Abstract
Diversity jurisdiction is an idea whose time has come--and gone. In its present form, it serves its alleged purpose so inconsistently that its benefits are minimal, if they exist at all. And the costs that it imposes are significant. The traditional arguments for and against diversity are well known, but the traditional arguments against it actually understate its disadvantages. Therefore, the purpose of this Article is to construct the arguments against diversity that traditional scholarship has left underdeveloped. These include the proposition that today, in the twenty-first century, there are more reasons than ever to authorize diversity jurisdiction more selectively. The arguments may not persuade every reader toward abolition of diversity, which arguably would be a drastic change, but perhaps they justify revision and retrenchment.
First Page
1
Recommended Citation
David Crump,
The Case For Restricting Diversity Jurisdiction: The Undeveloped Arguments, From the Race to the Bottom to the Substitution Effect,
62
Me. L. Rev.
1
(2010).
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol62/iss1/2