State v. Farnham: The Defendant's Exercise of the Right to Stand Trial as Negative Character Evidence

Authors

Richard F. Buckley, University of Maine School of Law

Abstract

A defendant in a criminal case may not receive a more severe sentence because he exercised his sixth amendment right to stand trial. However, determining when a court has more severely sentenced a defendant for exercising his constitutional right to a jury trial is a difficult task. Some argue that a defendant's choice to stand trial is relevant to the sentencing process as character evidence. The decision to stand trial, the argument goes, indicates a defendant's lack of remorse and an unwillingness to take the first step toward redemption by admitting his guilt. Others take the position that consideration in the sentencing process of a defendant's exercise of the right to trial impermissibly burdens both that right and the privilege against self-incrimination. In State v. Farnham, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, took the former position, holding that a sentencing justice may consider the fact that a defendant stood trial in evaluating the defendant's remorse, repentance, and potential for rehabilitation. This Note argues that a defendant's trial decision should not be used as evidence of character because it falls to accomplish its stated goal of accurately assessing character and needlessly diminishes constitutional rights guaranteed by both the United States and Maine Constitutions.

First Page

411

Recommended Citation

Richard F. Buckley, State v. Farnham: The Defendant's Exercise of the Right to Stand Trial as Negative Character Evidence, 37 Me. L. Rev. 411 (1985).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol37/iss2/8