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Abstract

The right to a speedy trial has been an integral part of the Anglo-American legal system since its foundation. The first statement of this guarantee seems to be in the codification of basic rights included in the Magna Charta. It was incorporated into the earliest laws of colonial America and later expressed in the sixth amendment to the Constitution. In Klopfer v. North Carolina, the United States Supreme Court stated, "The history of the right to a speedy trial and its reception in this country clearly establish that it is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution." The Court held that this right was of such a fundamental nature and was so essential to due process of law, that it should be enforced against the states in the same manner as it is enforced against federal encroachment. The fundamental nature of this right is further demonstrated by the fact that each of the fifty states recognizes and guarantees the right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court has detailed three potential evils of criminal justice that may be eliminated by the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. First, it prevents unwarranted and harsh incarceration prior to a trial that might reveal the accused's innocence. Second, it minimizes the emotional harm resulting from an unproven accusation. The body of tort law concerning false arrest and imprisonment is evidence that society realizes this danger and seeks to sanction its causes. Finally, it eliminates any possibility that a delay may impair or prevent an accused from exercising a vigorous defense. The existence of any of these hazards, whether singularly or in concert, is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence upon which our system of criminal law is founded. Since all the objectives of the speedy trial guarantee are present when an accused is serving a sentence in another jurisdiction, he should be able to enforce this right. When the question has been posed concerning separate venues, the general rule has been that a sovereign could not deny a speedy trial to an accused because he was imprisoned in an institution of that sovereign under a prior conviction and sentence of one of the sovereign's courts. But when the jurisdiction making the accusation differed from the jurisdiction of incarceration, the former was allowed to file a detainer and, in derogation of the accused's rights, delay trial until he had completed the sentence in the foreign jurisdiction. This inaction by the accusing jurisdiction was justified by the doctrine of comity. It was thought that since the accusing jurisdiction could not demand custody of the accused as a matter of right, it was under no obligation to request custody. A request might be denied and such a denial would be an insult to the accusing jurisdiction's sovereignty. The possibility of a rebuff outweighed an individual's right to a speedy trial.

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