

A judge’s interest need not be a direct financial one to violate due process. For example, in *Ward v. Village of Monroeville* the Court held that a mayor could not preside as a judge over ordinance violations and traffic offenses when contributions to the town’s budget came from the fines assessed by the court. While the mayor’s salary did not depend on his conviction rate, the mayor still had a financial incentive to convict; he was responsible for the town’s revenue production. That incentive, held the Court, is inconsistent with due process.

Similar incentives were held to violate due process in *Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie*. There, an Alabama Supreme Court justice ruled in favor of the plaintiff on his bad faith claim against Aetna. It turned out, however, that the same judge had filed two nearly identical

68. Id. at 531.
69. Id. at 523.
70. THE FEDERALIST NO.10 (James Madison).
72. 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). Between 1964 and 1968, the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees that the court had imposed provided nearly one-half of the village’s annual revenue. Id. at 58.
73. Id. at 60 (“The mayor’s executive responsibilities [sic] for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.”).
actions against other insurance companies making similar allegations and seeking punitive damages.75 Those cases were still pending in Alabama’s lower courts at the time the Aetna case was decided. The Supreme Court held that the justice’s refusal to recuse violated the Due Process Clause. Without deciding whether the justice was in fact influenced by his pending cases, the Court explained that the circumstances “would offer a possible temptation to the average judge to lead him to not to [sic] hold the balance nice, clear and true.”76 In other words, recusal was necessary not because of the justice’s ill will towards insurance companies, but rather because his decision “had the clear and immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and the settlement value of his own case.”77 As with Tumey and Ward, the judge could have used his position on the bench to further his own financial interests, acting as “a judge in his own case.”78

In short, before Caperton, the “interested judge” category was fairly straightforward: if the judge could be linked to any financial interest, disqualification was required. The common thread in all of these cases was that the presiding judge derived a direct or indirect benefit by ruling in favor of one of the litigants.

2. Criminal contempt

The second disqualification category that falls within the confines of the Due Process Clause does not involve any financial interest to the judge. Instead, the Court has held that the due process forbids a judge from wearing too many hats. For example, in In re Murchison, the Court found a violation of the Due Process Clause although the judge did not have a personal pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.79 There, the Court set aside contempt convictions and held that it is a violation of due process for the same judge to serve as the one-person grand jury and then preside over a contempt proceeding related to the grand jury hearing.80

Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, which followed In re Murchison, is also

75. Id. at 817.
76. Id. at 825 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
77. Id. at 824.
78. Id.; see also Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (holding that an administrative board made up of optometrists was disqualified from presiding over a hearing against competing optometrists).
80. Id.
instructive. In *Mayberry*, the defendant, in the course of trial, verbally attacked the presiding judge and continuously interrupted court, to the point where Mayberry had to be removed from the courtroom. The Supreme Court held that when the defendant faces criminal contempt charges he “should be given a public trial before a judge other than the one reviled by the contemnor.” Again, disqualification was necessary because of the interaction between the judge and the defendant prior to the contempt hearing. The Court explained that a “vilified” judge necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication.

3. *Caperton v. Massey*

This was the state of recusal law under the Due Process Clause until *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.* In that case, West Virginia Supreme Court Justice Benjamin cast the deciding vote in favor of the appellant, Massey, whose CEO, Don Blankenship, was an extremely generous supporter of Justice Benjamin in the previous West Virginia Supreme Court election campaign. Blankenship contributed more to Benjamin’s campaign than all other donors combined, all while his attorneys were preparing the *Caperton* case for an appeal. Justice Benjamin refused Caperton’s recusal request and voted with the majority in a three–two decision overturning the trial court’s verdict. The Supreme Court

82. Defendant referred to the judge as a “hatchet man for the State,” a “dirty sonofabitch,” and a “dirty, tyrannical old dog.” *Id.* at 456–57.
83. *Id.* at 462.
84. *Id.* at 466. The same rule applies when a trial judge, following trial, punishes a lawyer for contempt committed during trial without giving that lawyer an opportunity to be heard in defense or mitigation. See *Taylor v. Hayes*, 418 U.S. 488, 499–500 (1974). In such circumstances, a different judge should conduct the contempt trial in place of the judge who initiated the contempt.
86. *Id.*
87. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
88. During the campaign, Blankenship spent approximately $3 million to help Justice Benjamin. However, only $1000, the West Virginia limit for direct campaign contributions, was given directly to Benjamin’s campaign. The rest of the money (i) funded a tax-exempt organization, And for the Sake of the Kids, which was formed to defeat incumbent Justice McGraw, and (ii) was spent on newspaper and television advertising attacking McGraw. See Brief for Petitioners at 6–8, *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.*, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08–22).
89. *Id.* at 2. The case’s long history and factual background is not relevant for the purposes of this Article. It should be noted, however, that recusal played a prominent role in the case’s
reversed, holding that Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse violated Caperton’s right to due process.

After Caperton, there is little doubt that recusal is required under the Due Process Clause even when the judge has no personal interest in the outcome of the litigation and did not act as both a judge and a prosecutor or witness in the same case. It remains to be seen, however, whether this case is a trendsetter and will change the way that states approach judicial recusal, or if it is simply an outlier that will have limited jurisprudential effect. Some have suggested that the Caperton holding is fairly narrow, requiring a judge to recuse “himself because of campaign contributions or independent expenditures by an individual who is not a lawyer or party before the Court but has an interest in a case that is before the court.” 90 And Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion takes great pains to convey the limited precedential effect of the Court’s decision. The opinion describes the situation as “exceptional” and “extreme;” 91 so exceptional, in fact, that “[a]pplication of the constitutional standard implicated in this case will thus be confined to rare instances.” 92

But there is no reason to believe that the decision is limited solely to the campaign contribution context. Rather, the Caperton test may be satisfied, and disqualification may be required, even outside the universe of judicial elections and campaign contributions. For example, the Court accepted the notion that Justice Benjamin “would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected.” 93 There is nothing in that notion—the idea of a debt of gratitude—that is limited to judicial elections. Would a federal judge feel a debt of gratitude to the president who selected her? Or perhaps to the judge’s former colleague at a large law firm who helped the judge in some life endeavor? How the lower courts interpret the Supreme Court’s decision in Caperton will be one of the most important trends to follow

90. Rotunda, supra note 711, at 256.
91. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263, 2265, 2267.
92. Id. at 2267.
93. Id. at 2262.
Desktop Publishing Example

D. Recent Incidents

Recusal has garnered national headlines on many occasions over the last few decades. Judges have been denied appointments to the Supreme Court,94 suspended,95 and have faced other sanctions and general opprobrium for their recusal-related misconduct.96 But in the last decade alone, five current Supreme Court Justices—Justice Scalia, along with Justices Thomas,97 Ginsburg,98 Roberts,99 and Alito100—have been

94. When President Nixon nominated Judge Clement Haynsworth to the United States Supreme Court, his failure to recuse ultimately led to his nomination being defeated. First, Haynsworth’s opponents pointed out that he sat on an important labor case involving the Deering Milliken Darlington Manufacturing Company while owning stock in a vending company that installed and serviced vending machines in the Deering plants. See Peter W. Bowie, The Last 100 Years An Era of Expanding Appearances, 48 S. Tex. L. Rev. 911, 929–30 (2007). The Senate Judiciary Committee closely scrutinized Judge Haynsworth’s interest in the vending company and its relations with Deering. Id. at 930. Later, it was learned that Haynsworth purchased stock in the Brunswick Corporation while a case involving Brunswick was under submission, after oral argument and before the draft decision was circulated. Frank, supra note 2, at 56. Haynsworth did not recuse himself. In large part due to his improper conduct on the bench and failure to recuse himself in the Deering and Brunswick cases, Haynsworth’s nomination was denied by the Senate. See Bowie, supra, at 930.

95. For example, the Tenth Circuit suspended District Judge Stephen Chandler from all judicial duties after he refused to recuse himself in two cases. Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74 (1970).


99. Justice Roberts was questioned about his continued involvement in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld after he was approached about a potential nomination to the United States Supreme Court. The case was considered to be important to the President, and some scholars have commented that Roberts should have recused himself from Hamdan after he learned that he was being considered for the nomination to the Supreme Court. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Propriety of a Judge’s Failure to Recuse When Being Considered for Another Position, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1187 (2006).

100. While he was a judge on the Third Circuit, Justice Alito sat on a case in which Vanguard, a mutual fund management firm in which he had invested, was a party. Judge Alito wrote the opinion affirming dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim. R. Jeffrey Smith, Judge Participated in 2002...
embroiled in recusal-related controversies. Justice Scalia’s denial of plaintiffs’ recusal request in *Cheney v. United States District Court* is perhaps the most controversial incident in the last decade. Even before the Supreme Court’s *Caperton* decision, Judge McKeown called judicial recusal the “topic du jour.” But despite all this controversy, “the theoretical underpinnings of American judicial disqualification jurisprudence remain murky, . . . unsettled, . . . and replete with inconsistencies.” Recusal experts have commented that “judicial disqualification frequently is subjective, random, and arbitrary,” and that “disqualification law is a sprawling patchwork, as thin as it is wide.” Although judicial bias and recusal have always been issues of considerable importance, recusal has recently taken on an even greater significance that demands immediate scholarly attention. As judicial elections become “noisier, nastier and costlier,” recusal becomes more and more important to minimize the judicial bias created in the course of judicial elections.

This transformation of judicial elections is no minor point. The Supreme Court’s decisions in *Republican Party of Minnesota v. White* and *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* are part of the

---


102. Id. at 929.
103. McKeown, supra note 8, at 45.
104. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.6, at 14.
108. 536 U.S. 765, 794 (2002) (striking down a Minnesota judicial canon that prohibited candidates for judicial office from announcing their views on legal issues).
109. 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (holding that federal restrictions on corporate independent expenditures and electioneering communications are unconstitutional).

122
recent trend that has seen judicial elections come to resemble legislative elections. Over 70 percent of Americans believe that judges receiving campaign contributions are not impartial in litigation involving those contributors, and numerous empirical studies demonstrate that judges tend to rule in favor of their campaign contributors. Even judges do not believe that their colleagues can be impartial when dealing with those who helped them get elected. In this legal environment, recusal is necessary to ensure that bias stemming from judicial campaign contributions and judicial elections is minimized. In fact, judicial recusal may be the only way to deal with the appearances of partiality created when judges accept contributions from lawyers and persons who ultimately appear as litigants in front of the judge.

III. IS GETTING IT RIGHT ENOUGH?

As the discussion above shows, most jurisdictions in the United States have implemented recusal standards that revolve primarily around the appearance of impartiality. That is, in determining whether a judge should be disqualified from hearing a case, the challenged judge’s actual state of mind is largely irrelevant; the recusal decision hinges on the perceptions of “a reasonable person knowing all the relevant facts.” This standard is intended “to protect the . . . appearance of impartiality.” Of course, recusal is also required in the event the judge is actually biased, but rarely does a disqualification inquiry turn on a judge’s actual bias. Cases of actual bias are rare, in part because an


112. Pozen, supranote 110, at 305.

113. Roberts v. Bilar, 625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1980).

114. United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1988).

115. In Caperton, the Supreme Court held that a judge must recuse himself when there is a
“affirmative finding of actual bias requires direct evidence or a very strong inference that the judge was so predisposed against a party that he or she had an entirely closed mind.” Indeed, the appearance-of-bias test came into existence to address the problems inherent in a disqualification rule that either requires the litigant to show that the judge is “actually biased” or demands that the judge so conclude on her own. While some scholars and judges have criticized the appearance-based substantive recusal standard, few people dispute that appearances are important to the American judiciary and are a valid, if not a compelling, consideration in setting rules to govern judicial disqualification. Alexander Hamilton observed that the judicial branch has “no influence, over either the sword or the purse.”

Policymakers today appreciate that judges lack both electoral legitimacy and political force, making the judiciary’s success depend in large part on the public’s acceptance of its authority. Without such acceptance, a judicial proclamation carries no weight, and court rulings
are routinely ignored. If the public lacks confidence in the impartiality of judges, or worse, refuses to comply with judicial decisions voluntarily, the notion that “we are a government of laws” would necessarily collapse. If for no other reason, courts should be protective of their reputation from public outrage and rejection for the sake of self-preservation.

Just as policymakers recognize the importance of appearances and public perception in setting recusal standards, judges acknowledge that the success of the judiciary hinges in large part on public confidence—the people’s faith—in the impartiality, independence, and accountability of the judiciary. Justice John Paul Stevens once said, “[i]t is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law.” The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of appearances, stating that “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness” and that “to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice’.” Appearance of fairness, in other words, is as important as fairness itself. Thus, in considering the effectiveness of a recusal scheme, impartiality is only part of the equation; appearance of impartiality and appearance of justice are perhaps just as important.

But even if one starts with the assumption that appearances should continue to play a key role in recusal jurisprudence, we must still ask how and when appearances should be considered, what role public perception should play, and whether certain rules indeed foster the public’s confidence in the judiciary or, to the contrary, impede it. This is where current recusal jurisprudence goes astray. Despite my enthusiastic support for the consideration of appearances in judicial disqualification jurisprudence, I argue that scholars writing about recusal, as well as

---

120. Mackenzie, supra note 96, atix. There are many nations where judges’ rulings are routinely ignored and many others where the judiciary is held in disrepute because of its lack of independence, rampant corruption, or other forces.

121. Id.


125. Cf. Randall J. Litteneker, Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236, 267 (1978) (identifying the importance of “a judicial system that not only is impartial in fact, but also appears to render disinterested justice”).
politicians and bar associations setting recusal rules and judges enforcing those rules, have paid undue attention to the substantive recusal standard at the expense of other rules and standards that may actually be more important when it comes to maximizing the appearance of impartiality.

A. “Getting to Recusal”

Today, the entire “appearance” inquiry takes place at one discrete point of a recusal timeline: the time when the actual recusal decision is made. It is only then that the appearance-of-bias test is triggered, and only then that anybody—usually the very judge whose continued presence on the case is being questioned—considers the potential effect on public perception if the challenged judge continues to preside over, or casts a vote in, the case. The timing is generally not viewed as a problem because of the widely accepted assumption that if the judge makes the correct recusal decision, public confidence in the judiciary will be restored. In other words, so long as the judge reaches a “correct” recusal decision, law essentially operates on the well-established playground basketball principle of “no harm, no foul.” Under this assumption, postponing consideration of appearances until this late juncture makes perfect sense.

Operating under this assumption, policymakers (when it comes to recusal, the policymakers are usually legislators, bar associations, or state supreme courts) have focused almost entirely on the substantive recusal standard, amending it when controversies arise and defining more precisely the circumstances that should lead to recusal.126 For example, at the federal level, when Congress decides to amend the judicial disqualification statute, it almost always “enlarge[s] the enumerated grounds for seeking disqualification.”127 The focus on the substantive standard has led to what some commentators have termed a “vicious cycle.”128 Describing the holding pattern in the development of judicial disqualification doctrine in the United States, Amanda Frost wrote:

First, Congress sets the standard governing when judges must remove themselves from sitting on cases in which they are not able, or might not be able, to be impartial. That standard is then narrowly construed by the judges who must apply it to decide whether they themselves

127. FLAMM, supra note 2, § 23.1, at 670.
Desktop Publishing Example

should be disqualified from a case. Eventually, a particularly egregious situation arises in which a judge sits on a case when most outside observers think that she should have stepped aside. The situation comes to the attention of the press, the public, and ultimately Congress, which amends the law to provide stiffer standards for recusal. And then the whole process begins anew.\footnote{Frost, supra note 43, at 538.}

But it is not only politicians and bar leaders who operate under this assumption. Most of the scholarship in the field has focused on what I call “getting to recusal”—that is, seeking solutions that will lead to the “correct” substantive recusal decision, assuming, once again, that if judges can reach such a decision, recusal will do its job. In discussing recusal, scholars generally pay insufficient attention to preventing the underlying event or conduct from occurring.

Much of the normative recusal scholarship falls into one of two broad categories.\footnote{There is of course a great deal of descriptive scholarship looking at the history and evolution of judicial recusals, describing trends in judicial disqualification jurisprudence, and discussing the implications of particular recusal decisions.} The first focuses on the substantive recusal standard itself. Some authors argue that the appearance-based recusal standard is misguided and should be changed.\footnote{Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit of Actual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2007).} For example, Sarah Cravens suggests that the main goal of judicial ethics is to achieve not the appearance of justice but rather actual justice in judicial decisionmaking.\footnote{Id.} She argues that impartiality concerns should be addressed not through recusal standards that focus on appearance, but rather “through a requirement that judges provide explanations of adequate internal legal reasons supporting their dispositive decisions.”\footnote{Id. at 2.} Others defend the standard against these attacks, arguing that appearances should continue to play an important or even greater role in the substantive recusal standard.\footnote{Bassett, supra note 52; Frank, supra note 25; Jed Handelsman Shugerman, In Defense of Appearances What Caperton v. Massey Should Have Said, 59 DePaul L. REV. 529 (2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249 (2010); Brian P. Leitch, Note, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts A Proposal to Conform Statutory Provisions to Underlying Policies, 67 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1982).} Both camps, however, focus on the actual recusal decision; their disagreement is only about the standard that should be applied. They both mirror the approach that Congress has...
taken, tinkering with the substantive recusal standards and amending judicial disqualification statutes.

The second, larger category of recusal-related scholarship involves attempts by academics to identify the facts and circumstances that should lead to disqualification under the current, appearance-based standard. Here, again, the focus is on the recusal decision, but this time the effort is not to formulate the best substantive standard but rather to determine when recusal is necessary in the current scheme. For example, in a recent article, Keith Swisher argues that judges taking a “tough on crime” stance in the course of judicial elections should be disqualified under the current appearance-based recusal standard because their impartiality may reasonably be questioned. Others have argued for additional guidance and inclusion of specific, clear, bright-line substantive rules that would aid the court in deciding whether refusal to recuse would create an appearance of impropriety.

The assumption that a stringent recusal standard can negate the damage to appearances, and reinforce the appearance of judicial impartiality, also motivates judges. Concurring in White, which struck down a provision in Minnesota’s code of judicial ethics that prohibited judicial election candidates from discussing political issues and announcing their positions on those issues, Justice Kennedy explained that states “may adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires, and censure judges who violate these standards.” In other words, according to Justice Kennedy, the way to create and foster an appearance of a fair and impartial judiciary is by tightening the recusal framework, not by regulating the judicial conduct that creates the appearance in the first place.

The same reasoning continued in Caperton, where Justice Kennedy, this time writing for the Court, said that the “appearance of impropriety” standard is “[t]he principal safeguard against judicial campaign abuses’ that threaten to imperil ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the nation’s elected judges.” Again, any damage to the public confidence in the impartiality and fairness of the courts is to be remedied

---

135. See Abramson, supra note 56; Abramson, supra note 42.
137. Abramson, supra note 42, at 1080.
by imposing a strict recusal standard requiring disqualification of judges for even an appearance of bias.\textsuperscript{140}

The following chart (Figure 1) provides a visual illustration of the “getting to recusal” approach. It shows the four possible recusal decisions that a judge may reach. There are two correct decisions: a judge may recuse when there is appearance of partiality, and non-recuse when there is no appearance of impartiality. There are also two incorrect decisions: a judge may recuse when there is no appearance of partiality, and a judge may decide not to recuse when there is such an appearance. Under the traditional “getting to recusal” framework, the focus has generally been on getting the judge out of the two “wrong” boxes\textsuperscript{141} and into the two “right” ones. This Article argues that simply getting it right is not enough to create an appearance of impartiality.

\textit{Figure 1.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correct Decision</th>
<th>Wrong Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appearance of Bias: Yes</td>
<td>Appearance of Bias: Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recusal: Yes</td>
<td>Recusal: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrong Decision</td>
<td>Correct Decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearance of Bias: No</td>
<td>Appearance of Bias: No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recusal: Yes</td>
<td>Recusal: No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{B. Why Recusal May Not Be the Solution}

In the following pages, I suggest that the underlying assumption that a correct recusal decision fully restores public confidence and entirely eliminates the appearance of bias may need to be reconsidered. This may be the case even when a judge \textit{correctly} concludes (a) that his

\textsuperscript{140} Lower court judges have mirrored the Court’s rationale. In a recent case, the Eighth Circuit explained: “[W]e think the Constitution favors stricter recusal standards and fewer speech restrictions.” \textit{Wersal v. Sexton}, 613 F.3d 821, 841 (8th Cir. 2010).

\textsuperscript{141} In particular, the upper right box has caused the most concern. Although the judge in the lower left box wrongly recuses when there is no appearance of bias, most commentators today do not view this mistake as particularly problematic. This was not always so as courts had at one time held that it is “a judge’s duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified, but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason for recusation.” United States v. Edwards, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964) (citing \textit{BancoNacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino}, 307 F.2d 845, 860 (2d Cir. 1962),\textit{rev’d}, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)). The duty to sit has now been abandoned for most state and federal judges.
impartiality could reasonably be questioned and recuses, or (b) that his impartiality could not be questioned and declines to recuse. There are two reasons for this surprising assertion.

1. *Too little, too late*

The first reason why the “getting to recusal” approach fails to foster an appearance of impartiality is because the focus on appearances comes too late. Because appearances are considered only at the time of the final recusal decision, judges are free to engage in conduct that ultimately creates an appearance of partiality, and only then, once the appearance has been created, is the judge expected to recuse.¹⁴² This means that by the time the recusal decision is ultimately made and publicized, the public has already observed the conduct and the events that negatively affect its perception of the judiciary and formed its own, often negative, opinions about judicial impartiality. Recusal is intended as the solution to the problem; by requiring the judge to step aside, any appearance of impartiality is thought to be eliminated and public confidence in the court restored.

Research done by political scientists James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira suggests that things are not quite so simple.¹⁴³ Gibson and Caldeira set out to study recusal’s effect on restoring the public’s confidence in the judgment of a particular case or in the judiciary itself. They used vignettes modeled after the facts in *Caperton* to determine whether citizens believed that “the recipient of the campaign support can serve as a fair and impartial judge and whether the West Virginia Supreme Court itself is a legitimate institution.”¹⁴⁴ Among the independent variables that Gibson and Caldeira manipulated was the judge’s recusal decision—did the judge step aside or did the judge cast his vote in the case despite the calls for recusal. The authors hypothesized, just as scholars and politicians for centuries had assumed,

---

¹⁴². It is important to highlight that the underlying conduct that is the focus of this Article is not improper by itself, as judicial codes already prohibit judges from engaging in such conduct. Rather, the problem arises only when a particular litigant, or a particular case, appears in front of the judge.


¹⁴⁴. *Id.* at 11.
that “where a conflict of interest exists, recusal will rescue the legitimacy of the court.”

But this assumption turned out to be wrong, at least in part. Instead, the study revealed that the “effect of recusals is not to restore the court/judge to the level of support that exists when no conflict of interest is present.” That is, the recusal decision did not counteract the appearance of partiality that was created when a judicial candidate accepted contributions from a future litigant. This research confirms that the traditional assumption that recusals can neutralize conflicts of interests may not be entirely correct, and that “recusal is only a weak palliative for conflicts of interests created by contributions.” In other words, even when a judge on a multi-member court recuses, the public’s confidence in that court is only partially restored, and the public’s perception of partiality and bias is not completely erased.

These results may be surprising to some, but they also make a great deal of sense. Sticking to the judiciary election context, we know that campaign contributions have a negative effect on institutional legitimacy. This concern is not without reason, since data suggest that judges are more likely to decide in favor of their contributor. Furthermore, the public may be reasonably concerned that other contributions were made that simply have not yet come to light. It is much too optimistic, then, to expect that institutional legitimacy will be restored when apparently biased judges recuse themselves. To paraphrase Mr. Darcy, the public’s good opinion of the judiciary, once lost, is lost forever (or, at the very least, is not entirely restored by judicial recusal). In short, concentrating on the actual recusal decision in order to create or maximize the appearance of impartiality may make up only part of the picture, and our focus on appearances must come before the decision maker makes a recusal decision.

To see how this problem operates in the real world, let us take a look at what circumstances may lead to the public’s loss of confidence in the judiciary. The trigger may be a judge’s interest in one of the parties or in a certain outcome in litigation, as it was in Tumey and Lavoie, or it may be

---

145. Id. at 13.
146. Id. at 32.
147. Id. at 3.
148. Id.
149. Shepherd, supra note 111.
150. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 94 (Patricia Meyer Spacks ed., 2010) (1813) (“My good opinion once lost is lost forever.”).
the judge’s relationship with a litigant or an attorney for one of the parties, as it was in *Caperton* and the Scalia-Cheney duckhunting incident. An example of the former was recently on display in the challenge to the federal drilling moratorium in the wake of the BP disaster in the Gulf. Judge Martin Feldman, a U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana overturned a six-month moratorium on drilling that halted the approval of any new permits and suspended deep-water drilling at existing exploratory wells in the Gulf. It was later discovered that Judge Feldman held energy stocks in numerous drilling and offshore energy companies, including Transocean and Halliburton. After Judge Feldman failed to recuse himself, the case received significant media attention as numerous environmental groups sought recusal. But putting aside the judge’s recusal decision, the relevant question for this Article is whether a different substantive recusal standard—or even a different recusal decision—would have restored public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. I believe the answer is “no.”

When the federal drilling moratorium was litigated, the Los Angeles Times reported that

>[S]even of the 12 federal judges of the Eastern District of Louisiana already have cited potential conflicts of interest in bowing out of cases brought by fishermen, charter operators, tourist services and families of those killed in the April 20 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig in the Gulf of Mexico.

In the Fifth Circuit, it was discovered that most judges held some interest in oil companies, or had other close ties to the oil industry. As a result, recusals in cases involving the oil industry have become so common in the Fifth Circuit that the court was unable to reach a quorum to review a case.  

132

---


152. In other words, let us assume that a reasonable person could question Judge Feldman’s impartiality and that recusal was indeed required by 28 U.S.C. § 455—a reasonable assumption given the controversy that arose following Judge Feldman’s decision.


case brought by victims of Hurricane Katrina.\textsuperscript{155} It is precisely these
types of interests that may create the impression of a biased and partial
judiciary, and once the public has perceived judicial bias or a \textit{quid pro
quo} between a judge and a potential litigant, the recusal decision, no
matter what the substantive standard and no matter what the decision,
cannot fully restore the public’s confidence in the courts.

The Gibson & Caldeira study is the first of its kind. Very little is
known about how the recusal decision affects public perception of
judicial impartiality. Because of the centuries-old assumption that recusal
restores public confidence in the court, scholars have largely ignored this
issue. My hope is that Gibson & Caldeira’s findings, together with this
Article, will spur further study of how the public perceives judicial
recusal decisions, and the extent to which even a correct recusal decision
may still leave the reputation of the judiciary in doubt.

2. One case at a time

The second reason why focusing excessively on the substantive
appearance-based recusal standard and considering appearance only at
the time of the recusal decision fails to foster an appearance of
impartiality is that one-time, one-off recusal decisions are not as
effective in maximizing public confidence in the judiciary and the
legitimacy of the courts as broad structural reforms. In a wide range of
fields, scholars have observed that effective reform often requires
structural changes rather than relying on favorable outcomes one case at
a time.\textsuperscript{156} When recusal decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, public
confidence in the judiciary is undermined. This is partly because the
public does not know what led to a particular decision, and partly
because, as discussed in greater detail below, the public only learns of a
limited set of recusal decisions, which skews its perception.\textsuperscript{157} This is
ture even when the challenged judge properly assesses whether her
impartiality may reasonably be questioned, and even when the judge
ultimately recuses herself.

It is generally understood that “[a]s a matter of legal technique, it is
far preferable to have sound general principles rather than ad hoc rules,

\textsuperscript{155} Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010).
\textsuperscript{156} JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
\textsuperscript{157} The public’s lack of knowledge is especially true because judges rarely publish an
opinion explaining their recusal decision.
or even worse, a ‘myriad of single instances.’”158 But when it comes to recusal, ad hoc decisions are the norm, and each recusal decision becomes a one-time proposition, good for that day only. There is great variation from judge to judge in how they resolve recusal questions, and this variation not only leads to inconsistent results but also leads the public to question the fairness and impartiality of the judiciary.

Another reason why considering appearances on a case-by-case basis is problematic is that, at the point of recusal, judges generally know the parties, the lawyers, and the nature of the particular dispute from which they are asked to recuse. Of course, this information is not supposed to matter to the judge making the recusal decision, but it is hard to know whether it filters into judicial recusal analysis. For example, if the case involves a subject-matter close to the judge’s heart—let’s say the judge is particularly interested in expanding the scope of the First Amendment—there is a risk that the judge will decide not to recuse because she wants to cast a vote in the case, despite the fact that she may have a close relationship with one of the attorneys, or despite the fact that one of the litigants contributed heavily to her campaign. As Part IV argues below, the solution to this problem is that legislators must consider appearances ex ante, without knowing the particular circumstances in which recusal may arise in the future.

Congress and the courts have acknowledged the importance of appearances when it comes to judicial legitimacy. Now, they must come to realize that structural problems should be remedied by large-scale systemic solutions, not in a case-by-case fashion.159 Recusal statutes and judicial codes are unable to protect judicial legitimacy and the appearance of impartiality as long as the appearances are considered in an ad hoc fashion. In the recusal context in particular, there are two reasons why recusal decisions in individual cases do not create an appearance of impartiality: (1) the role of the media in publicizing non-recusal decisions, and (2) the difficulties inherent in the substantive recusal standard.

a. Judicial recusal and the media. The media plays an ever-increasing and important role in the way the public perceives judicial disqualification and judicial impartiality. When it comes to judicial

158. HAMMOND, supra note 116, at 6.
disqualification, only cases of non-recusal generally receive media scrutiny and public recognition. This is part of the reason why legislative and judicial reliance on judicial recusal decisions to create an appearance of impartiality, or even to eliminate the appearance of partiality, is misguided—when a judge steps aside, the public rarely knows it.

One need only look at the controversies that have arisen in the last few years alone—Justice Scalia’s nonrecusal in the case involving Dick Cheney, Justice Benjamin’s nonrecusal in Caperton, and Judge Feldman’s nonrecusal in Hornbeck Offshore Services v. Salazar. But one is hard-pressed to identify any high-profile cases of recusal. This is because recusal often takes place under the radar, without an explanation or an opinion from the recusing judge, and without media scrutiny. For example, decisions of the Supreme Court often indicate that one or more Justices did not participate in the case with a simple note that reads “Justice _______ did not participate in the decision.” Unlike the criticism and scrutiny that often accompanies nonrecusal decisions, these judicial recusals are generally ignored by the media and therefore cannot increase (or even affect) public perception of judicial impartiality.

In the rare circumstances when judicial recusals (as opposed to nonrecusals) actually receive public scrutiny, the attention is generally negative, often focusing on the underlying judicial conduct that necessitated recusal in the first place. In other words, even when judges fully appreciate that their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, their decision to recuse, just like their decision not to recuse, often is to the detriment of public confidence in the judiciary. This is because it highlights the conduct that created the appearance of impartiality in the first place. I touched on one example earlier in the Article: the media coverage of Fifth Circuit judges, and their frequent recusal in cases involving the oil industry. Despite judicial recusals in those cases, the reputation of the judiciary likely suffered from the disclosure that many, if not most, Fifth Circuit judges have connections to the oil and gas industry.

Another prominent recent example of a recusal that received largely negative attention involved Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski. In 2008, Judge Kozinski was presiding over an obscenity trial when it was reported that Kozinski’s personal website contained explicit

pornographic material. When the reports became public, Judge Kozinski recused himself from the case. Following the recusal, the public commentary was overwhelmingly negative and critical of the judge, focusing on the underlying conduct rather than on the recusal decision itself. Here again, a recusal decision intended to create the appearance of impartiality and fairness potentially had the opposite effect.

Aside from the fact that nonrecusal decisions receive far greater public scrutiny and attention than recusal decisions, there is yet another reason why even a correct recusal decision, one that properly considers public perception and appearance, does not promote an appearance of impartiality. This is because the public’s perception of the underlying events is often skewed by the “lens of the media.” To apply the appearance-based disqualification test correctly under the federal disqualification statute (28 U.S.C. § 455) or the state judicial codes, a judge must determine whether an impartial and objective observer, knowing all the facts, might question the judge’s impartiality and reasonably perceive an appearance of bias. But the public rarely, if ever, has access to all the facts that underpin a recusal controversy. These facts are often complex and may involve long-standing relationships between the judge and a litigant, or the judge and an attorney. While the superficial level of knowledge that the public may have perceived, or learned from media coverage, may lead a reasonable member of the public to question the judge’s impartiality, a greater understanding of the judiciary and the situation may negate any appearance of impropriety. As a result of this tension, the challenged judge may correctly determine that recusal is unnecessary because no reasonable person knowing all of the facts could question the judge’s impartiality, while at the same time the public perceives bias because it is basing its conclusions on a different set of facts. Once again, we may be left

163. Of course, this case is not typical and the salacious nature of the facts contributed to the negative publicity.
164. This was the issue raised by Justice Scalia in his recusal memorandum following the duckhunting trip with Vice President Cheney. In seeking Scalia’s recusal, the Sierra Club argued that “[b]ecause the American public, as reflected in the nation’s newspaper editorials, has unanimously concluded that there is an appearance of favoritism, any objective observer would be compelled to conclude that Justice Scalia’s impartiality has been questioned.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the D.C., 541 U.S. 913, 923 (2004). Justice Scalia identified numerous factual mistakes in the editorials and argued that the editorials should play no role in determining whether a reasonable
with a “correct” recusal decision that simultaneously damages the reputation of the judiciary and harms the appearance of impartiality.

b. The appearances of appearances. Furthermore, in an ironic twist, the substantive appearance-based recusal standard itself may damage the reputation of the judiciary and minimize its legitimacy for two reasons.

First, an appearance-based substantive recusal standard may be inconsistent with the practice of judicial elections. Jed Shugerman suggests that a slightly ambiguous standard like the “appearance of bias” has an advantage insofar as it may lead judges to “err in favor of recusing themselves.” And it is undoubtedly true that some judges do err on the side of caution, and step aside simply to avoid any controversy even when they do not believe their partiality could reasonably be questioned. But, thirty-nine states elect some or all of their judges, and the public overwhelmingly prefers elected judges over appointed ones, despite concerns about bias towards campaign contributors. As Justice O’Connor explained in her concurrence in White, judges who must run for reelection “are likely to feel that they have at least some personal stake in the outcome of every publicized case.” Studies show that even minor contributions, even rejected contributions, may create an appearance of partiality requiring recusal. An aggressive recusal standard may defeat the very purpose of electing judges and could actually harm judicial legitimacy by depriving citizens of an opportunity to choose their judges for the cases that matter most.

There is another reason why the appearance-based recusal standard may itself be damaging to the public perception of the judiciary. The “appearance of bias” test is not a model of clarity and precision, with some commentators going so far as to call the standard unworkable at

observer would question Scalia’s impartiality. Id. at 924 (“Such a blast of largely inaccurate and uninformed opinion cannot determine the recusal question.”).


168. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 143.

169. A recent study showed that in 60 percent of the cases heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “at least one of the litigants, attorneys, or firms involved had contributed to the election campaign of at least one justice.” Campaign Contributors and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.ajs.org/selection/jnc/docs/AJS-PAsudy3-18-10.pdf (last updated 2009).
best, and a sham at worst. This problem becomes more acute as high-profile accusations of judicial bias and partiality become more and more common, as they have in the recent months. As the dissenters in Caperton argued, an increase in the number of allegations that judges are biased will further “erode public confidence” in the fairness and integrity of the courts. While these predictions may be overblown, one cannot help but wonder whether an expansive recusal standard and increased publicity for recusal motions may adversely affect the public perception of the judiciary by undermining confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the American judiciary. This is in part because it is so easy to allege an appearance of impropriety and so hard to determine whether there in fact is an appearance of impropriety. When recusal standards are too nebulous, and if allegations of an appearance of bias become the norm in litigation, recusal law becomes too vulnerable to manipulation and rather than furthering the appearance of impartiality, may only harm it. Additional research is necessary to confirm the suspicion that over-recusal, and excessive demands for recusal, can weaken the judiciary’s reputation. But at least one commentator suggests that this may indeed be the case.

IV. EX ANTE REGULATION AND RECUSAL PROCEDURE

This Part proposes two changes to American recusal jurisprudence intended to increase public confidence in the impartiality of the courts and maximize judicial legitimacy. First, I will argue that when possible, ex ante regulation of judicial conduct that prevents the appearance of bias from arising in the first place would be the best method for creating and maintaining an appearance of judicial impartiality and fairness. Second, I propose that appearance-based regulation of recusal procedures may in fact do more to maximize the appearance of impartiality than the substantive recusal standards.

A. Ex Ante Regulation of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Elections

There is vast literature examining the tension between ex ante and ex

170. See Rotunda, supra note 117.
172. See Bruce A. Green, Fear of the Unknown Judicial Ethics After Caperton, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 229, 233–34 (2010).
173. Rotunda, supra note 117.
postconsideration in creating legal rules and standards. The advantage of
an ex post approach is that it permits greater accuracy and tailoring while
ex ante considerations often allow for greater clarity. But if it is true that
recusal comes too late to restore public confidence in the judiciary once
an appearance of bias has been created—if ex post recusal decisions are
not the best way to “promote public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial process”174—then the most important recusal related
jurisprudential changes are not actually changes to recusal rules at all.
Rather, they are changes to other rules regulating judges—rules of
judicial conduct and judicial selection—that explicitly consider how
certain judicial behavior may influence the perception of judicial
impartiality. For judicial regulation to truly have an effect on the
appearance of impartiality, we must increase our regulation of the very
conduct that creates the appearance problem in the first place, avoiding
even the creation of an appearance of bias. In other words, when it comes
to considering the appearance of impartiality and fairness, the best time
to think about recusal is before the appearance of bias arises.

By pushing back the time when appearances are considered we can
avoid much of the damage that the judiciary suffers as a result of
improper judicial conduct while eliminating the need for recusal rules
and decisions to carry the heavy load of remedying the problem. Under
the proposed ex ante regime, policymakers must do whatever possible to
minimize the need for potential future recusals, as well as the number of
calls for recusal. Implementation of better ex ante rules can reduce the
number of future Caperton-like appeals and ease the dissenting Justices’
conscerns that the Caperton decision will lead to a flood of new recusal
motions. Greater ex ante regulation of judicial conduct and judicial
elections also helps alleviate, if not eliminate, the “one case at a time”
problem identified in Part III.B.2. While judges may not be in the best
position to engage in the line drawing required in individual recusal
cases, ex ante regulation allows the line drawing to be done on a general,
 systemic level by legislators or bar associations. In other words, adopting
an ex ante approach to judicial recusal “eliminates the
burden on judges to determine where the line for recusal is drawn.”175

Furthermore, ex ante regulation of judicial conduct is preferable to ex

175. Symposium, Session 1 One Symptom of a Serious Problem Caperton v. Massey, 33
post recusal-based regulation because the latter method misses the 
conduct that negatively affects the judiciary but that may never otherwise 
come to light. For example, in an election context, the losing candidate’s 
conduct may harm the reputation of the judiciary but would never be 
challenged on recusal. Likewise, recusal is not welldesigned to address a 
situation where a judge develops a relationship with a particular 
contributor, and while that particular contributor never appears as a 
litigant in front of the judge, making recusal unnecessary, the contributor 
may still have an interest in the outcome of other cases heard by the 
judge. This “different litigant, same interest” problem is extremely 
difficult to address with recusal but may still damage the appearance of 
judicial impartiality and harm the reputation of the judiciary.

I propose four categories where ex ante rules couldassist in avoiding 
damage to judicial legitimacy and the appearance of partiality. Within 
each category, I will discuss my proposed rule and provide an example 
of how the rule would operate in the context of recent recusal-related 
controversies: (1) judicial elections, (2) judicial friendships and 
relationships, (3) judicial financial interests, and (4) extrajudicial 
activities.

1. Judicial elections

   a. The problem. We start at the beginning of the judge’s career: 
judicial selection.176 The process by which a judge is selected is one of 
the key factors in the public’s perception of the courts.177 especially 
important are the methods of judicial selection and the campaign 
environment.178 In fact, the element of judicial elections that has the 
greatest effect on the public’s perception of the judiciary is campaign 
fundraising.179 As mentioned earlier, the public’s concerns about the 
impartiality of judges receiving contributions from litigants are 
wellfounded. Recent studies confirm that judges are more likely to rule

176. Of course, recusal may be necessary as a result of a judge’s conduct before judicial 
selection. For example, if a judge worked as a partner at a law firm before joining the bench, as 
many judges have, those friendships cannot be regulated by an ex ante scheme. Ex postrecusal rules, 
like those contained in 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) are intended to address these situations.


178. Penny J. White, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Supplement Inappropriate 
Voter Cues and Enhance Judicial Legitimacy, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 635, 645 (2009).

179. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts Legitimacy 
for those who helped fund their campaigns. 180 Because ex post recusal cannot fully restore judicial legitimacy, it is important that we regulate conduct during judicial elections in order to avoid the harm in the first place. In other words, legislatures must regulate judicial elections to ensure that election-related practices and conduct do not damage the appearance of impartiality by pushing back the timeframe for when we look at appearance—all the way back to the election itself.

In Caperton, recusal was necessary because one of the litigants spent extravagant amounts of money to elect the very judge who would later rule on that litigant’s case. 181 The damage to the reputation of the judiciary is done at this early stage. The very fact that a future or current litigant helps a judge get elected gives rise to the appearance of judicial bias and partiality.

And Caperton does not present a unique fact pattern. Most judges in the United States stand for election and must raise the funds for their candidacies from the parties that they may eventually meet in the courtroom. For example, Avery v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company 182 was a class action suit for breach of contract in which the plaintiffs alleged that State Farm violated its duty to restore automobiles to their original pre-crash condition by using automobile parts salvaged from other damaged vehicles. 183 After the lower courts found in favor of the plaintiffs, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed. Like Caperton, Avery was decided shortly after an election cycle for the Illinois Supreme Court. During his campaign for the court, Justice Lloyd Karmeier made numerous pro-business statements. 184 Karmeier also received over $350,000 in contributions from State Farm’s employees and its lawyers. 185 After being elected to the bench, Justice Karmeier declined to recuse himself.

182. 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).
183. Id. at 811.
184. See Goldberg et al., supra note 106, at 510.
and cast the deciding vote in favor of the defendant. These two cases are just a small part of a larger problem. In fact, elected judges deciding cases involving their contributors has reached epidemic proportions. For example, a recent study showed that nearly two-thirds of cases heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2008 and 2009 involved at least one party, lawyer, or law firm that contributed to the campaign of at least one of the justices.\footnote{Malia Reddick & James R. DeBuse, Campaign Contributions and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, THE BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/elert/campaign_contributions_and_the_pennsylvania_supreme_court/.

\footnote{Bert Brandenburg, Big Money and Impartial Justice Can They Live Together? 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 207, 217 (2010) (“Money is changing judicial elections and threatens to erode trust in the courts themselves.”).

188. See, e.g., New York’s new rule prohibiting elected judges from deciding cases involving litigants that had contributed $2,500 or more to their campaigns. See Rules Governing the Assignment of Cases Involving Contributors to Judicial Campaigns, RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS § 151.1, available at http://nycourts.gov/rules/chiefadmin/151.shtml#section151_1.

\footnote{This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{White}, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After \textit{Caperton}, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that \textit{Caperton}“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, \textit{Caperton}’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.\footnote{This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{White}, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After \textit{Caperton}, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that \textit{Caperton}“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, \textit{Caperton}’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.\footnote{This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{White}, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After \textit{Caperton}, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that \textit{Caperton}“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, \textit{Caperton}’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.\footnote{This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{White}, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After \textit{Caperton}, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that \textit{Caperton}“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, \textit{Caperton}’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.\footnote{This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{White}, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After \textit{Caperton}, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that \textit{Caperton}“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, \textit{Caperton}’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.\footnote{This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{White}, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After \textit{Caperton}, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that \textit{Caperton}“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, \textit{Caperton}’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.\footnote{This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{White}, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After \textit{Caperton}, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that \textit{Caperton}“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, \textit{Caperton}’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.\footnote{This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{White}, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After \textit{Caperton}, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that \textit{Caperton}“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, \textit{Caperton}’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.\footnote{This Article does not discuss the potential constitutional hurdles to regulating judicial campaign contributions. While these hurdles are real, their effect may be overstated. After the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{White}, commentators predicted that most regulation of judicial campaigns may be unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lower-level courts struck down a number of canons regulating candidates’ conduct in judicial elections. After \textit{Caperton}, things may be looking up for supporters of regulation of judicial elections. See James Sample, Caperton Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 293, 303–04 (2010) (concluding that \textit{Caperton}“provides real momentum for state-based recusal reform efforts”). In fact, \textit{Caperton}’s apparent disregard of the infamous contribution/expenditure framework from \textit{Buckley v. Valeo} suggests that states may regulate spending in judicial elections in ways that are otherwise impermissible in other elections.}
Requiring anonymous contributions is a particularly appealing proposal because such a requirement likely would not be subject to many of the constitutional objections that a proposal to eliminate or limit contributions altogether would be.\textsuperscript{190} It is difficult to understand why judges need to know the identity of their contributors, and why contributors must let judges know that they have contributed, other than to curry favor with the judges.\textsuperscript{191} A few states experimented with anonymous contributions for judicial elections in the 1970s, but the idea has not caught on.\textsuperscript{192} Today, this proposal may sound strange given the trend towards more disclosure, not less. But it is time for all states that elect judges to consider implementing this approach to combat the problem of judicial bias towards their contributors.

Implementation of this proposal need not be overly complicated. Obviously, if judges were able to discover the identity of their contributors after the election, then the anonymity requirement would be futile. But it still seems likely that a successful anonymity scheme could be implemented. Perhaps the best approach was suggested by Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow, who proposed a similar regime that would operate through a privatized system of blind trusts.\textsuperscript{193} Under this regime, campaigns could no longer accept contributions directly from individuals or companies. Rather, all donations to candidates (and political parties) would have to be made by mail to established blind trusts.\textsuperscript{194}


\textsuperscript{191} For an excellent discussion of potential ethical issues involved in attorney contributions to judges, see Keith Swisher, \textit{Legal Ethics and Campaign Contributions The Professional Responsibility to Pay for Justice}, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 225 (2011).

\textsuperscript{192} See Stuart Banner, Note, \textit{Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors}, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 473 n.130 (1988) (noting that the ten adopting states were Arkansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming).


\textsuperscript{194} \textit{Id.}
2. Judicial relationships

   a. The problem. The second category that is a frequent source of recusal controversies is judicial relationships with friends. This can involve close friendships as well as romantic relationships with attorneys and litigants. Of course, these friendships are often unavoidable and cannot be prohibited outright. But particularly troublesome interactions between judges and their friends and colleagues should be regulated.

   One of the most famous recent incidents was Justice Scalia’s infamous duck-hunting trip with then-litigant Dick Cheney. After details of the trip came to light, calls for recusal reform grew to a fever pitch. The American Bar Association’s Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct considered revisions to the judicial code, and two Democrats on the House Judiciary Committee called for hearings to amend federal recusal law. Then, as always, the focus was on the final recusal decision; namely, Justice Scalia’s decision that his impartiality could not reasonably be questioned. But, can we foster an appearance of impartiality when it comes to judicial friends through ex ante recusal reform?

   b. The solution. There is little scholarship on regulation of judicial friendships, and even fewer rules regulating judges’ relationships with their friends and colleagues. What little scholarship exists supports the ex post “getting to recusal” approach that focuses on the substantive recusal rules (which I identified earlier). But, if our main goal is to maximize the appearance of judicial impartiality, then it is important to amend rules concerning friendships or interaction between judges and litigants rather than focusing on recusal alone. In other words, the ex ante rules that I propose do more to regulate the interaction between judges and litigants (or likely future litigants) where interaction would create an appearance of partiality, even if the judge might eventually have an opportunity to recuse.

   For example, the rules of judicial conduct could be revised to prohibit any interaction between judges and current litigants, or litigants that are likely to appear in front of the judge within the next year.


196. Id.
Admittedly, it is often difficult to predict which litigants will appear in front of the judge. Furthermore, it is important that judges remain active members of the community and participate in bar functions like Inns of Court. At the very least, however, when a party is litigating a case in the district court, the appellate judges likely to review any future appeal should refrain from interacting with that party until the case has concluded. This prophylactic measure is more likely to increase the appearance of impartiality and judicial legitimacy than asking the judge to recuse himself based on the appearance of impropriety.

States should also consider implementing ex ante rules regulating certain types of friendships and relationships that should be prohibited outright. For example, judges should be prohibited from having romantic or sexual relationships with litigants that frequently appear in front of them. Just last year, a controversy broke out in Texas when a former judge and a former district attorney in Texas admitted that they had engaged in a lengthy affair. Both had participated in the trial of a man who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Similarly, a number of states have recently considered whether judges can be friends with lawyers on social networking sites like LinkedIn or Facebook.

While these regulations may seem simplistic, invasive, or perhaps downright silly, these are precisely the types of ex anteregulations that can prevent situations like Justice Scalia’s duck-hunting controversy from damaging the reputation of the judiciary.

I do not propose that judges live in isolation, shielding themselves from any interaction with potential lawyers and litigants who may appear before them. Judicial selection mechanisms in the United States, whereby judges get to their position because of contacts and friendships formed in school, private practice, and public service, do not permit such an approach. But when one litigant shares a close friendship or an intimate relationship with the judge, the appearance of impartiality suffers. Restricting these relationships while cases are pending is a

---

197. Of course, this prohibition would not apply to judges who are married or related to those parties, but current recusal rules already require automated disqualification in those cases.


reasonable burden.

3. Judicial financial interests

   a. The problem. American recusal law takes a hard-line approach to recusal when it comes to judges’ financial interests: a judge must recuse himself from a case if he has any financial interest in a litigant, even if the ownership interest is only a single share of stock. But again, this is an ex post rule; there is no ex ante prohibition on stock ownership in the first place.

   We saw an example of the problems with the ex post approach last summer when the Fifth Circuit failed to reach a quorum in a case because too many judges were required to recuse themselves. Under the “getting to recusal” approach, the fact the judges recused themselves should eliminate any appearance of partiality. But this situation demonstrates why the ex post solutions alone are imperfect and insufficient.

   b. The solution. If damage to the judiciary’s reputation cannot be remedied by recusal alone, then it is important to create ex ante rules about stock ownership or financial interest when parties (or those interests) are likely to come in front of the court. Rather than permitting stock ownership for any company or industry that the judge wants and then requiring recusal or divestment on the back end, judges should simply be prohibited from owning certain stock. It is not unreasonable to require that judges invest only in mutual funds to ensure that their money is not closely tied to any particular company or industry.

   For example, an ex ante rule prohibiting judges in the Fifth Circuit from owning any direct interests in the oil industry would not unduly burden judges and would obviate the need for frequent recusals in cases that often come before the court. This would do much more for the appearance of fairness and the reputation of the judiciary than perpetual recusals.

201. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (2006). Generally, a computer program tracks judges’ stock ownership, and judges are automatically excluded from hearing cases involving corporations featured in judges’ investment portfolios. For a criticism of the rule, see Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1105 (2004) (“The idea that I would give up my honest judgment in a case for a few dollars is beyond silly—it’s ludicrous and insulting. So many of the things contained within the Canons, the ones most talked about, are wholly irrelevant in practice. They make no difference at all.”).

202. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 2010).
4. Extrajudicial involvement

a. The problem. Another problem is participation by judges in partisan activities that may create an impression that judges decide cases with an eye towards those partisan interests. Canon 4 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges does not appear to prohibit this type of conduct. A recent example demonstrates this concern.

Shortly after the Supreme Court decided *Citizens United*, reports surfaced that Justices Scalia and Thomas attended seminars and a political retreat sponsored by the energy giant and conservative bankroller Koch Industries. According to a Koch Industries mailing, the purpose of these retreats is to raise funds “to review strategies for combating the multitude of public policies that threaten to destroy America as we know it.” The seminar was held shortly before the case was added to the Supreme Court docket, but suggestions arose immediately that Scalia and Thomas’s ruling in *Citizens United* may have been affected by their time with Koch officials. Nothing is known about the discussions that took place at the seminar, but, as noted by Common Cause, the primary group that argued that Scalia and Thomas should have recused themselves, the ruling furthered the interests of Koch Industries.

b. The solution. Because there are no clear rules in place to prevent

---

203. Canon 4 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges reads:
A judge may engage in extrajudicial activities, including law-related pursuits and civic, charitable, educational, religious, social, financial, fiduciary, and governmental activities, and may speak, write, lecture, and teach on both law-related and nonlegal subjects. However, a judge should not participate in extrajudicial activities that detract from the dignity of the judge’s office, interfere with the performance of the judge’s official duties, reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, lead to frequent disqualification, or violate the limitations set forth below.


207. Id.
judges from being associated, even closely associated, with people, politicians, or political activists, ex post recusal is generally considered the best, perhaps the only, solution to this kind of judicial conduct. This type of conduct can and should be regulated ex ante, before the reputation of the court suffers and judicial impartiality is questioned.\textsuperscript{208}

Just as with the regulation of judicial relationships and judicial financial holdings, judges should not be permitted to attend functions, retreats, or any other activities sponsored by groups with a direct stake either in pending litigation or in litigation that frequently arises in front of the court. Such flat bans may seem draconian, but, to the extent that they increase the appearance of judicial impartiality and independence, they are worth the effort.

\textbf{B. Recusal Procedures}

Regulation of the underlying judicial conduct and implementation of ex ante rules that prevent the appearance of impartiality or bias from arising in the first place is the best approach to maximize judicial legitimacy and public confidence in the courts. But sometimes it is impossible to prevent recusals altogether no matter how well-tailored our ex ante rules may be. For example, no amount of ex ante regulation can prevent recusal-related controversies when judges were personally involved in passing or defending the very law in question.\textsuperscript{209}

Furthermore, at least in the United States, judges become judges because of their relationships, friendships, and connections with influential political leaders and members of the community established over many years. Those connections and relationships cannot be prevented. Neither can judges erase years, sometimes decades, of other experience, including private practice and public service. It is precisely in these circumstances that recusal law must be at its strongest.

An example of a situation where ex ante solutions are theoretically

\textsuperscript{208} It should be noted that, to the extent the conduct itself creates an appearance of impropriety or impartiality, such conduct is already prohibited by the Code of Conduct, at least for all judges other than members of the United States Supreme Court. See Neumann, supra note 57. The ex ante proposals in this Part, and throughout this paper, are intended to regulate conduct that does not create an appearance of impartiality until a particular case arises requiring recusal.

\textsuperscript{209} During Elena Kagan’s confirmation hearings, for example, Justice Kagan was questioned about whether or not she would recuse herself from a likely Supreme Court challenge to the recently enacted health-care reform law. See Laura Meckler, \textit{Republicans Push Kagan on Health-Care Recusal}, \textit{WALL ST. J.}, July 15, 2010.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704518904575364930042286638.html.
possible but practically infeasible occurs when it is not the judge’s previous conduct that leads to damage to the appearance of impartiality, but that of the judge’s spouse. Two recent recusal controversies illustrate this problem.

First, Ninth Circuit judge Stephen Reinhardt was asked to recuse himself from hearing the appeal of a same-sex marriage case because his wife, Ramona Ripston, the executive director of the ACLU of Southern California, was consulted about whether the case should have been brought in the first place. Appellants argued that Reinhardt must recuse himself because his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Judge Reinhardt denied the motion. Second, controversy has erupted over the activities of Virginia Thomas, the wife of Justice Clarence Thomas. After allegations that Mrs. Thomas has reported ties to anti-health care initiatives, House Democrats called for Justice Thomas to recuse himself from any legal challenge to the Affordable Care Act. Legal challenges to the Act have not yet reached the Supreme Court, and it is not yet known whether Justice Thomas will indeed recuse himself from hearing the case.

One could imagine an ex ante proposal that prohibits spouses or family members from engaging in political or legal activity on issues likely to reach the judge. And one could certainly argue that the public can doubt the impartiality of a judge whose spouse has publicly participated either in the case itself, or in political activity surrounding the case. But such ex ante solutions are too draconian and overinclusive. Therefore, I limit my proposal to ex ante regulation of judicial conduct and judicial elections; familial speech or behavior should be excluded

---

211. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2011).
212. Id. at 916.
213. Id. at 911.
214. Letter from Anthony D. Weiner, Frank Pallone, Jr., Fortey Pete Stark,& Christopher S. Murphy, U.S. Cong., to Justice Clarence Thomas, Supreme Court (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/48573148/Letter-to-Justice-Thomas-Asking-for-Recusal-In-Health-Law-Case. The letter was also partly spurred by Justice Thomas’s failure to disclose his wife’s receipt of substantial sums of money from the Heritage Foundation, a prominent opponent of health-care reform. Id.
from regulation.

1. (Non)history of recusal procedure

An astute reader may have noticed something lacking in the historical discussion in Part II: there was no mention of recusal procedure either at the state or the federal levels. This absence is not an omission by the author; rather, it is a reflection of the apathy and neglect that disqualification procedures have received from legislatures and bar associations devising disqualification rules as well as the courts interpreting them. The federal disqualification statute does not even provide a procedure for its enforcement. The same is true of the Model Judicial Code, which, like the federal statute, sets a substantive standard without a procedure for how that standard is to be enforced. Judges have generally made up the procedures ad hoc. One cannot review the history of procedural recusal law because none exists.

This observation may be surprising given the great deal of public attention that recusal has received in the last few years as well as the number of amendments to the substantive recusal rules. Despite that attention, and despite those amendments, the recusal procedures have remained stagnant and are by far the least developed aspect of American recusal jurisprudence. Scholars have observed that “[u]nlike almost any other area of the law, the process by which judges decide whether to recuse themselves ignores the systems usually employed to resolve disputes in a fair and impartial manner.”

Procedurally, policymakers treat recusal the same way it was treated hundreds of years ago. The practice of self-recusal, a procedural quirk that allows the challenged judge to rule on her own recusal motion, has a long history in the common law. But this practice was created with virtually no discussion in British cases or scholarly literature before spreading, again with no critical analysis or discussion, to Australasia and the Americas. This common law recusal procedure survives to this day: the general practice in both state and federal courts is that the judge to whom the motion to recuse is directed decides whether his or her recusal is necessary. And self-recusal is only one of the procedures that hearken back to Blackstone’s England. Judges rarely write opinions explaining their recusal decisions, and appellate courts rarely review

those decisions with any vigor.219

Procedures like self-recusal may have made sense when scholars and lawyers simply assumed that judges sworn to uphold justice could not and would not be biased.220 But as our understanding of human nature and the judiciary repudiated that presumption, and as social scientists uncovered the depths of potential subconscious bias, legislators and the courts should have reexamined recusal procedures like self-recusal.221 A system that relies on a sua sponte admission of bias, or even an appearance of bias, by a judge is bound to fail. Instead, various courts throughout the nation have adopted different approaches, resulting in a lack of uniformity.222 Some states permit a judge whose recusal is sought to decide his own recusal motions, while others require somebody else to decide such motions.223

More troubling is the fact that most states are silent on the subject, suggesting that recusal procedure is no more than an afterthought if it is a thought at all.224 And even when states get around to considering recusal procedure, the movements generally have little success. In the last decade, four states sought to amend their recusal rules to require that a judge other than the judge whose recusal is sought rule on each motion.225 All four efforts failed.226

Why is recusal procedure almost entirely ignored by Congress and state legislatures? One explanation may be that process is viewed as minutiae, unworthy of legislative attention. After all, procedural law has been described by some as “painstaking, ministerial, and ultimately

219. Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the Federal Judicial Disqualification Framework, 58 Drake L. Rev. 751, 760 (2010) (“While federal judges do recuse themselves in many situations, a judge who does so rarely writes an opinion explaining why.”). Because few opinions explaining the judge’s recusal rationale are published, the law of recusal is slow to develop and fails to provide any meaningful guidance to litigants and lawyers about when and whether disqualification is warranted in any particular case.

220. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *361 (“[T]he law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favor in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.”).

221. See BAM, supra note 115, at 78–80 (discussing the importance of tailoring recusal procedures to the evolving substantive standards).

222. Leubsdorf, supra note 16, at 238.

223. See e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.3(c)(5) (West 2006).


225. Id. at 772–73.

226. Id.
boring." Additionally, Congress has generally been cautious in regulating judicial procedures in order to protect judicial impartiality and maintain separation of powers. Moreover, it is (wrongly) assumed that procedural issues should be left to judges, since that is what judges presumably do best. Surely, one may think, judges can create recusal procedures that fairly implement the substantive rules that are in place. Part of the explanation for this belief lies in the underlying assumption, discussed and challenged in Part III, that so long as the judge ultimately reaches the correct recusal decision, nothing else, including the procedure used to reach the decision, particularly matters.

And even when scholars consider recusal procedure, it is only as a means to an end—the end being, once again, the correct recusal decision. In other words, when recusal procedure receives any attention, it is generally part of the critique of the outcomes rather than the appearances created by the procedures themselves. For example, other scholars have attacked the practice of self-recusal on the grounds that judges may not appreciate the presence of subconscious bias, which leads them to under-recuse. To the contrary, I argue that procedures themselves are the ends—it is in setting recusal procedures that we should be thinking about appearances, not hoping that procedures will lead to a substantive result that will create an appearance of impartiality.


228. Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2008) ("The procedure/merits line also rides on strong separation of powers concerns, dividing the respective lawmaking capacities of Congress and the courts.").

229. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 54, at 1242; Steven Lubet, It Takes a Court, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 221, 228 (2010) ("When it comes to disqualification, it takes more than a single judge to render a fair decision."). Of course, judges are at times self-aware of the possibility of subconscious bias. One of the all-time famous Supreme Court recusals happened in Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak when Justice Frankfurter recused himself because of his objection to the playing of radios on public buses. 343 U.S. 451, 454 (1952) ("[N]either the operation of the service [of playing the radio on public buses] nor the action of the Commission [in] permitting its operation is precluded by the Constitution."). In his memorandum explaining the recusal decision, Frankfurter said that his subconscious hatred of the radio on public buses was so strong that his "unconscious feelings" could influence his resolution of the dispute. Id. at 466–67.
2. The importance of procedure

Why might an appearance-based recusal procedure be more effective in creating an appearance of an impartial judiciary than the current outcome-based recusal model? Research by social scientists holds the key. This research supports the notion that the public’s perception of the judiciary is influenced in large part by whether the judicial process is perceived to be procedurally fair. In fact, several scholars have shown that even when a court’s substantive decisions are disfavored, courts retain their perceived legitimacy so long as the decisions were reached in a procedurally fair manner. These findings are especially true for an institution where the decision makers are appointed rather than elected and are independent from the public rather than accountable to their constituents.

Because procedural fairness is indeed crucial to public perception, ignoring recusal procedures is a fatal mistake, at least so long as recusal aims to create an appearance of impartiality. And if outcomes matter less than process, then leaving aside all consideration of appearances until the judge makes the final recusal decision, rather than establishing a proper appearance-based recusal procedure, misses the boat entirely.

Taking appearances seriously, therefore, means that reforming the recusal procedures should be a top priority. Only such large-scale structural changes can create an appearance of fairness and impartiality. Implementing proper procedures can legitimize judicial institutions that often operate in an independence-based model. For example, procedural changes requiring judges to explain their recusal decisions would foster judicial accountability by giving the public greater access to—and
understanding of—judicial recusal decisions. It would also require judges to be more thoughtful in decisions they have to justify publicly. Americans have great faith in the courts in large part because they believe they get a fair shot and a fair resolution. In the context of recusals this means that we should create procedures that reduce the appearance of partiality and reassure Americans that recusal decisions are made in a way that fosters impartiality and independence.

The question of what specific procedures are necessary to create the appearance of impartiality is difficult to answer without empirical studies. However, political scientists have identified four essential elements contributing to the perception of procedural fairness. First, litigants must be treated with dignity and respect. Second, parties must have the opportunity to participate in the process. Third, judges must be trustworthy, and, fourth, the judiciary must be neutral. These recommendations mirror, in some respects, those of the widely respected Legal Process Theory developed by Hart and Sacks. They identified five central procedural elements: (1) litigants must initiate disputes, (2) an adversarial process must allow each party to advance its position, (3) the court must provide a rationale for its decision, (4) the decision itself must be supported by a body of law, and (5) the decision maker must be impartial.

Some have argued that all of the elements identified by Hart and Sacks should be imported to the American recusal framework in toto. For example, Amanda Frost suggests that because these tenets of adjudication “serve a vital legitimating function,” they should all be “incorporated into recusal law.” There is some merit to this proposal; after all, if those are all essential ingredients in a legal system, why not incorporate them into our recusal jurisprudence?

234. Cf. Roberts, supra note 54, at 121 (discussing how the lack of clear recusal procedures in the United States Supreme Court “permits unaccountability, and increases doubts about appearances of impartiality”).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
240. Id.
242. Id. at 535.
But while the five Legal Process tenets identified above are essential for legitimizing judicial decisions, they may not all be necessary (or even advantageous) in creating an appearance of impartiality, and some may even undermine that goal. For example, the adversarial process is a key part of the American legal system, allowing both parties an opportunity to present their conflicting arguments. This party control over case presentation serves a legitimizing function. But importing the adversarial model into recusal jurisprudence may in fact harm the appearance of judicial impartiality by requiring that judges (or their representatives) argue their cases and attempt to prove to some neutral arbiter that they are not biased and that their earlier conduct was not improper. Pitting judges against litigants may in fact work to the detriment of appearances.

Therefore, this Article suggests a modified, appearance-based process theory, whereby those procedures that would appear to a reasonable person as necessary to create a fair recusal scheme would be implemented. In other words, rather than asking what procedures foster confidence in the correctness of the final decision, we should ask what procedures create an appearance of impartiality. This would require empirical studies designed to learn which aspects of the Legal Process Theory matter most for the purpose of appearances. For example, it seems that Legal Process Theory elements three, four, and five, which require that an impartial decisionmaker provide a rationale for its decision in a written opinion that must be supported by a body of law, would likely be the crucial elements that must be imported into recusal procedures. Elements one and two, that litigants must initiate disputes and an adversarial process must allow each party to advance its position, however, may or may not be necessary; this should be confirmed using social science data.

The specific determinations, however, need not, and cannot, be made at this point. The biggest procedural hurdle to the appearance of fairness, and one that must likely be addressed first, is the dubious practice of self-recusal. One of the most important procedural questions when it comes to recusal is the question of who should decide recusal motions: the impugned judge, another judge of the same court, a group of judges, or

---

243. Judges are often frustrated by what they perceive as frivolous recusal requests, and this problem would be exacerbated if judges were forced to defend themselves in a proceeding from such charges.
some other party. The issue of self-recusal has been perhaps the most criticized aspect of American recusal rules and procedures. When one looks at recusal procedure from the appearance-based perspective, the flaws inherent in a system where a potentially biased judge is assigned the task of ruling on her own recusal motion become immediately apparent. First, the self-recusal procedure violates the fundamental principle that one should not be a judge in her own cause. Furthermore, the practice leads attorneys to abstain from making a recusal motion because of a fear of judicial retribution. Finally, a judge deciding her own recusal motion may not acknowledge that she is biased, either because she does not recognize the bias, because she does not want to admit that she is biased, or because she does not want to admit that she engaged in conduct that created the appearance of bias.

There is another advantage to focusing on appearances while setting recusal procedures rather than leaving the appearance inquiry until the very end when the judge makes her recusal decision. It is the advantage of time—there is an opportunity to think about and conduct empirical research into what procedures create an appearance of impartiality, as opposed to when the case is already in front of the judge. When appearances are considered in creating recusal procedures, the burden of setting clear, consistent, and appearance-based recusal procedures will fall to state and federal legislatures. Judges are generally too hesitant to impose procedures that threaten the collegial relations with their colleagues. Judges rarely criticize a colleague for being biased or prejudiced, although they have anonymously acknowledged that their colleagues (but not them!) may be biased in favor of some litigants, especially those who helped them get elected.

Furthermore, considering appearances ex ante, before any case is actually pending, eliminates the opportunity for judges to consider the facts of the case in reaching a recusal decision. Once the decisionmaker knows the legal issue in question or the identities of the parties, she may under- (or over-) appreciate whether her impartiality might reasonably be


245. See Raftery, supra note 224, at 766 (discussing the role that legislatures can and should play in drafting recusal statutes and crafting recusal mechanisms).

questioned. For example, a judge may be tempted to refuse to recuse herself in a case involving a cause important to the judge (for example, tort reform for a conservative judge or abortion for a liberal one). But if legislatures consider appearances in advance and implement appearance-based recusal procedures, it may be more difficult for the underlying facts of the dispute to infiltrate the recusal decision.

More importantly, just as I questioned the wisdom of allowing judges to apply the “reasonable person” standard to test the appearance of their own conduct, judges are likewise not well-suited to set procedures for determining whether their own impartiality is in question. This is in part because judges do not have the means that legislators have to determine which procedures create an appearance of impartiality. Judges have their own interests in mind, and these interests often conflict with creating a recusal procedure that avoids the appearance of bias. Judges should neither be setting the recusal procedures nor applying the recusal standards to themselves. In fact, to the extent that judges do have control over either the recusal process or the outcome, they are not likely to appear impartial.247

I conclude this Part by returning to the discussion of the substantive recusal standard and by reconsidering what the substantive recusal standard should entail. Earlier, I argued that the appearance-based standard in place now is not by itself sufficient to create an appearance of impartiality. But that, of course, is not an argument in favor of scrapping the standard altogether. Rather, I believe legislatures must consider the substantive recusal standard just as they would recusal procedures and determine what standard is likely to foster an appearance of fairness. One should not assume that an appearance-based standard is best for appearances. As mentioned earlier, by lowering the threshold that parties must meet to obtain recusal, more recusal motions will be filed and public confidence in the courts may suffer.248 Ultimately, just as the

247. One solution would be to create an independent office to review recusal-related decisions. The 112th Congress has suggested the creation of an Inspector General for the judicial branch. Judicial Transparency and Ethics Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 727, 112th Cong. § 1021 (1st Sess. 2011). Although the office is intended to investigate misconduct and prevent “waste, fraud, and abuse” within the judiciary, an additional option may be to give it the power to review recusal decisions by federal judges. Id. § 1023(3). This procedural change may instill confidence in the public that judges are accountable for their recusal decisions.

legislatures will need to determine which recusal procedures create an appearance of impartiality, they will also need to decide what substantive recusal standard is best for judicial legitimacy and the reputation of the courts.

V. CONCLUSION

Recusal lies at the heart of our understanding of the role of the courts in a democracy. It is meant to ensure judicial independence and impartiality and to protect the legitimacy of the courts as well as the reputation of the judiciary. Without reforms to various aspects of recusal law, public confidence in the judiciary—the primary source of judicial legitimacy—will continue to wane.

This Article suggests that the long-standing assumption that recusal completely restores the appearance of judicial impartiality and public confidence in the courts may need reexamination. It is time to focus on the circumstances that lead to recusal as well as recusal procedures. By shifting the focus away from the substantive recusal standard and the actual recusal decision, we can begin to maximize the appearance of impartiality on a systemic basis. And by considering appearance ex ante, before problems arise, we can put in place ethics rules and recusal procedures that truly legitimize the judiciary and restore the people’s faith in the fairness of the American courts.

denied the recusal motion, somebody leaked the decision to legal blogs, creating even greater controversy and drawing negative attention and publicity to the West Virginia courts. Id. This publicity ultimately led Justice Ketchum to recuse himself not because he believed his continued presence on the case violated the appearance of impartiality, but rather because he did not “want [the] Court to be publicly maligned.” Id.