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Abstract

Security Insurance Group, the Connecticut insurer, sought declaratory relief' alleging that failure by its insured to furnish timely notice of the accident as prescribed by the policy precluded its liability. The insured contended that Maine's notice statute was applicable, requiring only that the insurer receive notice of the action before judgment, and that this requirement was satisfied. Alternatively, the insured contended that even if the Connecticut notice term were held applicable, since there was no contact between the two cars, it was his belief that he was not at fault and thus had no reason to notify his carrier of the accident. The trial judge accepted the insured's alternative contention and held that he had not failed to give notice "as soon as practicable" under the circumstances. This result was buttressed by the fact that the insurer actually learned of the accident during January or February of 1967, when the accident victim's insurance carrier filed a subrogation claim with defendant's carrier. On appeal, the Law Court upheld the insurance company's contention that the Connecticut contract notice provision applied to determine the insured's rights with his insurer, but held that the insured had failed to notify his carrier within a reasonable period of time. The court reached this conclusion by focusing on section 2901 of the Maine Insurance Code, which delimits the applicability of the Code to insurance policies delivered or issued for delivery in Maine. Finding that the Connecticut contract did not fit within this provision, the court ignored the liberal notice provision embodied in section 2904 in rendering its decision. Although the Law Court was confident in its interpretation of intended legislative policy under the Code, it felt compelled to lend support to its opinion by stating that for the legislature to impose its notice requirement on foreign contracts would have "violated constitutional safeguards" because to apply forum law to a foreign contract would have been a denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. It should be apparent that Maine not only had a sufficient interest to have its policy given precedence but that it had the more significant interest. Using the governmental interest analysis suggested by one recent commentator, the focus should be on the issues to determine the imposition of one interest over the other. Maine's interest, aside from the fact of accident within its borders, was defined through its statutes which unequivocally mandated a right in any victim to recover if notice was received by the judgment debtor's carrier prior to judgment. Actual notice which was received long before judgment blunts any hardship Security Insurance Group might claim under the Maine provision. Unfortunately, because the Law Court did not consider all the relevant factors nor fully analyze the notice statute to discern the true legislative intent, it has severely restricted the rights of a Maine citizen to indemnity protection.

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