Abstract
Gordon Stewart was convicted of a felony and sentenced to fifteen to nineteen months in the house of correction and a $2,000 fine, or an additional 2,000 days in lieu thereof. Since he was indigent this represented a total sentence of approximately seven years. Upon petition to the Windsor County Court this original sentence was set aside as being in excess of the twenty-four month statutory maximum. Resentencing was ordered and a different judge sentenced respondent anew to a term of twenty-three to twenty-four months in the state prison with appropriate credit given for time already served. On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court defendant contended that this increase in sentence chilled his right to appeal and was therefore a violation of due process under the Supreme Court's decision in North Carolina v. Pearce. The Vermont court, limiting its consideration of Pearce strictly to the chill analysis, rejected petitioner's contention. The court held that, since the final sentence was within the statutory maximum and less than the total sentence from which relief was sought, there was no increase and thus no chill upon the exercise of his right to appeal. In thus limiting Pearce, however, the Vermont court failed to consider all the implications of that holding. Aside from protecting against any actual chill which might result from the practice involved, Pearce also intended to discourage any governmental action which placed a price on appeal or evidenced judicial vindictiveness. And, although double jeopardy and equal protection may not have been applicable to the particular facts of Pearce, the decision should not be read as rejecting those rationales in all cases dealing with resentencing procedures.
First Page
161
Recommended Citation
Alton C. Stevens,
Stewart v. Smith: A Misapplication of North Carolina v. Pearce,
24
Me. L. Rev.
161
(1972).
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol24/iss1/11