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Abstract

In Tuttle v. Raymond, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, reconsidered the appropriateness of Maine's common law doctrine of punitive damages. Under the doctrine, punitive or exemplary awards are permitted in tort actions, at the factfinder's discretion, for the purpose of deterring wrongful conduct. Prior to Tuttle, a plaintiff raised a claim for such an award if he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was guilty of intentional, wanton, malicious, reckless, or grossly negligent behavior. Because of the doctrine's uncertain justification and vague standards, however, punitive damages had become the subject of mounting criticism, and, although the Maine rule was substantially in accord with the rule in other jurisdictions, the Law Court itself had questioned the doctrine's propriety. Thus, an appeal limited to the issue of the validity of a punitive damages award in Tuttle v. Raymond presented an opportunity for judicial action. After reviewing the history and purpose of punitive damages, the Tuttle court responded not by abandoning the doctrine but by imposing new bounds on its application. In holding that the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with express or implied malice, the court redefined both the standard of proof and the standard of conduct necessary to justify consideration of a punitive damages award. The decision is commendable insofar as it addresses many of the criticisms directed at the doctrine and attempts to draw guidelines where nebulous standards might have allowed unfair and inefficient results. The Tuttle court may have gone too far, however, in redefining the standard of conduct necessary to justify an award of punitive damages; the doctrine's viability was sustained but its vitality was imperiled.

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