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Abstract

When a criminal defendant appears without a lawyer before a trial court, the trial judge must decide whether to appoint counsel to represent him. The trial judge's decision is one of constitutional magnitude under both the United States and Maine Constitutions, and the decision made in any particular instance affects the integrity of the trial process and the validity of any conviction. The scope of the constitutional right to appointed counsel has lately been the subject of major decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. The United States Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin held that the sixth amendment compels appointment of counsel in all criminal prosecutions of indigent defendants who do not competently waive appointments and who, upon conviction, are actually imprisoned. In Newell v. State, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that under article I, section 6, of the Maine Constitution indigent defendants who do not waive counsel must have counsel appointed where the charges against them carry potential penal sanctions in excess of a $500 fine or six months imprisonment, or both. This Comment examines both Argersinger and Newell and raises the problems that must be resolved in order to fix the scope of the two holdings. The core element of Argersinger is causation—the causal connection between an uncounseled conviction of an indigent and his immediate or eventual incarceration. Argersinger creates an absolute standard based upon an actual penal consequence of conviction. Newell, on the other hand, focuses on potential penal sanctions as a measure of the total penal and collateral consequences of conviction. Although both holdings represent a balancing of the defendant's need for counsel against society's ability reasonably to provide appointed counsel, each court measured the defendant's need by a different standard.

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