Abstract
Before 1965, the defense of contributory negligence was an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery in tort actions in Maine. Under the contributory negligence principle, any degree of fault attributable to the plaintiff defeated his or her claim; the fault of the plaintiff and of the defendant was not compared. In 1965, the Maine Legislature enacted the Comparative Negligence Act in order to eliminate the harshness and inequities of the contributory negligence doctrine. The Act also served to stop juries from using compromise verdicts to reach a fair result. Under the Act, a plaintiff's fault is compared with that of the defendant; the plaintiff may recover damages if the jury finds that he or she was less at fault than the defendant. Thus, unlike the contributory negligence rule, Maine's Comparative Negligence Act permits a negligent plaintiff to recover, but only if the plaintiff is not equally or more at fault than the defendant. Damages under the Maine Act are reduced "to such extent as the jury thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage. In the expanding area of tort litigation, fair and workable principles are essential if the jury and the court are to perform effectively. Although the wording of the Maine Act is unfortunate and needlessly complicated, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (sitting as the Law Court) succeeded in Wing v. Morses an earlier comparative negligence case, in constructing a two-standard, three-step process for jury determination of fault and apportionment of damages. The Wing v. Morse construction of the Comparative Negligence Act provides a fair, predictable, and reviewable approach to comparative negligence and successfully furthers the legislative intent. In Jackson v. Frederick's Motor Inn, however, the Law Court deviated from the Wing analysis. This Note examines the Jackson interpretation of the Act and shows that this interpretation is incorrect and unjust in light of the statutory purpose. The Jackson court failed to apply the Wing procedure properly and has thereby created serious and unjustifiable doubts concerning the vitality of the Maine Comparative Negligence Act.
First Page
207
Recommended Citation
Nancy L. Diesel,
Comparative Negligence in Jackson v. Frederick's Motor Inn: What is Compared?,
34
Me. L. Rev.
207
(1982).
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/9
