Abstract
As medical science and technology progress, the distinction between traditional notions of life and death becomes increasingly blurred. Persons in dire medical conditions, lacking all cognitive and sensory abilities, may now be kept "alive" for indefinite periods of time. In the seminal case of In re Quinlan, a court was first asked whether it was ever legally permissible to withhold or withdraw life-preserving care from a persistently vegetative person. Since In re Quinlan, the courts of many states, including Maine, have confronted this issue. In In re Gardner, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, affirmed a superior court judgment authorizing the withdrawal of life-preserving care from an incompetent hospital patient in a "persistent vegetative state" (PVS). In affirming the judgment, the Law Court held that the incompetent patient had made a prior decision not to be maintained in such a medical condition and that the patient had a legal right to have his decision enforced. Three members of the Law Court dissented, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the patient would want treatment discontinued. Moreover, the dissent argued that the state's interests in preserving life and in preventing suicide outweighed any interests of the patient in having treatment discontinued. The dissent also maintained that life-sustaining care in the form of nutrition and hydration should not be withdrawable in this case. This Note examines the Law Court's analysis in In re Gardner and the standard that it announced in deciding whether to allow the withdrawal of life-sustaining care from a PVS patient. This Note maintains that the Law Court erred in finding that the patient had made an actual prior decision to refuse medical care. The Note also argues that the Law Court's adoption of a personal rights-based analysis was inappropriate. Finally, this Note criticizes the Law Court for its failure to articulate clearly a legal procedure to guide future guardians who seek to withdraw an incompetent's life-preserving care.
First Page
447
Recommended Citation
John K. Veroneau,
In re Gardner: Withdrawing Medical Care From Persistently Vegetative Patients,
41
Me. L. Rev.
447
(1989).
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/9