•  
  •  
 

Abstract

The Maine Law Court has observed that, "a central function of American courts [is] to protect and relieve the individual from injurious unconstitutional conduct by government officials." Apart from the political process, the judicial process is the only means through which citizens can ensure that government conforms to the law. The courts provide a forum for citizens to challenge the legality of official acts, and serve as a "means of correcting illegal practices of government officials which would otherwise be irreparable." The question of standing is a critical element of the court's task of balancing the individual's right to challenge municipal actions against the state's interest in protecting government officials from harassment by litigation. In Maine, the courts have adopted a rule designed to "insure the preservation and efficient management of . . . essential elements of community life, and at the same time protect public spirited citizens, who may be disposed to serve [the community], from vexatious litigation." Maine courts have relied on the preventive-remedial doctrine to determine taxpayer standing in suits against municipalities, and to limit frivolous or multiple suits against municipal officers. The distinction between preventive and remedial relief "is the heart of a long-established doctrine which governs the standing of [Maine] taxpayers to sue the municipalities in which they reside." The preventive-remedial distinction recognizes the right of taxpayers to apply to the court for preventive relief in the case of threatened unlawful action by municipal officers, while denying standing to plaintiffs seeking remedial relief for a wrong that has already occurred. The doctrine serves as a threshold bar that restricts access to the court system by denying standing to plaintiffs seeking non-preventive relief. Currently, Maine taxpayers have no right to apply for remedial relief after the commission of an illegal municipal act, where the act is one which affects the entire community and not specifically those bringing suit. Taxpayers who allege and prove injury shared by the public at large have standing to seek only preventive relief from actions by municipal officers. Traditionally, "an individual citizen who suffers no particularized injury from a public wrong can not seek relief from the courts; relief vindicating public rights must be sought by . . . the Attorney General of the State of Maine." The Maine Attorney General is thus considered the only proper plaintiff when remedial relief is sought by a taxpayer without particular injury. When "the injury claimed is one shared equally by all the members of the community the action must be brought by the Attorney General . . . as representative of not only the particular Plaintiffs who seek remedial relief bu the entire community." The Attorney General's role in municipal actions has been justified as a means of preventing multiple suits against municipalities, and protecting municipal officers from litigation by dissatisfied taxpayers. Despite the important policy considerations that suppport application of the preventive-remedial rule, the doctrine is not without its critics. Commentators have noted the elusive quality of the preventive-remedial distinction, and the Law Court itself has admitted that the "distinction is no bright line test." Additional criticisms have focused on the doctrine's restrictive effect on taxpayer standing, causing one detractor to "strongly recommend[] that [the state] more generously allow taxpayers and citizens to attack illegal action by their public servants." Recently, Maine's Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae in McCorkle v. Town of Falmouth, advocated a less restrictive approach to taxpayer standing, and argued that the Law Court should entirely abandon its preventive-remedial approach. The Attorney General's criticism of the restrictive preventive-remedial rule is consistent with recent Law Court decisions in which the court questioned the continuing viability of the preventive-remedial doctrine. The Law Court has acknowledged the doctrine's restrictive nature, and implied that limitations on taxpayer standing are no longer appropriate. Although the Law Court has not acted to abolish the doctrine, the court has noted that most of the policy considerations that once supported the preventive-remedial distinction may no longer exist, and has stated that the doctrine may presently "have little more to commend itself than its age.” The acknowledged weaknesses of the preventive-remedial approach to standing suggest that a reevaluation of the preventive-remedial doctrine and its history is appropriate. Accordingly, this Comment reexamines the decisions that have shaped the preventive-remedial doctrine. Using McCorkle v. Town of Falmouth as a springboard, this Comment demonstrates that inconsistent application of the doctrine has reduced it to a vague, unworkable standard, and concludes that the preventive-remedial doctrine has become an inadequate, manipulative tool that should be replaced. Finally, this Comment discusses and recommends specific alternatives to the preventive-remedial doctrine that can accomplish the doctrine's original objectives in a manner that is responsive both to the needs of litigating taxpayers and municipalities.

First Page

137

Download

Share

COinS