Abstract
In recent years, American courts have used two different standards in informed consent actions to define the scope of a physician's duty to disclose to his patient the risks inherent in a proposed medical procedure—the professional disclosure standard and the material-risk standard. In Woolley v. Henderson, the Maine Law Court expressly adopted the professional disclosure standard. Prior to the Law Court's decision, however, but after the cause of action in Woolley arose, the Maine Legislature enacted the Maine informed consent statute. Justice Glassman's opinion in Woolley expressly declined to construe the statute. The continued relevance of Woolley to similar cases in the future depends upon the construction of this statute. This Note outlines the doctrine of informed consent and evaluates the relevant policy considerations supporting the Law Court's decision. In addition, this Note demonstrates that Woolley has continued vitality for causes of action governed by the informed consent statute.
First Page
311
Recommended Citation
John C. Milazzo,
Informed Consent in Maine: Woolley v. Henderson and the Informed Consent Statute,
34
Me. L. Rev.
311
(1982).
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol34/iss2/8
