In State v. McPartland, Mallory McPartland challenged her conviction for operating under the influence, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained in a sobriety checkpoint that led to her arrest. In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, sitting as the Law Court, affirmed the judgment against McPartland. This case centered on a matter of first impression in Maine—what constitutional standard should a law enforcement officer apply when determining whether a motorist, lawfully stopped at a sobriety checkpoint, may be kept for secondary screening? The majority concluded, and the dissent agreed, that the appropriate standard is that a law enforcement officer must have a “reasonable articulable suspicion” that a motorist is driving under the influence in order to refer the motorist for secondary screening. The difference between the dissent and the majority, however, was that the dissent did not believe that the standard was met in
Holly L. Doherty,
State v. McPartland: Applying the Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Standard to Secondary Screening Referrals at Sobriety Checkpoints in Maine and the Proper Role of the Law Court in Reviewing a Trial Court's Application of This Standard,
Me. L. Rev.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/14