Abstract
The power to punish contempt of court is an ancient power justified as inherent and necessary for the effective administration of justice. Because criminal contempts are willful challenges to the power of a court to maintain control over its proceedings, contempts are acts which serve to lessen the dignity and authority of the court. Certainly, the maintenance of decorum in the courtrooms is of paramount importance. Absent the ability to sanction willful disobedience, a court is powerless to enforce its decrees or control its proceedings. Yet it is a power readily open to abuse; application of this power must be strictly scrutinized. Despite the apparent need for the contempt power, it is a power that remains suspect. The need for the court to vindicate its authority is contrary to the constitutional rights of those facing contempt proceedings. Alleged contemners may risk imprisonment without notice or hearing. They may have no right to counsel and their case will not be heard by a jury. In short, contemners may be imprisoned without resort to the procedural guarantees held, in other contexts, to be essential to the due process of law. The traditional justifications for this anomalous result have been varied. Contempt has been considered by some courts an offense unique unto itself, to which constitutional safeguards do not apply. Other courts have viewed contempt as an offense that is criminal in nature but which is outside the scope of constitutional guarantees. Yet the sanctions that the contemners face are identical to those they would face in any other criminal proceeding. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the problems surrounding the law of criminal contempt. The Court has held that when the sanction imposed would guarantee a defendant a jury trial in any other criminal proceeding, the same guarantee must be afforded the contemner. The federal constitutional right to a jury trial is guaranteed, however, only when an offense is "serious." Therefore, the contemners' right to a jury trial attaches only when the contempt is "serious." The Maine Constitution, however, has been interpreted more liberally than the federal constitution on the issue of jury trials. The Law Court has held that the right to a trial by jury extends to all charged with criminal offenses, regardless of severity. In a separate series of cases, the Law Court has recognized the Supreme Court's analysis that contempt is a crime to which the jury trial right may apply. Yet to date, the Law Court has not analyzed the effect of the concept of contempt as a crime against the backdrop of the expansive jury trial guarantees of the Maine Constitution. This Comment examines the logical conclusion stemming from the union of these two principles. Further, the Comment examines methods by which the courts may maintain an orderly flow of justice and, at the same time, may preserve rights guaranteed under the Maine Constitution to the contemner. In Maine, the alleged contemner should have the right to a jury trial.
First Page
407
Recommended Citation
Christopher D. Hardy,
Criminal Contempt in Maine: Constitutionally Protected or Neglected?,
34
Me. L. Rev.
407
(1982).
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/11
