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Abstract

The past fifteen years have witnessed the steady growth of both the theory and practice of state constitutional law. Initial inquiry focused on whether state supreme courts should provide their residents more expansive substantive and procedural rights under their state constitutions than required by United States Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Constitution. Given the plethora of state constitutional decisions expanding rights beyond the federally required minimum, or "floor," it is apparent that a large number of state supreme courts have settled the question of whether they will in fact interpret their state constitutions in such a manner. Nevertheless, lingering suspicion remains that state supreme courts utilize their state constitutions only when they disagree with controlling Supreme Court precedent. Critics of independent state constitutional decisionmaking charge that state supreme courts resort to state constitutional provisions only when a particular result is desired. These critics of "result-oriented" state constitutional decisionmaking argue that state supreme courts should articulate principled doctrinal bases for decisions that depart from Supreme Court precedent. In response to the critics of "result-oriented" decisions, courts and commentators have attempted to develop cohesive methods of state constitutional decisionmaking. Current debate has therefore shifted primarily to the appropriate method by which state supreme courts should construe their respective constitutions. Proponents of independent state constitutional decisionmaking, although advocating somewhat different methods, all agree that if state courts utilize a consistent method to address state constitutional claims, a principled body of state constitutional law is more likely to develop. The growth of state constitutional law in Maine has tracked this developmental trend. Several Maine Supreme Judicial Court decisions during the 1970's explicitly interpreted the Maine Constitution to provide greater protection to individual rights than mandated by the United States Constitution. The Maine court, however, did not develop a consistent methodology by which it would address state constitutional law issues. Rather, the court took an ad hoc approach. This situation continued until 1984, when the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, adopted a specific method of state constitutional decisionmaking in State v. Cadman. The method adopted has been termed the "primacy method" of state constitutional decisionmaking. In a nutshell, the primacy method requires a state court first to examine any state constitutional issue raised by a litigant. Only if the litigant's claims fail under the State constitution will an examination of federal constitutional claims be undertaken. The significance of the adoption of this method is twofold. First, it provides clear direction to the bench and bar as to how state constitutional law claims are to be addressed. Second, by choosing this method, the Law Court has articulated a particular and controversial theory of federalism that ensures a primary and active role for the Maine Constitution.

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